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Recognising Choice 
A Study of the Changing Politics of the Common Agricultural Policy 
through an Analysis of the MacSharry Reform Debate in Ireland and 
the Netherlands 
Hilkka Vihinen 
Abstract. The politics of the European Union Common Agricultural Policy is 
investigated on the basis of the concept of politics as action, through an assessment 
of the construction of the political dimension in agricultural policy. This approach 
maintains that the politics of a policy reveals itself in the way choices are 
recognised, the way alternatives are articulated and what kinds of arguments are 
used. Shifts in emphasis in the CAP are examined, and the work also aims at 
contributing to an understanding of European integration and the role that the 
common policy for agriculture has in this. 
The work includes a case study on the public debate in two member states, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, conceming the MacSharry reform, decided upon in 
1992. An analysis of the actors, themes and argumentation shows what interpreta-
tions and emphases were possible and how these were reflected in the different 
constructions of agriculture and of the European reality. 
The work concludes by envisaging a change in paradigm from an income policy 
for farmers towards a contract between society and agriculture. This would entail 
an increase in the number of relevant actors, and a shift in power among the 
existing ones. In addition, a broadening of politicised themes is discussed. 
Index words: politics of agricultural policy, EU, Common Agricultural Policy, 
MacSharry reform, European integration 
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1. Introduction 
It is hard to write on the European Union without having to touch upon the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). For decades, this has been in monetary 
terms the largest and most developed common policy sector in the EU'. Its 
creation was a prominent political achievement in its time, and since other fields 
of common policy were slow to pro gress, it soon carved a reputation for itself as 
the flagship of European integration. 
Set in motion in 1968, the CAP has nevertheless not turned out to be the 
success it was originally designed to be. Although it has achieved some of its 
objectives, it has also been subject to strong criticism. Most critical observers 
call into question why such a policy was required at ali, and why it still exists, 
given ali the modernisation that has taken place in agriculture and in society. 
Others blame it for causing inequality among farmers and between regions, and 
in general for its inefficiency, costs, fraud and lack of transparency. 
On the one hand, the CAP has been of considerable symbolic value as the 
herald of an integrated Europe, of a community with a shared heritage and 
common interests. But on the other hand, it has from the outset been at the heart 
of almost ali EU disputes, both internal and external. 
Although the contribution of agriculture is by no means very significant any 
longer in the terms of employment or incomes in the European Union, agricultural 
production still has direct and concrete effects on the landscape, the environment 
and public health, and consequently it continues to be an object of public 
interest and state intervention. Moreover, even the ordinary person in the street 
who may be rather inactive in day-to-day politics will tend to have strong 
personal opinions when it comes to agricultural policy. Examination of the CAP 
is not only a matter of its measures as such (price regimes, direct income aid, 
quotas etc.), but it is also significant for European politics in general, since it 
gives concrete form to the relation between the European Union and its citizens. 
The European Union has grown up around the Common Agricultural Policy 
and changed during the decades. It started as an economic community of six 
countries centred on the principle of free movement of persons, services and 
capital, and it is at present a political union formed by 15 member states with a 
further 12 countries negotiating over accession. This political union exercises 
close cooperation in many policy areas, such as economic and monetary 
integration policy, which is soon to lead to a single currency, foreign and 
1  The coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993 marked the start of a new 
era conceming the names given to European institutions. To avoid too much confusion when 
discussing times both before and after Maastricht, the designation "European Union" or "EU" 
will be used throughout, even when referring to the pre-Maastricht period. Only in direct 
quotations will "EC" be used if this was the original form. 
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security policy, environmental policy, transport policy, energy policy, enterprise 
policy and research and development policy. At the same time its institutions 
have been strengthened. Consequently, the general setting for the CAP has 
transformed fundamentally. Also, the CAP itself was transformed under Agenda 
2000, published in 1997, when rural development policy was established as its 
second pillar. 
1.1. Topic of this research 
Changes in the global economy, technological transformation and the political 
restructuring of Europe can hardly have left agriculture intact. In fact, agriculture 
is the arena in which these changes have been translated into a common policy. 
From this perspective, the general objective of this research is to analyse the 
Common Agricultural Policy by focussing on the structure of discourse 
concerning it over this period of change. More precisely, we will examine how 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy was politicised in connection with its 
major reform in 1992, the MacSharry reform. The reform debate is used here as 
an example of talking "in terms of agricultural politics". The intention is not to 
explain how certain decisions were made, but to investigate the political 
deliberations embedded in agricultural policy. 
In the terms of political science, this is a study of the politics of a policy, 
taking the CAP as an example. Moreover, the debate on the MacSharry reform 
serves as a specification of it, constituted in a certain political constellation and 
for a limited, although undefined period of time. "Policy" is understood here as 
a specific form of politics, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 2.5. 
As for agricultural policy, the changes in the intellectual horizon of the CAP 
will be an object of special interest here. How has the parlance of agricultural 
policy changed? What is the relationship of this change to the general context of 
the European Union on the one hand, and to changes in food production on the 
other? Ts the European way of thinking about agriculture changing qualitatively, 
and what are the possible obstacles to change? 
In the first place, this thesis will deal with the sensitivity of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, its openness and ability to transform itself. It will underline 
the almost self-evident fact, we often ignore in our haste, that both the choice of 
problems in the society and their solutions are man-made. Hence it is essential 
to scrutinise the frameworks of political questions as well as the criteria for the 
answers and the manner of their formulation. According to the approach to 
politics adopted here, the politics of a policy will be revealed in the way the 
choice is recognised, how the alternatives are articulated and in what kinds of 
arguments are used. 
As it is obvious that times of change bring the basic principles closer to the 
surface of the debate, the inquiry is focussed on the main, recent reform of the 
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CAP, namely the MacSharry reform, finally decided upon in 1992. Public 
debates in two EU member states, Ireland and the Netherlands, during the 
preparation phase for this reform are analysed thoroughly. The gradual opening 
of this political arena is described, accompanied by the change in the mutual 
order of agricultural policy issues, with new actor structures and new arguments. 
It is important to notice, however, that this examination does not aim at explaining 
the impact of that debate on the CAP. 
In the second place, this study aims at obtaining a better insight into the 
politics of the CAP, which can allow evaluation of the broader process of 
European integration. Is there a common perception of European Union 
agriculture? Whose domain is it, or more generally, who commands the rural 
space in European policy making? What does the geopolitics of the EU look like 
from inside the Common Agricultural Policy? The answers to these questions 
can inform us about the nature of European integration, and especially about 
communication between the member states in the decision-making process. 
1.2. Outline of the research 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical setting 
for the work. The relevant schools of thought in agricultural economics and 
political science will first be reviewed with respect to interpreting the political 
dimension of agricultural policy. After that, the theoretical framework ofpolitics 
as an action will be presented to give direction to the investigation. The case 
study, its selection and delitnitation and the methods applied will be presented 
in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 examines the CAP as a policy by reviewing the development of 
political issues in it since the late 1950's. Special attention is paid to the 
objectives of the policy and to their evolution in subsequent reforms. Before the 
analysis of the case study, Chapter 5 introduces the reader to the case countries, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, especially to their political settings and agriculture. 
Chapters 6-8 provide a detailed analysis of the public debate in the two 
countries during the preparation phase of the MacSharry reform, from December 
1990 until July 1992. Chapter 6 consists of an analysis of the actor structure: 
who were the participants in the debate and what was their mutual order, and 
Chapter 7 of the thematic analysis, that is: what is being discussed, which 
themes are important and which ones are dismissed. Chapter 8 analyses the 
argument structure: how the actors tried to convince and persuade their audiences. 
Chapter 9 offers a concluding interpretation of the political dimension of the 
CAP and of its politics as a part of European integration as a whole. The final 
conclusion draws general themes from the findings and from the present situation 
which may be relevant to the future development of the CAP. Are there any 
qualitative novelties, new ways of thinking about the role and connections of 
13 
agriculture vis-å-vis territory, rurality, European geopolitics, the relationship of 
human beings to nature, global food production or trade? Could the politicisation 
of production technology, for example, challenge the traditional income policy 
— based politics? The concluding discussion aims at placing the Common 
Agricultural Politics in the general context of European political integration and 
new challenges facing food production. 
14 
2. Theory: Politics of a policy 
2.1. Introduction 
This thesis is an inquiry into the political dimension of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, into its politics. For this purpose, the concept of politics as an action will 
be introduced as a theoretical approach which will be applied to the empirical 
analysis. 
Before that, we will first briefly review the mainstream approaches to 
interpreting the politics of agricultural policy in agricultural economics and 
political science. Judging from the variety of policy combinations and theories 
of agricultural economics that are currently flourishing, there is apparently more 
than one way of conceiving of agriculture as a part of the economy or of society. 
Similarly, there is little unanimity about the values and goals connected with 
agriculture. This is basically what agricultural politics is about: what is the role, 
meaning, position and function of agriculture in modern societies, and what are 
the most suitable policy measures for achieving the preferred state of affairs. 
The review below does not intend to be an exhaustive account of ali approaches, 
but hopes to give a general idea of how the political dimension in agricultural 
policy has conventionally been understood. 
2.2. Agricultural politics in agricultural economics 
Agricultural economics is applied economics concerned with 'how farmers 
behave and whether their behaviour is good for them or for anybody else, 
qualitatively speaking' (McCloskey 1994, 113-114). Contemporary agricultural 
economics can be divided into two major schools of thought: radical (Marxist) 
economics and neo-classical economics.2 There are different perspectives on 
policy formation within neo-classical economics, which illustrate the extremes 
in the understanding of politics in agricultural policy: the social welfare 
maximisation perspective (also called the rational choice theory) and the (new) 
political economy perspective. The former is currently the dominant mode for 
research purposes. 
2.2.1. Social welfare maximisation perspective 
Neo-classical economics is basically a resource allocation theory. It stresses 
profit or utility maximisation and emphasises the role of price mechanisms in 
2 For an overview of the perspectives on agricultural policy fommtion provided by agricultural 
economics, see van der Zee 1997, 7-119. 
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bringing about resource adjustment, given changing consumption or production 
conditions. Moreover, neo-classicism operates with concepts of optimality in 
which delicate marginal adjustments are involved. Neo-classical economics 
entails three basic assumptions: that agents behave rationally (rational choice), 
that individuals' preferences are stable and that interaction tends towards an 
equilibrium. Although the notion of equilibrium is central to the neo-classical 
theory, many corrections have been made to the "classical" theory in order to 
cope with real-world phenomena: market failures, externalities, indivisibilities, 
group wants, non-marketable benefits and costs or monopolistic costs, just to 
mention a few. 
The need for state intervention in agriculture has widely been connected with 
the obstacles to resource mobility, which keep the sector chronically out of 
equilibrium both internally and with the rest of the economy (Brandow 1977, 
237). In the farm problem view, introduced by Theodor Schultz (1945) and 
widely accepted by agricultural economists, the structural characteristics of the 
production and consumption of agricultural commodities3 cause the economic 
development of the agricultural sector to differ from that of the rest of the 
economy. 
The welfare maximisation4 perspective broadens the farm problem view by 
including externality issues in order to explain and correct market failures5. 
Imperfect competition is an important argument for government interference, 
but this view also notes the absence of certain markets, which also calls for 
government intervention. In this perspective, the role of government is to correct 
market failures and to redistribute incomes. The government is perceived 
primarily as a managing and complementing agent, a kind of benevolent dictator. 
As welfare economics starts out from the premise that the government knows 
what is best for society from the social welfare point of view and chooses policy 
instruments accordingly, this model does not require information on the 
functioning of the political process or problematization of it. 
3 Characterised by fixed and price inelastic production, production processes dependent on 
biological processes and the weather, inelastic demand, a time lag between the production 
decision and the decision to market the agricultural produce, which causes the market to 
behave cyclically (known as the cobweb theorem), and the tendency of agricultural supply to 
grow faster than the demand for food, resulting in a decline in farm income. 
4 The welfare maximisation perspective originates from the work of Pigou (1932), which focusses 
on the reasons why the market fails to allocate and distribute resources and suggests government 
interference in the private economy in a policy-specific manner. For a review on the social 
welfare maximisation approach to agricultural policies, see Gardner (1987). 
5 Market failures occur if competition is not perfect, if there is not a full set of markets, and/or if 
economic agents do not have perfect information. Public goods and externality explanations 
are especially used to describe imperfect competition situations in agriculture. See Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980). 
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The social welfare maximisation approach has been widely used to study 
agricultural policy. Its strength lies essentially in explaining the functioning and 
particularities of agricultural markets. As for explaining politics, it regards 
agricultural policy as a deliberate, purposeful response to market failures by a 
benevolent government, which has superior information as compared with other 
agents (van der Zee 1997, 3, 17). Following the general premises of neo-classical 
economics in general, benefit maximisation and the concept of equilibrium 
have been the key concepts in the resulting research. 
Agricultural policy studies following the welfare maximisation perspective 
usually limit the type and number of agents to three large aggregates: producers, 
consumers and the government. The government is understood to be a rational 
economic agent which complements the actions of the others. Policy formulation 
is in turn assumed to be the responsibility of the government. 
In the welfare maximisation perspective, political considerations are 
customarily taken as given from outside and kept as a separate, non-formal 
subject of analysis. Political decision-taking is not in focus, since the decisions 
are expected to be taken rationally, as the appropriate arguments for attaining 
policy aims are given. In this situation the political action is that of a tending 
physician. Maximising social welfare is the given target, and policy is a means 
for achieving it. 
As for understanding politics, it can be concluded that the welfare 
maximisation perspective has provided arguments for agricultural policy, but its 
own understanding of politics is unproblematic: it takes the aims as given, 
expecting that someone knows what is best for society and that well-defined 
goals must exist somewhere. Under these premises, politics is only an instrument 
for reaching given goals. 
2.2.2 Political economy approach 
The (new) political economy perspective6 is essentially a reaction to the social 
welfare maximisation tradition. It rejects the idea of an omniscient, benevolent 
government and calls into question the assumption of correcting market 
imperfections in a perfect and costless manner (van der Zee 1997, 23). 
According to this approach, policy is formulated in a political environment 
with more than one agent and there may be opposing or conflicting interests 
within the government. Government consists of a number of legislative and 
executive bodies with goals of their own. In contrast to the social welfare 
maximisation approach, the political economy school emphasises the rational 
and self-interested behaviour of agents, especially politicians, voters, interest 
6 Known also as the "public choice theory". 
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organisations and bureaucrats. Hence, political economy analyses focus on the 
allocation and distribution of public resources in the political market and 
emphasise that policy formation is the result of self-interest motivated behaviour.7 
Mueller (1989, 1) defines political economy as "the economic study of 
nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political 
science". In this perspective, political decisions can be explained by resorting to 
the rational self-interest of the many participating individuals. This is a major 
difference relative to the single actor model in the welfare maximisation approach. 
In political economy studies, individuals are assumed to he well aware of 
their (fixed sets of) preferences and to maximise their utility subject to certain 
constraints. For example, politicians try to maximise their political support, 
lobbies the benefit of their members and voters their individual welfare. These 
agents try to maximise egoistic utility, although subject to constraints. Moreover, 
this approach takes into account the fact that organisations which are originally 
formed in order to promote the interests of their individual members will also 
develop interests of their own, related to but not always identical to those of the 
members. Similarly, government agencies have their organisational interests, 
such those of the civil servants who are keen on promotion. 
The idea of preferences is central. They are assumed to he fixed exogenously 
and to he stable. This means, however, that not much attention is paid to the 
source of these preferences, or to the extent to which they may he modified in 
the light of reflection and argument (Weale 1992, 63). Interaction between 
actors is assumed to tend towards equilibrium, and collective entities (such as 
firms, parties, or bureaucracies) are treated as unitary agents for the purpose of 
analysis. Political decision-makers are modelled as actors with only a single 
maximising course of action open to them (Dunleavy 1991, 1-10). 
In political economy studies on agricultural policy, government behaviour is 
the explicit object of analysis. In particular, the focus is on the determinants of 
agricultural policy. Why do agricultural policies in industrialised market 
economies take the form of farm support, and why are policy instruments 
usually indirect and non-transparent by nature (van der Zee 1997, 264)? 
This approach sees agricultural policy as a result of the way in which the 
preferences of rational political actors are combined in the political process. 
Such analyses of political formation view the political process as a matter of 
7 Political economy started with the work of Downs (1957) on voter and politician behaviour, 
and was followed by the theories of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) on supply and demand in 
government policies, the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971), Olson's work on pressure 
groups (1965, 1982), the theory of rent-seeking (Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974) and Directly 
Unproductive Profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati 1980, 1982), and Stigler's (1971) and 
Peltzman's (1976) theory of regulation. For an overview of the development of the political 
economy field, see Swinnen and van der Zee (1993), and van der Zee (1997, 23-43). 
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market exchange, in which policies are the supply of political goods. Models (of 
voting, interest groups or bureaucracies) are used to describe, explain and 
predict agricultural policy. Similarly, policy issues are compared in terms of 
their costs and benefits. 
In the political economy tradition, politics is explained in economic terms 
(Ware 1979, 5). Political action is reduced to rational interest-motivated action, 
i.e. the social is reduced to the individual. Moreover, the activity of a group is 
expected to be the sum of the individual members' rational interests. Politics 
thus resembles a game among rational agents, a game that can be formalised and 
preferably modelled. 
When the assumptions of perfect information, exogenously fixed preferences, 
unitary supply-side actors and decision-makers with single maximising courses 
of action are translated into political contexts, some real-world difficulties arise. 
Dunleavy (1991, 249), for example, questions a number of requirements of the 
political economy tradition: "People may not have determinant preferences on 
most political issues; may not rank political preferences (for example, because 
there is no common numeraire like money in economic markets); may operate 
with intransitive preference orderings, may be easily satiated and hence only 
satisfice in their political `consumption' and may behave altruistically in important 
respects." 
In the tradition of neo-classical economics, the main problem in agricultural 
policy research has to do with the methodology. There is no flexible, all-
inclusive and testable model to explain agricultural policy developments 
empirically at ali levels (van der Zee 1997). For a model to be manageable, it 
can never map ali the important aspects of reality8. Even with a good policy 
model one has to be humble, since model outputs are not "hard" scientific facts 
but rather tools for working towards a better understanding. In policy studies, 
models are just evidence to be used in an argument together with other data and 
information (Majone 1989, 11). Evidence refers here to "... information selected 
from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in the argument in 
order to persuade a particular audience of the truth or falsity of a statement" 
(ibid., 10). This is, of course, more or less the practice in ali social sciences. The 
particular problems with agricultural policy research have to do with the attempt 
to formalise at the cost of empirical correspondence and with ruling out those 
arguments that do not fit into the model (McCloskey 1990, 1129). 
The literature on economic research into agricultural policy pays attention to 
the fact that empiricism has been neglected. According to Silvis (1994), 
assumptions about the characteristics of people, things and their interrelationships 
do not agree sufficiently well with reality. Another fi-equently mentioned problem 
8  On problems with respect to explaining and predicting aggregate phenomena, see Brandes 
(1989). 
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is the exclusive exaltation of sophisticated (econometric) methods — in particular 
the use of regression analysis — while ignoring data and more problem-oriented 
subjects (Paarlberg 1963, Bonnen 1989, Pasour 1993). In the words of McCloskey 
(1990, 1126): "Regression analysis seems to have a tighter hold on the empirical 
imagination in agricultural economics than it has in other applied fields ." 
The main problem from the political point of view is whether the political 
setting can, after ali, he seen as an extension of the economic market. Politics 
comprises choices about issues that are often remote from people's everyday 
experiences. Moreover, political choices are made in collective processes that 
are radically different from economic markets, where individual actors are 
expected to make rational decisions.9 
For example, if we dwell somewhat on the maximising principle, a profound 
problem arises. On the one hand, in the presence of uncertainty, incomplete 
information, complexities and ambiguity, it is questionable whether we can base 
any explanations on the premise of maximising behaviour. On the other hand, 
any pattern of individual behaviour can, if one wants, he classified as utility 
maximisation.1° Some ambitious attempts have been made to remove the 
restrictions that methodological individualism has imposed on the political 
economy approach, e.g. by including factors such as justice, solidarity or 
ideologies in benefit functions (Thijssen 1986). 
Michel Petit (1985) is one of the public choice researchers who are inclined 
to emphasise political processes more than the motives of individual actors. He 
views agricultural policy as an outcome of dynamic processes, driven by conflicts 
of interest, which are regulated through political institutions. For him, political 
debate and negotiations are important elements. In the long run, economic 
forces change the interests at stake and affect their relative weight, but even 
when broadened in this way, the analysis leaves the political process unstructured 
and isolated from the interplay of social and ideological factors, which often go 
far beyond the agricultural sphere as a productive sector. 
Moyer and Josling (1990) modified Petit's model of a dynamic process of 
agricultural policy-making, ending up with an approach combining elements of 
rational choice, public choice and organisational and behavioural models. Their 
aim was to make political bargaining visible. Jaap Frouws (1991), a political 
sociologist himself, criticised Moyer and Josling for arriving at an extensive 
model which brings more and more factors and actors to the description of the 
policy process, but leaves the weightings and interrelations of the numerous 
inputs unclear. According to Frouws (1991, 270-272), the crucial problems with 
this approach are its failure to include the role of the state as a source of 
9  On these restrictive premises in public choice theories, see Dunleavy (1991, 4). 
10  On attempts to abandon the utility maximisation principle, see Brandes (1989), Kornai (1971) 
and Day (1984). 
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economic, political and ideological power, and its inability to see the actions of 
the different agents as a reproduction of the social structure — of social practices 
that determine the dynamics of power relations and maintain power structures. 
For the time being we can conclude that the neo-classical agricultural 
economics approaches view agricultural politics as an instrument intended for 
superior purposes, namely, for benefit maximisation or self-interest. This 
instrumentalist view of the role of politicsi 1 is characteristically couched in 
means-end terms. It also reveals a highly policy-oriented view of politics in 
which there are certain "values" and "criteria" which politics as an activity 
ought to be oriented to serve. These criteria are used to justify the claims of 
politics, and the problem that arises is one of balance. In addition, the social 
welfare maximisation perspective takes the state as the only proper policy agent, 
whereas the political economy approach explicitly dissociates itself from this 
view. The instrumentalist view of politics understands it as the fabrication of an 
artefact and not as an activity in its own right (Palonen 2001, 130). 
2.2.3. Marxist agricultural economics 
Although the Marxist approach has not been widely used in the study of 
agricultural economics in the developed westem countries, it did gain a foothold 
in France, especially from the 1960's onwards. Like the political economy 
approach, it was a reaction to the shortcomings of neo-classical economics, and 
particularly to its pro ductivist interpretation of agriculture. 
At the core of the positive neo-classical theory of economy lies the idea that 
economic growth is possible because of an increase in productivity, which in 
turn is a result of both technical progress and mobility of the factors of production. 
In this view, industrialisation transforms agriculture in a similar manner to other 
sectors of the economy. According to Petit (1982, 330), French agricultural 
economists became disillusioned with economic growth as the only goal of the 
policy, and with its negative consequences. 
The Marxist agricultural economists have argued firstly that farm structures 
did not adjust and lead to the incomes in agriculture that factor mobility and 
technical progress should have implied according to the productivist doctrine of 
neo-classical economics. Secondly, the development towards industrialised 
production and contractual arrangements did not proceed other than in the pork 
and poultry production sectors. Thirdly, because the agricultural economics 
version of neo-classical economics presented factor mobility as a necessity, as 
an economic force which cannot he opposed, and advised policy makers to 
11  The terms proposed by Kari Palonen (1999, 20-21) for classifying views on politics are used 
here: politics as an instrument, as a necessity and as a freedom. 
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facilitate this transformation, Marxists also blamed the productivist approach 
for the negative consequences of these policies. Incomes in agriculture remained 
lower than in other sectors, farmers were losing their countervailing power vis-
å-vis agribusinesses as their cooperatives were advised to grow larger and 
specialise, so that power had to be transferred to technocrats (Petit 1982, 331). 
If attention is paid to economic growth only, argued the Marxists, too many 
questions regarding the ultimate objectives of society were left aside. From their 
point of view, the price paid for economic growth was not acceptable. 
Marxist agricultural economics starts with the family farm, attempting to 
understand its functioning both as a production unit and as a consumption unit. 
From this point of view, the behaviour of a farmer is no less rational than that of 
any other economic agent. It also tries to cover analytically ali the diversity of 
farmers' situations, aspirations and objectives. In so doing, its main interest, 
according to Petit (1982, 333), is the global interpretation of ali the changes 
affecting agriculture. As its basis lies in dialectical materialism, it is prone to 
emphasise conflicts among the social classes and among different groups of 
farmers. Here the Marxist approach draws attention to the fact omitted in the 
mainstream agricultural economics, which concentrates on price and income 
problems, structural policies, the role of technical progress, agricultural trade 
etc., that these issues always have a social conflict dimension. On the other 
hand, the neglecting of resource allocation problems is a severe shortcoming of 
the Marxist approach itself. 
The most important contribution of the Marxist approach has to do with its 
epistemological criticism of the emphasis on quantitative methods in mainstream 
agricultural economics. According to Petit (1982, 336), these methods reflect 
"..an economic theory of partial phenomena, i.e. an a-systemic, a-historical and 
a-political view of economic phenomena". The Marxist approach is more inclined 
to study an agricultural problem in its larger historical, social, economic and 
political setting. 
To conclude, on the basis of what can be said about the French school of 
Marxist agricultural economics, politics in this approach has to do with structural 
power, in particular that between conflicting classes. Class analysis is the basis 
from which to understand politics. But even here politics is understood 
instrumentally, as the organised power of one class for oppressing another. 
2.3. Agricultural politics in political science 
Although the work of political scientists on agricultural policy has been, according 
to one political economist (Posner 1974, 341), "almost entirely devoid of theory", 
it is still worth reviewing. This review is not meant to be exhaustive, but is 
intended, as above, to give an idea of how the politics of agricultural policy has 
been dealt with, now in political science. 
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Three traditions can be seen as relevant to the present research: pluralism, 
corporatism and policy network analysis. One factor that ali these approaches 
have in common is that they emphasise relations between govemment and 
interest groups. Furthermore, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive but 
illuminate different characteristics of agricultural policy. 
2.3.1. Pluralism 
According to a textbook definition (Heywood 1997, 76), pluralism — also widely 
referred to as empirical democratic theory (Held 1997, 199) — is a theory of 
political power. As a theory of society and politics12 it starts by acknowledging 
the existence of multiple groups in society and maintains that the "group" is the 
central unit of the social order. This is in a way a reaction against institutionalism 
in political science. 
For the pluralists, groups are a structural source of stability and the central 
expression of democracy. To a certain degree, pluralism shares with economics 
the notion of politics as a self-interested realm13. In the words of Held (1997, 201), 
pluralists "tended to take for granted the view that, just as economics is concemed 
with individuals maximising their personal interests, politics is concemed with 
sets of individuals maximising their common interests". The essential aspect 
here is that competition and participation take place among groups, not among 
individuals. 
In general, pluralism offers the image of a complex political process with 
multiple participants and uncertain outcomes (Jordan 1990, 295-296). Power is 
understood to be fiugmented and decentralised in existing Westem systems, and 
pressure is exerted on the state not only by groups but also by parties, the 
electorate and the bureaucracy. Some pluralists assume the state itself to be 
neutral, essentially just reflecting the forces within society, but most consider 
govemment agencies to act as pressure groups themselves alongside non-
govemmental groups.14 
12  The theory of pluralism has evolved from the early works of Robert Dahl (1961), David 
Truman (1951), II. Eckstein (1960) and C.E. Lindblom (1965). The discussion here concems 
the mainstream of pluralism, i.e. interest-group pluralism. To be precise, pluralism is not only 
an account of social groups, as some writers focus on it as a moral or epistemological theory. 
See McLennan (1995) for an account of the variety of kinds of pluralism that exist. 
13  This understanding of politics has been criticised, particularly by democratic theorists who 
argue that political participation transforms self-interest into a concem with the public good 
(Barber 1984). Thus politics proper transcends groups. This view on politics differs somewhat 
from the mainstream, instrumentalist pluralism. There are remnants here of a certain pseudo-
Aristotelian tone in its orientation to a given "good life", which Palonen (1999, 20-22) would 
call a functionalistic or necessitarian view on politics. 
Early pluralist studies in particular have been criticised for their uncritical, assumedly "empirical" 
approach to existing Western democracies and for their assumption of a neutral state. 
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The main function of an interest group, according to pluralism, is to aggregate 
the interests of its members and represent them to the policy-makers. Pluralists 
thus believe in the existence of a certain consensus within which political 
groups operate, and to which groups that do not accept these mies will not he 
granted access. 
Pluralism also implies that certain checks exist to ensure that power is not 
concentrated in the hands ofjust a few groups. One interest group is expected to 
he matched by an alternative counter-group. If no such counter-group can organise 
itself, a potential group will still exist, the interests of which will have to he 
taken into consideration by the govemment (Smith 1990b). For the pluralist, 
there is no single elite which makes decisions and benefits from them ali. 
The method adopted by pluralists is to analyse who exercises power by 
looking at the process of decision-making: who was involved and who prevailed. 
In practice, pluralist-oriented researchers have mainly focussed on case studies. 
Agricultural policy has offered a good example for the empirical observation 
of interest group behaviour. A pluralist study of agricultural policy focuses on 
various interest groups, such as the farmers' organisation or the food industry 
and environmental groups, and emphasises the lobbying capabilities of these 
groups, their resources and the ideas and views that they contribute to the 
policy-making process, and would most probably also include the response of 
the govemment as an important indicative factor (Winter 1996, 16). 
In a classical pluralist study of agricultural policy, Self and Storing (1962) 
argued that there was widespread agreement on agricultural policy in Great 
Britain, as a result of which the political process had become apolitical. In 
pluralist terms this was a sign of apparent consensus. Wilson (1977, 45), in Mm, 
used agricultural policy as an example of "Whitehall pluralism", where the 
close relationship of the farmers' union to the Ministry of Agriculture had not 
destroyed pluralist decision-making, because of the countervailing power in the 
discussion of agricultural policy which exists in the Cabinet and in cabinet 
committees. Hence it was argued that a system of plurality of interests prevents 
clientelist relationships from leading to a monopoly in a certain policy area. 
The main shortcoming often referred to in pluralism is the overemphasis on 
the role of groups in the political process. Pluralism implies that the existence of 
numerous interest groups guarantees that power is widely dispersed among 
these groups — though not necessarily equally. Institutional and ideological 
factors can profoundly affect the availability and exercise of power, however 
(Smith 1993, 25). 
Thanks to the criticism that has been put forward, new perspectives have 
developed in pluralism, which now acknowledge that govemment-interest 
relations are often institutionalised and that certain groups are excluded. Policy 
communities and issue networks have been added as crucial concepts (Smith 
1990b, 311-315). Policy communities imply that certain interest groups may 
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have structured relationships with departments while certain other groups and 
issues can be excluded from the policy arena. However, even in the case of a 
closed policy community, as in agricultural policy, the achievements of farmers' 
unions are considered incomplete and unpredictable (Jordan and Richardson 
1987, 111-112). In the course of time, policy communities have been associated 
not only with pluralist studies, but also with corporatist positions. 
Neopluralism, in turn, starts with the assumption that business is privileged. 
Hence, certain groups may have particular advantages as a result of their economic 
power, which allows political influence to he expressed through structural 
relationships rather than observable activity. In a market system, business takes 
many decisions instead of the govemment. In addition, business is assumed to 
exercise an unequal influence on which issues reach the political agenda and on 
what altematives are seriously considered (Smith 1990b, 315-319). 
2.3.2. Corporatism 
Although neopluralism introduced the issue of structural power to pluralism, its 
importance is far greater in another political science approach, corporatism15. 
Like pluralism, corporatism is concemed with explaining the distribution of 
power in western democracies. In contrast to pluralism, however, it emphasises 
formalised relations between a limited number of closed and hierachically 
structured interest groups and the state. Pivotal to corporatism is "the direct link 
with regulation, whereby representative groups assume some responsibility for 
the self-regulation and disciplining of their own constituency in retum for the 
privileges afforded by their relatively close relationship with govemment" (Cox 
et al. 1986, 475-476). 
To cite Lijphart (1999, 171), "[t]he typical interest group system of 
majoritarian democracy is a competitive and uncoordinated pluralism of 
independent groups, in contrast with the coordinated and compromise-oriented 
system of corporatism that is typical of the consensus model". In exchange for 
influence on the content of politics, interest groups commit themselves to the 
decisions made and often play an active role in the implementation of these 
decisions. In this sense, corporatism also emphasises the significance of interest 
groups mediating between the state and their own group members. 
Corporatism — often with such prefixes as "neo", "liberal", "democratic" or 
"societal" to distinguish it from neo-fascist ideas of the corporate state — became 
a much used approach in political science from the late 1970's onwards. It was 
applied especially to comparative studies of westem (European) states and 
economies, trying to explain why corporatist economies were believed to have 
15 For an overview of corporatism, see Williamson.(1989). 
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performed in superior ways (e.g. Katzenstein 1985, Lijphart and Crepaz 1991, 
Paloheimo 1984, Pekkarinen et al. 1992). 
Actually, a controversy prevails over the theoretical status of corporatism. 
Some claim that it does not constitute a distinctive entity, but is rather an 
extended method of (corporate) pluralism16 (e.g. Jordan 1984, 152), whereas for 
others (esp. Schmitter 1974, 1979, 1981, 1985) it offers a new theoretical 
paradigm for government-interest group studies. Ultimately, the difference has 
to do with the extent to which organised groups are incorporated within the 
policy arena (Winter 1996, 22). In practice this difference is perhaps less 
categorical, since some researchers are inclined to see corporatist and pluralist 
arrangements as taking place side by side, or forming mixed combinations. 
Cawson and Saunders (1983) argue that corporatist arrangements develop over 
issues concerned with production and that pluralist politics dominate over 
consumption issues. 
Despite general criticism of its theoretical grounds and empirical applicability 
(e.g. Almond 1983, Wilson 1983, Jordan 1984, Therborn 1992), the 
(neo)corporatist approach is still used, although it is now fi-equently given a 
more modest content, such as managing national economies in an integrated 
way (Siaroff 1999), or using it as a "middle-range theory" (see Grant 1985, 
Winter 1984, Frouws 1993). 
Corporatism studies on agricultural policy have served as examples of 
sectorized corporatism (Bolin et al. 1984, Micheletti 1987, Anderson 1987, 
Keeler 1987, 1996, Frouws 1993), aiming at showing that there a close interest 
group — department relation prevails in agricultural policy, a specific system of 
interest articulation and policy formation, which differs from other government 
policies. 
Policy formation has been seen as a result of an institutionalised relationship 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and the core of agricultural interests: national 
farmers' associations, organisations of agricultural cooperatives and the 
agricultural trade and food industry associations. In some cases a party 
ideologically close to agrarian interests has been included, as has been especially 
common in the Nordic agricultural policy model (see Helander 1981, 
Bolin et al. 1984, Just 1994). This core group has been seen as able to make 
decisions without much reference to non-farm groups. The shared set of beliefs 
and exclusion of other interests have relatively efficiently closed agricultural 
policy circles off from outsiders (Smith 1988, 1990a; Frouws 1993, 255). 
16 The same ideas have been discussed under labels such as "subgovemment", "iron triangle" 
and "segmented pluralism", ali of which refer to the regularised incorporation of organised 
interest into the public policy process. 
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2.3.3. Policy network approach 
In a similar vein as neo-corporatism focusses on sectoral forms of corporatism, 
the policy network approach segregates policy analysis into policy sectors. 
Policy network analysis claims greater accuracy in the tracing of government — 
interest group relations than has been possible with the pluralist or corporatist 
approaches. The network tradition ignores traditional policy making arenas such 
as parliaments and political parties, arguing that these are of only limited 
importance in sectoral policy-making (Richardson and Jordan 1979, 74). Instead, 
resource interdependence is seen as the key feature of sectoral policy-making. 
Benson (1982, 148) defmes a policy network as "... a cluster or complex of 
organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished 
from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource 
dependence." According to this definition, the policy network concept offers 
tools for describing, characterising and typologizing relations and interactions 
between the state and societal interests. 
A policy network emerges when political actors exchange resources regularly. 
The general train of thought in the policy network tradition emphasises the 
character of the modem state. Public affairs have become increasingly complex, 
organised actors dominate policy-making and the modem state itself is dependent 
on resources which only specific, organised interest groups can generate in a 
policy field or sector. 17 
Common concerns in the policy network approach are who is involved in 
public policy-making, how the core actors exclude other interests, and why 
policy processes and outcomes within many policy areas have remained stable 
for a relatively long time. In general, the function ofpolicy networks is understood 
to be restricted to specific policy fields or sectors, such as agriculture (Daugbjerg 
1996, 23-24). 
Some writers also distinguish between two main types of network: stable 
"policy communities" at one extreme, and more unstructured "issue networks" 
(Rhodes 1986, 22-23; Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 249-251, Smith 1993). A policy 
community is seen as a special type of stable network which exists if there are 
effective shared "community" views on the problem (Jordan 1990, 327). As 
those involved in policy-making (ministers, key civil servants, leaders and officers 
of key interest groups) tend to prefer stability, certainty and predictability, they 
try to divide complex situations and broad policy issues into manageable sub-
issues. Policy-making thus becomes specialized and left to a limited number of 
participants who deal with the technical details. Issue networks, in turn, are less 
integrated than policy communities. They comprise similar kinds of policy 
17  For a review of the policy network approach, see Daugbjerg 1996, 22-40. 
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actors, but there are numerous participants which are interdependent only to 
limited degree (Rhodes 1988, 78). 
Jordan and Maloney (1995, 19) argue that- "the politics of the policy 
community is the politics of the particular — a means to resolve the detail (and 
sometimes the substance) of politicised issues". This view implies that modem 
policy processes are developing towards increasing fragmentation and 
specialisation, towards policy making in sub-sectoral policy communities. 
Those within the policy network tradition who are more inclined to think in 
pluralist terms describe contemporary policy-making as taking place through 
sub-sectoral policy communities. Others, however, view sectoral networks as 
more important. As for agriculture, a dispute among network researchers has 
arisen on whether British agricultural politics is characterised by sub-sectoral 
policy communities (Jordan 1981, Jordan and Maloney 1995) and issue networks 
(Jordan and Schubert 1992), or by sectoral policy-making (Smith 1992, Cavanagh, 
Marsh and Smith 1995). 
Winter (1996, 26-27) argues for the interpretation that policy communities 
are more likely around production issues if there is a limited and relatively 
stable group of participants, if economic and/or professional interests dominate, 
and if there is a shared sense of purpose and community, a consensus on a set of 
priorities and an agreed need for public expenditure. Furthermore, participants 
in a policy community have a shared understanding of the problems and priorities. 
Issue networks comprise a large number of participants who may have many 
interests in addition to the particular issue of food and agriculture. The members 
of an issue network do not have strong shared beliefs, stability or a shared 
culture. According to Winter, issue networks may form especially around 
consumption issues. 
The need to analyse the characteristics of networks empirically has led to 
formal network studies employing sophisticated statistical methods and quantified 
data for mapping actors' positions in a network. Pappi and Henning (1999), for 
example, developed on index of resource flows between actors and the distribution 
of equilibrium control in EU agricultural policy decisions. They showed that the 
national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise 
of their national farmers' lobby, while the Commission relies more on contacts 
with other political actors within the system, and less with the demand side of 
politics, whether interest groups or the European electorate as a whole (ibid., 
279). 
Carsten Daugbjerg (1996) uses network analysis in an investigation into 
public policy in agriculture. He aims at showing that network structures influence 
policy choices, maintaining that the role of policy networks cannot be neglected 
if one seeks to understand the choice of nitrate policies in Denmark and Sweden 
or the outcomes of agricultural policy reforms in the European Community and 
Sweden. He concludes that radical policy choices are possible in a centralised 
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state which does not have a cohesive agricultural policy network and where 
farmers' structural power has declined with time, whereas in fragmented polities 
with a cohesive policy network (the EU), agricultural policy reforms are less 
fundamental. In his opinion, policy network structures make a difference, but 
sectoral policy choices cannot be seen in isolation from the macro-context in 
which they are embedded (ibid., 269). The latter should actually be a 
commonplace in ali serious policy analysis. 
As a research approach, policy networks can be seen first as a way of 
understanding new governance, which constitutes a significant form of 
coordination in modern societies. Secondly, it is possible to study the conditions 
for the development of policy networks and differences in the structures and 
processes involved, and thirdly, it is possible to study the consequences of 
policy networks (Kenis 1999, 181). The main contribution of policy networks to 
the analysis of agricultural policy has been to function as a tool for more precise 
description and empirical categorisation. As an approach, policy networks still 
lack the wider macro-theory that the older approaches of pluralism and 
corporatism offer. 
2.4. Conclusion: Politics as a means 
Approaching agricultural policy from different angles enriches our understanding 
and enables a more complete picture to be formed. Economics approaches to 
agricultural policy aim at formalising the policy options, but either take political 
considerations as given (social welfare maximisation perspective), or explain 
them on the basis of interests (political economy). Public choice approaches 
cause economics and political science to overlap by combining interest 
maximisation with institutions and power. The corporatism, pluralism and network 
analysis approaches lay the explanatory emphasis on actors, their institutionalised 
relationships and the political culture, or more precisely, on the interdependence 
of agricultural policy actors. 
Consequently, it has become evident on numerous occasions that interest 
groups are crucial actors in agricultural policy. They have close relations with 
decision-makers and with the agricultural administration, whether the nature of 
the relationship is corporatist or pluralist. Likewise, policy networks can be 
identified, as well as the significant role of experts, which has not been discussed 
here but which can been studied under such concepts as "epistemic communities" 
(on this concept, see Haas 1992) and "advocacy coalitions" (Sabatier and Jenkins 
1993). 
What mainstream economics and political science approaches to agricultural 
policy have in common, however, is an instrumentalist view of politics. Aims 
and objectives are left to be determined above or outside of politics, whereas 
politics is considered a means for reaching these aims. When politics is a means 
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for fulfilling the formal decision of a benevolent govemment, as in the social 
welfare maximisation approach, politics becomes restricted to a sort of calculation 
of means and side effects. These approaches do not pose the question of the 
political significance of a policy. 
In the political economy, pluralism and corporatism approaches, politics is 
looked for and explained in the terms of interests, which are based on assumed 
preferences, although in fact the formation of preferences may often be a crucial 
question in politics. As Keith Michael Baker (1990, 6) puts it, "interest' is a 
symbolic and political construction, not simply a pre-existing social reality". 
Starting with interests as "givens" either leads us to c1ichd explanations about 
the formation of agricultural policy, or else, in some cases, makes it difficult for 
us to match the supposed interests with the actual political choices made. 
Agricultural policy studies have to a large extent been examinations of 
decision-making where the principles of rational choice have been applied to 
public policy-making. The underlying notion of rationality has been that of 
"maximising something", i.e. choosing the best means to a given end 
(Majone 1989, 12-13). As discussed above, this approach suffers from its origin 
in the sphere of private economic transactions, which assumes a unitary decision-
maker, an individual who wishes to be consistent. In politics, several actors may 
be rational and consistent and still hold divergent views, which underlines the 
importance of negotiation and persuasion. Majone points out this feature, and 
also the lack of distinction between policies and decisions in single choice 
situations. Important policy decisions are more than attempts to do as well as 
possible in the situation immediately in front of the policy-maker — it is perhaps 
more appropriate to talk about them as policy judgements. Moreover, there is 
the exclusive preoccupation with outcomes, and in turn, the lack of concern for 
the processes whereby the outcomes are produced, since social processes are 
seldom of merely instrumental value. Finally, decisions in politics must always 
be justified, and there is no unique way of constructing an argument (Maj one 
1989, 15-18). The continuous process of debate does not fit well into a rational 
choice model for explaining agricultural policy. 
Finally, agricultural policy studies have ali along the line explained policy 
outcomes in terms of the characteristics of structures or agencies. As mentioned 
above, there is no reason to disagree with these general findings. My argument 
here is, however, that we would receive a different picture of both current and 
potential agricultural policies if we were to change the perspective and scrutinise 
the formation of the content of this policy. Paying more attention to the content, 
to the construction of policy problems, to the profiles of actors and to the role of 
argument and persuasion in agricultural policy may help to stimulate a broader, 
better informed, more open and more diversified debate on agricultural politics. 
In fact, contemporary political science theories offer altemative tools for 
investigating agricultural politics from the inside and reflecting the interpretations 
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and experience of those who are active in agricultural policy. It is possible to 
raise the content of the policy to the fore and concentrate on the way of thinking 
and reasoning which lies behind its construction. It is important in this approach 
to explicate how people perceive agriculture and how they translate their 
perceptions into political actions. For this purpose, we have to change our view 
of politics from an instrumental one towards acting in a situation. By taking a 
different starting point, we can emphasise certain aspects of politics which are 
not usually given much consideration. 
2.5. Politics as action 
A common feature of ali the approaches presented above, in both economics 
and political science, is that agricultural policy is dealt with as a kind of closed 
system, a sector or arena in which there are a limited number of actors and a 
limited number of issues are at stake. This also conforms with the understanding 
of politics that presents the political system as a more or less stable order of 
polity, which is changed in regulated forms by means of policy. This paradigm 
gives a clear vision of both what is political and what is central, typical and 
visible in politics (Palonen 1993a). In thinking of politics as a sector, borders 
become essential, since only generally accepted.institutions and their deeds are 
included in politics. 
The nature of what is political has been much debated in contemporary 
political philosophy. Without going into the details of that discussion18, an 
important point for the present purposes is that this revision of the concept of 
politics has opened up new possibilities to conceive what is political in a certain 
phenomenon. This means that it is possible to go beyond the limitations imposed 
by concentrating on the constellation of agricultural policy-making. 
As the aim of this work is to analyse the politics of agricultural policy, one 
option would be to use the notion of political culture. Ever since the initial work 
of Gabriel Almond (1956), it has served as a "conceptual umbrella", covering 
perceptions, beliefs and values conceming everything political19. For the purpose 
of this study, political culture is too broad to function as an analytical device. 
In the course of time, political culture has been adjusted to formulations 
which allow for more linguistic approaches. Keith Michael Baker (1990), for 
example, sees politics as maldng claims. It is "... the activity through which 
individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement, and 
enforce the competing claims they make upon one another and upon the whole" 
(ibid., 4). For Baker, a political culture comprises "the set of discourses or 
18 For a review of the debate, see O'Sullivan (1997). 
19For an overview of the concept of political culture, see Lane 1992. 
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symbolic practices by which these claims are made" (ibid., 4). Baker' s notion of 
political culture could be used for studying the Common Agricultural Policy, 
but the concept of politics as action is even better suited for the explicit study of 
the construction of agricultural policy, since it focusses the investigation directly 
on the political, without collecting diverse phenomena under the term political 
culture. 
In order to challenge the traditional, functionalist or instrumentalist approaches 
to politics as a sector or an arena, we shall employ in the following the definition 
of politics as acting in a situation. Thus, instead of taking a spatial view of 
agricultural policy as politics, as in the approaches discussed above, it is possible 
to suggest a situational view. The idea of politics as action can be found in the 
thinking of the political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958/60), for example. 
According to Arendt the core of politics lies in allowing and maintaining plurality 
and diversity, and in presenting different and contesting ideas and opinions in 
public, both in speech and in action. In this respect, politics is a unique 
phenomenon which cannot be reduced to other activities or to the qualities of 
political actors. 
In this approach, politics is understood in terms of the possible. It is seen as 
an aspect or quality instead of as a limited sphere. Another essential aspect is 
the shift of attention from the "results" of politics to "acting politically". Thus, a 
central element in this approach is the existence of possibility and freedom of 
choice as the basic characteristics of politics. Contingency, the correlate of 
freedom and choice, the Spielraum for action, is its constitutive criterion (Palonen 
1999, 24). One characteristic of political action is the possibility for doing 
otherwise: the ability to see alternatives and the capability for expressing this 
possibility of choice. Politics is connected with situations which require a 
choice and decision, and conversely, in situations where there is room for 
alternatives and choice, there one will also fmd politics. The contingent character 
of politics-as-activity expresses the possibilty, the occasion or opportunity to do 
something: it opens a horizon for action without specifying how to act in 
connection with this horizon (Palonen 2001a). 
Contestability is another essential characteristic of a political situation. 
According to Melvin Richter (2001, 137), the assumption that only consensus 
on a single set of views could produce social order and effective political 
decision is highly questionable. In this view, conflict, not consensus is decisive 
for regimes that are both free and democratic: Richter distinguishes different 
levels of contestability of political concepts (ibid, 138-140). First, it is possible 
to conceptualise a phenomenon in contested forms: we may agree, for example, 
that something called globalisation is taking place, but there may be differing 
ideas about its nature, its present effects and future consequences. Secondly, a 
concept may be relatively undisputed (e.g. the family farm in the European 
model of agriculture), but the questions concern its range of application. Thirdly, 
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the same concept can be understood differently, so that equality means for one 
person the same treatment for everyone before the law, while another person 
will hold that everyone should have about the same amount ofresources. Fourthly, 
acting upon a concept that is valued in the political system may entail 
consequences that conflict with another highly ranked concept, so that we have 
a disagreement about the relative priority of the two principles. In agricultural 
policy, for example, the objective of protecting the environment has grown in 
importance, which increases the cost of production, but at the same time the 
objective of producing cheap food for consumers has high priority. Fifthly, 
disagreement about the meaning of political concepts may arise among adherents 
of different and irreconcilable ideologies. Ideology as such refers to an 
understanding that politics must be conducted from the standpoint of a coherent, 
comprehensive set of beliefs which must outweigh every other consideration. 
In addition to contingency, or Spielraum, and contestability, it is characteristic 
of politics that something is actually rendered controversial. In politics there is 
nothing absolutely "given", no policy without conceivable alternatives (Palonen 
1983, 19). On the contrary, it is essential in this approach to question the 
"givens", to scrutinise the ways in which questions are framed and the criteria 
for answers, for it is in these choices that political acts emerge. 
The characteristics introduced above are ones that are essential for politics as 
a phenomenon. The list would not be complete without observing that in politics 
the results bear a paradoxical relation to the intentions of the participants. The 
unanticipated consequences of actions are constitutive of politics (Palonen 2001a). 
In understanding politics-as-action, action should not be understood in a 
narrow sense, as only a physical act, for example. In fact, most political actions 
(also) exist in textual form, e.g. as treaties, agreements, laws, regulations, 
pamphlets, speeches or public arguments. A political "text" may thus be spoken 
or written or, in some cases, take the form of a picture. I will return to the 
methodology of using texts for "reading the political" in more detail in Chapter 
3.3. 
The main value of the politics-as-action -approach is that it may open up new 
prospects for understanding agricultural policy from the inside, from the 
experience and uniqueness of acting politically. It aims at exploring the traces 
or imprints of politics, and it implies both pointing at the political as it appears 
in agricultural policy, and showing the issues that have been, or could potentially 
be, presented from another point of view, i.e. chosen and evaluated differently. 
Texts are signs that offer an opportunity to explicate the actions the participants 
in a policy process carry out: which alternatives they express, how these are 
formulated and reasoned, and which choices have been made. On the other 
hand, the interpretations which contain political choices are not always directly 
recognisable in political texts. In order to reveal the political aspect, we must 
examine the different horizons of politics that actors have, e.g. what kinds of 
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issues and criteria they connect with agricultural policy, and what strategies 
they use for legitimating their ideas. Critical readers must not allow the text to 
convince them, but they do have to ask questions. Crucial questions are: who is 
talking about politics, what are they saying, how, when, where, to whom and for 
what purpose? 
In addition to applying a situational view to politics, the theoretical framework 
is based on an elaboration of the concepts of policy and politics. Some historians 
and political scientists have dealt with the theoretical problems encountered in 
the concepts of politics. Heidenheimer (1986) argues that the broad concept of 
policy developed in English has connotations that allow its employment in a 
sense in which it is more ambiguously complementary to politics, and offer a 
greater perspective on the capacity of policy to serve as a reigning word and key 
concept than does the German Politik or French politique. Policy is a keyword 
that has a non-institutional, purely intentional meaning. Since its dictionary 
meaning refers to a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, 
party ruler or statesman, Heidenheimer underlines that its meaning is related to 
will and intention. 
Karl Rohe (1994, 64, 67, 80) used the English polit- vocabulary to show how 
the German Politik embraces several distinguishable meanings: "Policy and 
politics are part of every Politik and may be identified as distinguishable 
dimensions of political action... One could say that Politik consitutes the 
realisation of Politik in the sense of policy, with the help of Politik in the sense 
of politics, on the basis of Politik in the sense of polity... Concepts like 
administration, planning, public affairs are primarily related to the concept of 
policy. But when political thinking involves concepts like power, authority, 
conflict, and participation one would seem to he dealing with a stronger politics-
orientation." It will he argued here that agricultural policy is a specific form of 
politics. 
In order to show this, we shall discuss an empirical case of the politics of the 
Common Agricultural Policy in terms proposed by the Finnish political scientist 
Kari Palonen, who has also conceptualised politics-as-activity by means of the 
English polit- vocabulary (1983, 1993a, 2001a, 2001b). In this conceptual horizon, 
Palonen refers by policy to the regulating aspect of politics, politicking alludes 
to the performative aspect, polity implies a metaphorical space with specific 
possibilities and limits, while politicisation marks an opening up of something 
as political, as "playable". Furthermore, policy-politicking and polity-
politicisation form two conceptual pairs. Politics is understood in terms of 
spatial metaphors of a sphere, a sector or a field that has been occupied by the 
borders and regulations of the policy-polity space, while in the activity concept 
politics is constituted by the "verbal" figures of politicisation and politicking 
(Palonen 2001a, 2001b). 
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Policy and politicking thus form a pair. According to Palonen (2001a), "a 
policy refers to a direction of activities, to a line, project, pian, programme or 
doctrine". Policy thus has a teleological connotation, where teleology implies 
that a phenomenon is due to the purpose or design that it is serving. In addition, 
it has a normative character, so that it serves as a criterion for the selection of 
what should be realised amongst possible futures. Thus it implies a criterion of 
judgement which regulates the inclusion or exclusion of activities, types and 
degrees of coordination etc. 
Politicking, in turn, serves as a single verb for "acting politically". It includes 
such operations as tactics and strategy, and is always aimed at a certain public. 
It is action in a performative sense: it refers to opposing others and acting 
cunningly and cleverly. Using the metaphor of playing, politicking takes place 
within certain games already recognised as political. One case in point is the 
way in which the Agriculture Committee of the European Parliament wields 
power by refusing to take its final position. This is done when the Commission 
shows no willingness to compromise on proposals of importance to the 
Committee. The Council cannot decide until Parliament has voted, so the 
Commission has no other choice but to negotiate informally with the Agricultural 
Committee. If this leads to a common position between the Commission and 
Parliament, confirmed in the plenary session, then the Council has to vote 
unanimously against the proposal in order to defeat it. With clever tactics, the 
European Parliament can wield power in cases where no formai co-decision 
procedure has been established. Politicking presupposes improvisation and taking 
advantage of the details of the ongoing situation. It is not only about what 
should be done, but also how to do it. 
Polity and politicisation form another pair in Palonen's (2001a) 
conceptualisation of politics. If polity has traditionally referred to a metaphorical 
space that separates the political sphere from other spheres, it can be considered 
in terms of activity as a temporalised space that has been politicised and 
commonly accepted as political, and that separates such activity from that which 
is not accepted as political. Polity can thus be viewed as a Spielraum of activity, 
which results from previous politicisations and is established to the extent that it 
at least tacitly hinders new politicisations. Here polity should be understood as 
any specific regime of power shares, instead of a single "political system". 
Polity refers to a complex in which power shares are divided into legitimate and 
illegitimate ones: certain power shares have gained privileged positions, while 
others have faded away and appear as anachronistic, and attempts to create new 
ones are viewed with suspicion. According to Palonen (ibid.), the "core" 
Spielraum of a polity serves as a paradigm for politicking. Yet, the historical 
and temporal character of a polity means that the "core" Spielraum of the 
legitimate polity is constantly being undermined due to the shifting significance 
of the sources of power in the situation. The invention of new topics on the 
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agenda, new dimensions of human agency or new practices of politicking are 
prone to destabilise the polity, not only within its margins, but also in the 
interpretation of what is essential and decisive in it. 
Politicisation does not mean here an increased interest in "political affairs" 
among certain persons, but "the naming of something as political, rendering 
something political, interpreting something politically or turning something 
political" (Palonen 1999, 29). Politicisation thus has to do with rendering topics 
controversial and thus politically significant. By doing so, it is possible to create 
new subject matters for politicking beyond the conventional policy sphere. 
Politicising does not change the matter at hand as such, it is basically a qualitative 
operation. It can be an invention, a construction of chances with respect to 
which no chances were previously seen or admitted to have existed (Palonen 
2001a). This kind of invention requires the construction of a new perspective 
that renders things to appear different. But according to Palonen (ibid.), 
politicisation can in another perspective mean detecting the political potential of 
some existing changes, shifts or processes. In this kind of disruptive moments of 
politicisation claims that "order" cannot be upheld without something, or that 
the "laws of nature" cannot be violated, have been politicised in the sense of 
being rendered obsolete by creating the "impossible" without catastrophes. This 
kind of politicisation is based on analysing the results or effects of long-term 
changes, which render some alleged "necessities" or "impossibilities" obsolete 
and use these changes in order to declare a new space for action. In an established 
polity, politicisation either introduces new items which alter the relationship 
between the existing ones or discards existing items. A more radical politicisation 
takes place when the introduction of a new dimension puts the existing items 
into a new perspective. Finally, an important dimension in politicisation has to 
do with time. Politicisation increases the Spiel(zeit)raum available in the future, 
but it also presupposes a redescription of an Umschreibung (ibid.) of the past. 
The principal task in the present work will be to show the quality, strength 
and nature of politics in the CAP by focussing on the debate concerning 
agricultural policy formation in a given situation (the MacSharry reform). On 
the one hand, this implies an effort to make the domain of the political in 
agricultural policy visible and to reveal its inherent controversies and possibilities 
of choice — to show locations and moments of politicisation and politicking. On 
the other hand, the task is to outline the limits and restrictions of politics, points 
at which potential issues, actors and arguments are absent. Furthermore, this 
approach endeavours to pay attention to the origin of the dominant way of 
thinking in agricultural policy: what is considered important and what is not, 
what is perceived as a strong argument, where the "centre" is and what there is 
at the margin. 
The political dimension receives its meaning and significance only in relation 
to the general setting. As a consequence, when assessing the political in 
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agricultural policy, the spatial, temporal and organisational contexts — which are 
often neglected in mainstream studies — are important. These will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
In the following, the reform debates will be reconstructed and analysed in a 
setting which takes into account the characteristics of agricultural policy actors 
and their interrelationships. However, this study differs from the corporatist or 
network approaches, for example, in that actors and their characteristics are not 
used as the final explanation for the agricultural policy. We will concentrate 
especially on the consequences of this actor structure, i.e. in what ways 
agricultural policy gains expression. In this perspective, politics is to be found 
in the nature of the action. Politics is not seen as a puzzle for which, given clear 
goals and sufficient information, correct solutions always exist and can be 
found by calculation (Majone 1989, 20). In politics as action, attention is directed 
towards the exercise of political skills, such as good timing and attention to 
details, and towards the capacity to move the limits of the possible creatively. 
In summary, the framework of this study on the politics of a policy states that 
a "policy" is a form of politics that is 
constituted by combining several acts or measures into a coherent 
line, project or programme, 
a form of politicking that is regulated and controlled by 
teleological and normative criteria that are in a problematic 
relation to each other, 
based on a continuity that is broken by challenges to change 
(revision, correction, abandonment etc.) 
related to a polity that is based on a specific Spielraum of 
politicisations with implicit exclusions of other forms of 
politicisation 
united by a name 
inessential, i.e. there are no a priori reasons why a policy should 
be a better form of politicking than no policy. 
The Common Agricultural Policy offers a good example of such a policy, 
and the debate on the MacSharry proposals is a specification of this, constituted 
in a certain political constellation. 
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3. Focus and methodology: Reading the political 
3.1. Introduction 
Different research approaches to the politics of agricultural policy were discussed 
in Chapter 2, and the perspective of politics as action was introduced to 
complement the other approaches. It was shown that different approaches 
illuminate agricultural policy from different points of view, but no account is 
ever able to exhaust the phenomenon completely. Moreover, it was argued that 
as to explaining the political, the conventional approaches concentrate more on 
the actors and actor structures. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that ali 
information that is gained with by applying different relevant approaches and 
methods is valuable. When choosing a method, the subject and the framing of 
the problem to be investigated should be decisive. The method must be able to 
analyse those features which the researcher wants to investigate. 
This research starts out with the assumption that "European agriculture" 
does not refer to a single, given reality, but something that is being constantly 
constructed and reconstructed by different groups of users. These constructions 
are nowhere better available than in public debate. This is why texts (broadly 
understood) will be the main object of our analysis. 
Concentration on textual material quite naturally also implies a 
methodologically qualitative, and to be more precise, also a linguistic orientation. 
The political, politicisation and politicking in agricultural policy will be explored 
using the tools of qualitative methods, especially the reconstruction of discursive 
fields, content analysis or argumentation theory — depending on the focus of the 
analysis. 
Using texts as a source in political analysis is nothing new or special. On the 
contrary, it is rather difficult to say anything about politics without referring to 
written documents. A more specific linguistic turn has taken place in social 
sciences, however, a linguistic orientation that emerged in the context of the 
wider post-positivist interpretative tradition, which refuses to transpose the 
search for causality or the uncovering of general laws which is typical for the 
natural sciences. Instead, it aims at elucidating the meaning of certain social 
processes and at tracing conceptual connections (Hajer 1993, 38). 
Linguistics-oriented analysis has already been applied to studies related to 
agricultural policy. Maarten Hajer (1993), for example, used discourse analysis 
to analyse environmental policy, and growing numbers of researchers have used 
linguistic approaches to try to show how rurality is constructed in the EU or in 
national policies (e.g. Halfacree 1993, 1995; Jones 1995; Frouws 1998; 
Richardson 2000). 
Studying texts is essentially about what is said or written. Analytically, it 
means trying to make sense of the regularities and variations in what is being 
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said or written and to understand the effect of the specific way in which it is 
done (Hajer 1993, 39). There are various research methods which could be used 
in order to achieve this objective, and the ones chosen here will be presented 
later in this chapter. Before that, the empirical cases will be introduced. A 
textual analysis, just like any other study, has to be carefully limited and 
focussed in order to be successful as an item of empirical research. 
3.2. Delimitation of the research 
3.2.1. Case countries 
In principle, studying the politics of the Common Agricultural Policy would 
require analysing everything that has been said or done under this label ever 
since the first ideas for such a policy were launched in Europe. No single study 
could comprise this without getting lost in the multitude of discussions. Therefore, 
a case study has been chosen as a means of delimiting the empirical analysis. 
Two major perspectives are possible. On the one hand, one may concentrate 
on the Brussels end, i.e. on the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, 
the Commission, or more specifically on the functioning of the directorate-
general VI, or on the other hand, one may focus on the CAP in the EU member 
states. 
Basically, the actual choice depends on what one wants to stress. In this case, 
as the aim is to analyse the construction of agricultural politics in the public 
domain, the latter alternative reaches the core of the problem better than the 
former. Focusing on policy formation inside DG VI would increase our knowledge 
of the way of thinking and reasoning among the EU bureaucratic staff, for 
example, and of their formal and informal connections and their views on 
European Union agriculture, but it would allow us to say little about how the 
CAP is perceived beyond those professional circles. The "Brussels end" will 
have a voice in our material in the form of the reform proposals, i.e. the official 
policy documents. 
Unfortunately, the member states perspective still leaves the researcher with 
too large a material, to say nothing about the number of languages one should 
master in order to be able to study ali the national debates. It was therefore 
necessary to restrict the material further. Material from two countries was 
considered suitable to analyse discussions in different national contexts and to 
reach a practical level of valid empirical data. One has to be careful, however, 
when making broad generalisations about the whole EU on the basis of two 
countries. 
The Netherlands and Ireland were chosen as case countries on the following 
grounds. The Netherlands represents a founding member of the EU, located in 
its geographical heart, and has consistently acted in the forefront of the CAP. 
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There were also practical reasons. The first years of this research were carried 
out in the Netherlands, which meant that expertise and working contacts with 
the Dutch agricultural circles were easily available. 
The fact that Ireland had a special relation to its own Commissioner 
MacSharry, and the Netherlands opposed the reform almost until the final stage, 
gave reason to expect different arguments to be expressed. In addition, Ireland is 
a small EU country in terms of population, whereas the Netherlands is considered 
"the largest of the small member states". Furthermore, Ireland has a geographically 
somewhat peripheral location in the EU, which was assumed to give a different 
view on EU politics. The main features of agriculture and politics in the 
Netherlands and Ireland will be presented in more detail in Chapter 5. The two 
countries have one important feature in common, namely they are both exporting 
agricultural products to a large extent. This characteristic brings them closer in 
spite of the other differences, and adds to the relevance of the case study. 
Consequently, this research will make use of two national debates as examples 
of the political thinking connected with the CAP. This formulation includes an 
important methodological choice, which distances it from traditional comparative 
studies based on the assumption of direct comparability of the chosen cases. A 
preference is shown here for the more constructivist approach which sees 
problems as being always named and understood in a specific context. From this 
point of view, a fruitful comparison has to focus on the different ways of 
naming a problem: on the contours of the discourse, the rhetorics chosen and the 
differences in the logic of argumentation. In this approach, interpretations depend 
on the context. 
3.2.2. The MaeSharry reform debate 
Even after these delimitations, the empirical material would be too large for a 
single piece of research aimed at a detailed analysis. The political dimension of 
the CAP is in essence traceable in any text concerning it, from the Treaty of 
Rome to the description of recent policy instruments and policy objectives. 
As one inevitably has to be content with only a part of the whole CAP, it is 
reasonable to look for an aspect which could be expected to be particularly 
sensitive to the political dimension. Revolution, one may argue, could be 
experienced as an ultimate moment of political choice offering politics as an 
action in its immediacy. In the absence, or at least improbability, of a revolution 
within the CAP, refonns offer excellent material for such an analysis. Reforms 
open up the debate, at least in principle, to fundamental re-evaluation and 
change. Major reforms can be seen as an arena for explicating the "political 
programme" of the CAP. Consequently reform texts as such are of interest for 
studying the political dimension, and also for studying why the debates that 
these proposals brought about raise the politics of the policy to the surface. 
40 
The 1992 reform of the CAP, often referred to as the MacSharry reform, was 
chosen as the case ,for the present purpose. The MacSharry reform is a fairly 
recent one, so that the debate still makes sense for today's reader. It is also 
considered to be the most profound reform of the CAP so far. Furthermore, it is 
old enough and can be perceived as a more or less completed project, which 
enables us to assess the persistence of the emphases that it has given to the 
politics of the CAP. The present. profile of the CAP will be discussed in the 
conclusions in Chapter 9. 
The history of the CAP and the MacSharry reform will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. It would be useful to mention certain basic facts here, however. 
The case study concentrates on the public debate during the preparatory phase 
of the reform, from December 1990, when the first version leaked out, until the 
final decision in June 1992. The preparatory stage is useful for the examination, 
since it created an intellectual space for reconsidering the policy. This 
reconsideration took place in a structured manner, however, because it was 
based on a proposed plan. The debate was thus time and space-specific, which 
allows for an interpretation in relation to a certain context. This is especially 
important for the reliability of the conclusions. If the debate had been chosen at 
a random, without connecting it to a well-recognisable context, it would be 
more difficult to judge the significance of the different arguments. 
In order to reveal the political aspect of agricultural policy — that is, to put it 
simply, how choices are made, we have to examine the horizons of the politics 
pursued by the different actors. The main questions thus are as follows: what 
issues and criteria were connected with agricultural policy, and what arguments 
were used for legitimisation of the ideas? Moreover, it is also important to .show 
what issues and arguments the agricultural policy actors chose to omit. 
3.2.3. Text corpus 
As this work aims to reconstruct the CAP debate at large, a comprehensive body 
of material was required. In order to include ali possible actors and their 
expressions and arguments, the text corpus was collected from the public debate, 
understood in a broad sense. The text corpus includes debate on the MacSharry 
reform in major national newspapers and magazines in both countries from 
December 1990 until June 1992. In .the Dutch case, a couple of articles from 
November 1990 are included, since the debate on the possible reform started 
earlier there than in Ireland. The public debate includes both news articles, 
articles by experts and articles expressing opinions. Furthermore, the different 
versions of the MacSharry reform naturally form part of the text corpus, the part 
which gave a stimulus and direction to the debate. 
The material thus consists of texts that were produced during the preparation 
of the reform proposals. These texts were brought about without the involvement 
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of the researcher, and in this sense they are more authentic than interviews, for 
example. Selected interviews with key actors are used as supplementary material, 
however, predominantly in order to define more closely the findings made in the 
text corpus. 
The whole text corpus comprises 1046 articles, of them 488 are Dutch (300 
classified as news, 157 as opinions and 31 as articles by experts) and 558 Irish 
(300 news articles, 231 opinions, and 27 articles by experts). The fact that there 
are exactly 300 news articles from each country is a sheer coincidence (see 
Appendix 1). In addition to the public debate material, 11 interviews were held 
with selected key actors in the two countries, including politicians, farm 
organisation leaders, high civil servants and academics (a list of persons 
interviewed is given in Appendix 2), 6 connected with Ireland and 5 with the 
Netherlands. There were 2 major farming organisations to interview in the Irish 
case, compared with one in the Netherlands. The interviews are used as secondary 
material, the primary material being the public debate texts. 
The material is representative, since ali articles on the reform published in 
the main newspapers and periodicals were collected. Interpretation of the debate 
would not necessarily have required such a coverage, but the larger material 
helps to construct the specific context of the debate. This assistance was needed, 
because the researcher is neither Dutch, nor Irish, and thus did not have any of 
the pre-understanding for analysing the debate that a native would have had. 
Being an outsider was not necessarily a disadvantage, however, since the 
researcher had less personal passions with respect to either of the countries 
studied. The only additional requirement was a sufficient knowledge of the 
context. 
The material was collected from the press cutting archives of the leading 
farmers' unions in the two countries. The Dutch Landbouwschap and the Irish 
Farmers' Association (LFA) both follow the discussion on agriculture in their 
respective countries and collect ali articles from leading.national and regional 
newspapers and periodicals, editing the daily collections for the use of their 
personnel. From these archives, ali articles which mentioned the word "reform" 
during the time studied were collected. Regional newspapers were so numerous, 
especially in the Netherlands, and primarily repeated the same news as the 
national newspapers, that they were excluded. 
Radio and TV debates are not included. There were few of these relative to 
the debate in newspapers and periodicals, and they would hardly have contributed 
anything significantly new to the material. Transcripts of radio interviews were 
available in the press cuttings, for example, but as spoken language differs from 
written debate, it would have required different interpretation methods from 
those used for the rest of the material. The benefit of including radio and TV 
debates would have been smaller than the extra treatment that these spoken 
"texts" would have required. The transcripts of the radio interviews were read 
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through initially, but for the reasons listed above, they were not used in the 
analysis. 
The above-mentioned delimitations were a practical necessity, although it 
goes without saying that they inevitably narrowed down the empirical basis of 
the work. It would no doubt have been interesting to carry out similar, detailed 
case studies of ali the EU member states, but since the public debate analysed in 
the chosen countries covers the overall discussion relatively well, and since the 
countries are not too similar, some general conclusions on the nature of CAP 
politics and its changes can also be made. 
The starting point here was that agricultural policy was a matter of interest 
for a wide range of people. In the terms of the political economy tradition, there 
were many interest groups which would have found that the CAP concerned 
them, and these groups clearly had different points of view. Not ali those 
interested, however, were necessarily organised into groups. In the pluralist 
tradition, they could be understood as "potential" groups. The analysis thus 
focusses on the public perception of the CAP, since the media offer an arena for 
the public at large and not only for professional circles concerned with agricultural 
policy. In democracies like the Netherlands and Ireland ali possible ideas are in 
principle allowed to be expressed in public, and even opinions which are not 
organised enough to participate in the CAP formation as such can (and do) 
appear in newspapers and periodicals. In turn, public debate also affects the 
understanding that people have of the CAP. 
Furthermore, the choice of studying public perceptions of the CAP is linked 
with the purpose of this work. Since the aim is to investigate which themes and 
arguments are conceivable when discussing the CAP, a broad arena is needed. 
For politicians, in particular, the nature of the political arena makes a difference. 
In as far as they can affect what is printed in public, publicity is for things which 
can stand up to the light of day. This specific arena is suitable for politics that 
can be indulged in by anyone (Palonen 1993b, 161). By contrast, there is the 
form known as "cabinet" politics which is for an exclusive political arena: for 
insiders only. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, agricultural policy-making has been seen as an 
exclusive business among corporatist or otherwise closely networking actors. If 
the aim here were to explain how certain decisions were made, it would require 
concentrating on the more or less closed circles. More attention has in fact been 
paid to such "cabinet" politics in mainstream research than to the question of 
how agricultural policy appears in front of the eyes of the general public. 
The argument pursued here is that agricultural policy is very much in the 
interests of the public at large and is not only a matter for farmers, a few 
politicians and the administrative bodies who implement the policy. By definition, 
everyone who eats is affected by agricultural policy. Similarly, we are involved 
in agricultural policy when we pay taxes. Agricultural policy also has a significant 
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impact on the landscape, as about half of the land area on the earth is used for 
agriculture. Agriculture is also an important issue in our exchange with other 
regions of the world. Moreover, agriculture can be seen as the interface at which 
mankind is in contact with nature, a dimension that has become more relevant as 
the manipulation of living organisms has reached the gene level. Understood in 
these terms, agricultural policy is everyone' s business. The closed "inner circle" 
is not excluded from the present investigation, of Course, as it is part of the 
public at large. As a matter of fact, many professional agricultural policy actors 
also participated in the public debate. 
In addition, agricultural policy in the public domain carries one important 
quality connected with the Arendtian notion of politics as action. It requires an 
audience. Arendt compares politics with the performing arts, as both need a 
publicly organised space for their "work" (Arendt 1968, 154). Even though 
there is no denying that cabinet policy has a strategic meaning for the CAP 
within the EU, public debate on the CAP is important as an arena for showing 
its disputability and controversiality. An intimate and closed circle easily has 
unpoliticising effects (Palonen 1993b, 167). The public debate serves here as a 
display of the possible range of CAP politics. Whether the debate appears to be 
restricted in one way or another (issues, arguments or agents missing) remains 
to be shown in the case studies. 
3.3. Research method 
3.3.1. Language and politics 
From the point of view of this work, politics takes place in texts. But to be able 
to deal with the political in texts, one has to go beyond the natural attitude 
towards language and communication according to which there is a reality and 
then there is communication about reality. Or, apply this to the present situation, 
first there is European Union agriculture and a common policy for it, and then 
there is communication about this agriculture and its policy. This assumption is 
based ultimately on the arrogant assumption that the truth is known and that it 
only has to be communicated to others. 
In politics, decisions have to be justified, and arguments are used for this 
purpose. It is therefore .essential to accept that there is no unique way of 
constructing an argument. Data and evidence can be selected from the available 
information in a wide variety of ways, and similarly, there are several alternative 
methods of analysis and ways of ordering values (Majone 1989, 19). To show 
the choices made and arguments used, texts need to be analysed in order to 
study their political dimension. 
In this case, even if we collected ali possible statistics describing European 
Union agriculture in ail the member states, we would not receive "the truth and 
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nothing but the truth". In order to give a description that can be followed, we 
need to simplify and reduce complexity. We would have to make many choices, 
since there is no way of covering European agriculture totally. We would have 
to make a choice concerning what we regard as "a farm" and what not, or who 
would be classified as "a farmer". Are part-time farmers included, and if they 
are, on what criteria? What is the "countryside", and what is a "village"? Would 
we just count livestock units, or would we classify them according to how the 
cattle are kept? Likewise, the way in which we chose to categorise different 
groups would affect our understanding of the characteristics that we were 
studying. Furthermore, many features are not comparable, especially if they 
include culturally differentiated meanings and values. Consider, for example, 
the formal position of farmers' wives in the context of farms as enterprises in 
different countries, or the category of "family farms". 
It is important to note that there is nothing intrinsically condemnable in 
selecting a particular combination of data, facts and values. Without this choice 
it would not be possible to communicate at ali about complex issues. Nevertheless, 
the choices we make not only construct social reality, they are also of political 
significance. They reveal what is thinkable, and what we regard as important. 
The CAP debate reveals "actors' constructions" (Mormont 1990), for example, 
which are based on representations conceming, in this case, the dimensions and 
characteristics of EU agriculture. What we are likely to find important depends 
on our context, on our ideas of what is desirable, and so on. 
At the same time, our choices indicate that the pattern of perceiving EU 
agriculture or the CAP is not inevitable. It is man-made, subject to change, and 
also constantly subject to revision and criticism. As a consequence, it is always 
possible to see things anew, to describe them in new ways, and to communicate 
these innovations to others. It is, basically, these choices that the politics is 
about. 
As for using political debate for studying the political, Norman Fairclough 
(1992, 211) points out that "... language is widely misperceived as transparent, 
so that the social and ideological 'work' that language does in producing, 
reproducing or transforming social stnictures, relations and identities is routinely 
`overlooked'". He suggests a view of text as a choice, as a selection of options 
from systems constituting meaning potentials. As Fairclough (ibid., 212) goes 
on to explain, this view of text can be extended to the identification of "absences" 
as well as presences. 
The viewing of texts as a result of more or less deliberate choices and the 
analysing of what is absent or omitted can offer tools for reading the political 
aspects of texts. Kari Palonen (1993a, 15) has called this kind of reading as 
demapping: "It does not destroy the maps presented, it rather directs attention to 
the principles used in drawing them, or else the research may use already 
existing maps but read them differently." 
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The task of reading the political in this empirical analysis of the MacSharry 
debate in Ireland and the Netherlands is divided into three parts, focussing on 
the actor structure (Chapter 6), the thematic structure (Chapter 7) and the 
argument structure (Chapter 8). Bach of these phases uses slightly different 
methods and approaches in order to optimise the achievement of the main 
objectives of this research. The main methodological points conceming the 
empirical inquiry will be presented briefly in the following, with the attention 
being paid to the concept of new rhetoric, which has been applied to the analysis 
of the argument structure. 
3.3.2. Actors and themes 
Themes 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the actor structure and thematic structure of the 
MacSharry debate. This dual analysis shows first who appear as subjects in the 
public debate conceming the CAP and what are the main themes dealt with in 
that debate. Secondly, an examination of the actor structures and thematic 
structures is used to point out more precisely which actors and themes are being 
considered more relevant or important than others, and thirdly, showing the 
actual structures help us to deliberate upon which actors (or actor groups) or 
themes that would in principle be possible do not appear in that debate. 
A number of concepts from discourse analysis are employed to organise this 
level of analysis. Discourse analysis is specifically used to outline the debate in 
such a manner that the political aspects of agricultural policy become more 
visible. 
For this purpose, an application is made of concepts from the later work of 
Michel Foucault. In his later books, Foucault analysed the social discourses on 
social disciplinisation and punishment and on sexuality (Foucault 1981, 1991). 
In this phase he went beyond the strict analysis of discourse (archaeology) and 
instead began to pay more attention to the conditions, limitations and 
institutionalisation within discursive formations (genealogy) (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983, 104). 
In Foucaultian discourse analysis, discursive practices appear in accepted 
concepts, legitimised subjects, taken-for-granted objects and preferred strategies, 
which yield justified truth claims (ibid., xxiv). When studying discursive 
formations, we describe relations between statements (Foucault 1972, 31-39). 
We are dealing with a discursive formation if certain types of statements, 
concepts or thematic choices appear regularly. Thematisation not only aims at 
showing that certain issues exist or recur, but also attaches importance to the 
distinction between issues and themes. It is crucial how issues are interconnected 
and what sort of Iines of reasoning they follow. An issue must have regular 
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connections and logical functions of this kind in order to form a distinct theme, 
either alone or together with other related issues. A certain theme may occur in 
different fields of discourse, and in different analyses and conceptual systems20. 
The broadened definition of discursive field proposed by Magali Sarfatti 
Larson (1990) is employed here according to which a Foucaultian discursive 
field goes beyond the institutions within which "codes" are elaborated, leamt 
and applied, in conjunction with legitimating discourses21. "At some point, we 
must include fields that only have a thematic ideological unity, that are unified 
only because ali their parts, ali their actors, ali their speakers, are concerned 
with the same thing and almost always with conflicting points of view." (Larson 
1990, 35). 
Basically, what is at stake in the approach applied here is the notion that 
phenomena which are discussed are not necessarily to he described in a natural 
way with precisely the concepts and categories through which they appear in the 
discussion. Moreover, this notion turns our attention to the pattems with which 
certain ways of conceptualising and categorising are connected with certain 
practises and contexts. The aim here is to show how the reform debate was 
conceptualised and politicised in two EU member states " and what kinds of 
politicking strategies were employed. 
It is common to assume that public deliberation and public policy are primarily 
questions of defining goals and finding the means to achieve them. In fact, the 
crucial aspect in both of them is to define the norms which determine when 
certain conditions are to he considered policy problems. "What's the problem?" 
is a good question. It draws attention to the timing and context in which certain 
issues become politicised. Agricultural policy issues are neither given nor 
constant, but are themselves a fimction of the policy-making processes that they 
are supposed to guide. The construction of policy problems can he studied with 
different approaches,22 arnong which thematic reading will he adopted here. 
Actors 
Hannah Arendt (1958/1998, viii-ix) argues that the fundamental condition of 
politics is that "it goes on among plural human beings, each of whom can act 
and start something new", and continues (ibid., 7): "While ali aspects of the 
20 For example, it is possible to discuss the GATT trade talks without any connection to the 
MacSharry-reform, and "justice" appears as a theme as well in literature and film. 
21  Although Foucault himself studied and referred to actual institutional settings (the asylum, the 
hospital, the gaol, the school, the army, the courtroom, the factory, the social welfare agency, 
the publishing industry, the art gallery, the museum and so on). 
22  For example agenda setting (see e.g. Kronsell 1997), or taking problems apart in the way done 
by women studies (see e.g. Bacchi 1999). 
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human condition are somehow related to the human condition of plurality23, this 
plurality is specifically the condition 	of ali political life". Her notion of 
politics as an action also requires that "... the political realm rises directly out of 
acting together, the sharing of words and deeds" (ibid., 198). This is why the 
analysis of the politics of agricultural policy has to investigate the range and 
nature of actors in the debate. 
Connecting actors with thematic reading, Larson (1990, 35) sees discursive 
fields as battlefields where experts of different kinds are fighting for pre-
eminence, but where other, non-expert forces also intervene. Publicity is also a 
means of drawing attention to the arguments one wants to put forward. The 
public image of agricultural policy has often been connected with the dominance 
of the farm lobby and ministry of agriculture officials, which has created an 
impenetrable jungle ofjargon for outsiders (see Bolin et al. 1984). The aim here 
is to determine systematically and explicitly who were actually the actors in the 
agricultural policy discourse on the MacSharry reform in Ireland and in the 
Netherlands. Actors are either those who performed as active subjects, or were 
named by others as actors in the course of the debate. 
A helpful metaphor here is that of a casting for a play: there are various 
actors on the scene of the Common Agricultural Policy performing in certain 
roles that differ in importance and represent various reference groups. 
Furthermore, the actors may perform in different connections and in different 
arenas. The analysis presents the main division of actors in our two case countries: 
into those who had main roles and those who were less prominent, and those 
who were not present themselves but were referred to. In addition, we will also 
pay attention here to those who neither had any say in the debate, nor were 
mentioned by others. The public at large, in its turn, forms the audience, which 
responds to the moves made by the other actors but does not itself take the 
initiative. 
It is useful to distinguish two main types of actor, and also certain subgroups. 
First, there are two kinds of human actor: those who consider themselves 
competent in this specific discourse (those who write about the subject), and 
those who are regarded as competent by others (by other actors or by the 
media). Essentially, actors are only powerful in so far as they are constituted as 
authorities vis-å-vis other actors through discourse. The two groups partly overlap, 
however, as the latter group includes those who are recognised in the discursive 
field but seldom perform in the discussion themselves. Those affected by the 
policy, for example, are usually represented as interest groups (farmers, farm 
wives, animals, consumers, taxpayers, agri-business etc.). Furthermore, there 
23  That is, "the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world" (Arendt 1958/ 
1998, 7). Arendt's idea ofplurality in politics should not be confused to the idea ofpluralism 
discussed in Chapter 2.3.1. 
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are actors who often perform but do not have their own say in the discourse (e.g. 
"Brussels" or the EU Parliament). 
Secondly, since we are concemed here with supranational policy, various 
countries, both member states and other, non-EU countries, appear as relevant 
actors. On the basis of this analysis it is possible to illustrate different ideas 
regarding the EU, the significances of different countries and the influence of 
the intemational environment in general. The analysis at this level will be 
focussed especially on questions of what lies at the centre, where the periphery 
is, and how the rest of the world is arranged around these two. Furthermore, it 
will seek to reveal the demarcation Iines which arise as a result of CAP 
controversies. 
The actor structure will be investigated by means of content analysis, a 
research technique that is frequently used in the social sciences that seeks to 
understand the data as symbolic phenomena rather than a collection of physical 
events.24 The most common form of data representation in content analysis is in 
terms of frequencies. 
Absolute frequencies will be used in the chapter on actors in the following 
way. Each actor mentioned in the debate will be picked out only once per text 
irrespective of how many times the name was repeated, and the number of texts 
in which each actor has appeared will be recorded. One should be cautious 
regarding comparisons between the two countries, however, as the debates are 
incommensurable for this purpose, e.g. on account of the different languages, 
journalistic styles and national platforms available for the discussion. The 
frequencies give an idea of the emphases existing inside the national debates, 
but intemational comparisons are possible only at the level of individual topics 
of emphasis. One might conclude, for example, that the Prime Minister is a 
more prominent figure in the Irish discussion than in the Dutch debate. The 
Taoiseach (Haughey, and later Reynolds) ranks high among the Trish actors, but 
the Premier (Lubbers) was not regarded as an authority by the other Dutch 
actors even though he occasionally said something about the topic. The national 
debates can be discussed together only in relative terms, but not in absolute 
figures. 
Commissioner MacSharry has not been treated here in the manner of the 
other actors, because his name was mentioned in virtually every text, being part 
and parcel of the reform proposal. Only occasionally, mainly in texts classified 
here as "expert" opinions, was the reform discussed as a Commission proposal. 
Interviews given by Ray MacSharry have nevertheless been included in the text 
corpus used for the actor structure analysis. 
24  Content analysis has been used especially in communication studie,s. On the basis of content 
analysis, see Berelson and Lazarsfeld 1948, Berelson 1952, Krippendorf 1980. 
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3.3.3. Arguments 
The argumentation structures of the MacSharry reform debate will be analysed 
in Chapter 8. This analysis will concentrate especially on texts carrying arguments 
relevant to the scope and content of the reform and will be structured in terms of 
the main themes in the debate. It will thus deepen the thematic analysis by 
showing the ways of politicising/depoliticising and politicking used in the debate. 
In essence, analysis of the argument structure means the examination of 
practices used for persuasion and legitimisation. It is an attempt to reconstruct 
the argumentative strategies built into the discussion on the CAP and to disclose 
the persuasive elements implicit in them. 
It will be shown that the arguments used in the reform debate very often 
draw their strength from economic reasoning. As McCloskey (1994, 82) has 
stated: "Economists specialise in knowing about costs and benefits. But someone 
— maybe even an economist — might want to learn about the speech by which 
people construct their stories of the cost and benefit." 
The following discussion will first outline rhetoric as an approach and discuss 
the role of argument in defining realities and constructing policy choices. It will 
then turn to the rhetorical approach to be used in this work, that known as new 
rhetoric, and finally it will discuss the three analytical sub-fields of new rhetoric 
which are relevant here: adaptation of the speaker to the audience, the premises 
or starting points used in argumentation and the associative and dissociative 
techniques of argumentation. 
Rhetoric as an approach 
The word "rhetoric" has traditionally had two definitions, Platonic "rhetoric", 
which refers to mere fiattery and cosmetics, or "eloquence", and Aristotelian 
"rhetoric", which includes ali the available means of uncoerced persuasion 
(McCloskey 1994, xiii). It is the Aristotelian version that will be considered 
here. Rhetoric is speech that has designs on the reader (ibid., xiv). In other 
words, the message is commonly altered in response to the demands of the 
communication situation: the presence and character of the audience and speaker 
relative to each other, the language spoken in common, the style of the customarily 
used medium, the history of earlier similar talk and the practical purpose to be 
achieved by means of the communication (ibid., 35). 
Although there is no need to fight the ultimate battles of positivism here, the 
current revived interest in rhetoric can be seen as a reaction to positivism. 
Historically, the origins of modern rhetoric have been dated to the seventeenth 
century writings of Francis Bacon (Summa 1989, 90) whose ideas on the 
imperfection of human perception foreshadowed the growing interest in 
psychological and cognitive processes during the subsequent centuries. Like the 
other early proponents of rationalism in the seventeenth century — Descartes, 
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Hobbes and Spinoza — Bacon nevertheless had a paradoxically low opinion of 
the power of reasoning in human affairs. The distinction between form and 
substance advocated by the Cartesian school has by and large been inherited as 
a part of scientific positivism (see McCloskey 1994), but if positivism was a 
reaction to German idealism, the latter has made a comeback from the 1960's 
onwards in a slightly different form, as pragmatism or rhetoric, finding its 
reality in social discourse (ibid., 11). 
Basically, we use language to organise our image of the world. Knowledge 
without human speech is merely an ideal type in the mind of God, whereas real 
knowledge entails communication (ibid., 33-34). The people studied here who 
discussed EU agriculture were giving it meaning and interpreting the events, 
trying to make their perception sound coherent and significant. The political 
aspect reveals itself in the choice of what is important, in argumentative strategies 
and in the vocabularies used for handling issues that are deemed important. 
The new rhetoric25 approach is in principle suitable for studying ali the 
methods of proof used by human beings, except perhaps for those of formal 
logic and mathematics. Many of the objects studied by the social sciences do 
not fall into the realm of strict logic. Especially in the domain of politics, 
demonstrative proofs are seldom available for either those who take the political 
decisions or those engaged in the academic study of the field of politics. Rather, 
we find ourselves dealing with "reasonable decisions", "reasonable choices" or 
"reasonable hypotheses", with deliberation and controversy. Politicians, for 
their part, deal with the credible, the plausible or the probable (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1). 
The new rhetoric perspective 
The different approaches in the rhetorical tradition offer a variety of conceptual 
apparatuses for text analysis26. One thing that ali these approaches have in 
common is that they are interested in rhetorics as a way of communicating 
through the use of symbols, as is typical of human beings. The new rhetoric is 
not a study of stylistic manipulations, as is often understood by the term rhetoric, 
but rather a theory of practical reasoning, an analysis of informal reasoning as 
distinct from an analysis of the forms and rules of formal deduction and induction. 
For the new rhetoric, ali human reasoning — conceming facts, values, opinions, 
decisions or beliefs — proceeds rhetorically, so that rhetorical persuasion is not a 
deceitful or superficial way of influencing others by means of words but an 
ordinary technique for thinking and interaction. 
25  The term "new rhetoric" is used in distinction to old Greek classical rhetoric. 
26111 addition to Perelman, leading theorists in new rhetoric are Kenneth Burke (see e.g. 1950/ 
1969, 1966) and Stephen Toulmin (see e.g. 1958). 
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We will present below one possible set of tools for studying argumentation, 
the new rhetoric approach of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
which will be employed here for analysing the argument structure. The new 
rhetoric is essentially a theory of argumentation, which, unlike demonstration, 
presupposes a meeting of minds. Rhetorical analysis connects meaning with its 
argumentative context. Argumentation is always addressed by a person, called 
the rhetorician — whether by speech or by writing — to an audience of listeners or 
readers (Perelman 1979, 10-11). The presence of a real or hypothetical audience 
always has an influence on the text, even though it does not have to be implicitly 
expressed, and may even go unrecognised for the author. Rhetorical techniques 
are a grammar of communication, so that although it is not necessary to know 
the grammatical rules by heart, it is impossible to produce understandable 
speech without following these rules at least to some extent. 
Essential to this approach is the notion that argumentation aims at finding a 
common understanding in a situation of reasonable contraries: "two different 
decisions, on the same subject, can both be reasonable and be expressions of a 
coherent and philosophically justified point of view" (Perelman 1979, 115). 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 1) write: "The very nature of deliberation 
and argumentation is opposed to necessity and self-evidence, since no one 
deliberates where the solution is necessary or argues against what is self-
evident." Consequently, argumentation presupposes contingency in an action 
situation. In this way the Perelmanian model of argumentation will be helpful 
for detecting political aspects for the purposes of this study. It is weaker, 
however, when it comes to explicating thematisation, because it takes the theses 
upon which argumentation take place as given — without asking what is their 
origin, how they were chosen or what is their meaning (Palonen 1995, 15). This 
is why this approach was not used in the thematic analysis. 
The approach of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is concemed with the 
structure of argumentation from the point of view of its persuasive efficiency. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca seek to discover the basic methods that are used 
in contingent arguments addressed to audiences of any sort. In most of his texts, 
Perelman underlines the persuasive function of argumentation, so that there is a 
certain consensus orientation in his concept of politics. 
Kari Palonen (1995, 14-15) has also drawn attention to how the limiting of 
argumentation to the maximisation of adherence detracts from the interpretative 
power of the analysis. Palonen continues that Perelman actually also uses the 
verb "provoquer" when defining the aim of argumentation (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 5 and Perelman 1977, 23)27, which broadens the scope 
27  In the English translations, it has been translated either "to induce" (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969, 4) or "to elicit" (1982, 9). 
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of the analysis towards acting in a situation. In The Realm of Rhetoric Perelman 
(1982, 12) writes: "We should note in this regard that argumentation does not 
aim solely at gaining a purely intellectual adherence. Argumentation very often 
aims at inciting action, or at least at creating a disposition to act", and continues 
(ibid., 13): "... when we are dealing with theses presented in an argumentative 
discourse, these theses aim at times at bringing about a purely intellectual result 
— a disposition to admit their truth — and at other times at provoking an immediate 
or eventual action." This connects argumentation with action, which keeps the 
situation in motion (Palonen 1995, 14). The present work focusses in particular 
on the kind of argumentation which aims at changing the recipient's understanding 
of the given situation, or at preserving the status quo. 
The new rhetoric approach also has obvious connections with discourse 
analysis, although it also differs in principle from it and from other post-
structural approaches. The main difference relative to a strict Foucaultian 
discourse analysis28 is that the latter speaks of being at the mercy of language, 
whereas the new rhetoric approach studies influencing by means of language 
(Summa 1989, 70). 
To apply this to the analysis of the MacSharry reform debate, we can start 
with the notion that there are numerous ways of perceiving the topic of the 
debate (changing the CAP) and the situation (in EU agriculture) and that these 
produce different understandings. Moreover, the mutually competing perceptions 
of the problem lead to different recommendations for a solution and prepare for 
different, mutually exclusive ways of proceeding. This work aims firstly at 
showing that these processes really took place in the debate, and secondly at 
revealing what kinds of argumentative strategies were used. It will be similarly 
important to fmd out whether there were potential perceptions and Iines of 
argument that were not uttered. This will provide a parallel inquiry to the 
chapters on themes and actors. 
The major elements in the new rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
can be summarised as follows (Perelman 1982, x-xi). In the first place, 
argumentation proceeds informally. Secondly, arguments are always addressed 
to audiences for the purpose of inducing or increasing their adherence to the 
theses presented. Thirdly, to gain any degree of success, the arguments have to 
proceed from premises that are acceptable to the audiences. Arguing always 
includes procedures by which ideas and values can be given a special presence 
(in the French sense of being made present) in the minds of those adclressed. 
Thus, the major objects of examination in this analysis are the relationship 
between the speaker and audience and the arguments in relation to propositions 
28  The kind of discourse analysis applied in this study is not Foucaultian in a strict sense even 
though it was inspired by Foucault's terms. 
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that they concern, i.e. how the actual argumentation is built up. The term 
rhetorical analysis will be taken below as referring to a study of texts that 
concentrates on the way the rhetorician — speaker or writer — addresses a 
particular audience in a given situation, and on the way that rhetorician supports 
the theses or propositions with arguments or proof. We will now discuss these 
analytical subfields in more detail. 
Rhetorician / Audience 
The limits for a framework of argumentation are determined through the 
distinctions made relative to other types of intersubjective process — e.g. using 
force, logical syllogising or pure intellectual meditation. The relationship between 
the speaker (or writer) and a real or hypothetical audience is essential. The 
nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully presented will 
determine to a great extent both the direction the arguments will take and the 
character and significance that will be attributed to them (ibid., 30). Different 
types of audience construction will direct the argumentation towards different 
schemes. In other words, when entering into argumentation, the rhetorician 
weighs up the situation, chooses the appropriate words and style, and determines 
the goals according to the nature of the audience. The most important distinction 
is that between a universal and a particular audience. 
By an audience, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to a set of individuals 
whom the rhetorician wishes to influence by his arguments. They do not 
necessarily have to be a real or physically present group of listeners or readers, 
of course, and it is possible for the speaker to address a vast audience in its 
entirety or only to a small fraction of the listeners. A universal audience represents 
the "highest" aim of the rhetorician, to find arguments that could convince ali 
rational adult human beings, "the whole of mankind, or at least, of ali normal, 
adult persons" (ibid., 30). 
A particular audience can be any limited group of listeners (or readers) 
whatever, i.e. any specific subgroup of the universal audience. It may refer to a 
concrete group of people at a particular moment or place, or to an abstract, 
specific target group for the argumentation, defined according to some definable 
principle. The particular audience that is addressed is not necessarily the group 
of people physically present at the moment when the argumentation takes place. 
A case in point is a politician making a speech in Parliament. The particular 
audience is in effect the potential body of electors and not the listeners who are 
physically present (Foss et al. 1985, 108). The status of an audience varies with 
the concepts that one has of it (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 34): the 
universal audience for one person may be no more than a particular audience for 
another. 
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In any event, if we compare the two kinds of audience, the rhetorician can 
become better acquainted with the composition and structure of a particular 
audience — i.e. with the social background and position of the recipients of the 
rhetoric — and thus find reasons that the audience will understand and be 
sympathetic towards, and simultaneously also the ones that are best left unstated 
in this case. Self-deliberation and argumentation presented to a single hearer are 
extreme examples of particular audiences. 
Perelman (1982, 18) makes one more important distinction between a universal 
and a particular audience, namely that discourse addressed to a specific audience 
aims to persuade, while discourse addressed to the universal audience aims to 
convince. In general, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca maintain that the mere 
fact that a speaker engages in argumentation is a sign of the existence of 
differing views on the subject under discussion and of the great importance the 
speaker attaches to gaining the audience's consent. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 19-26; Perelman 1982, 9-20) stress 
that the more homogenous the structure of the audience, the easier it is for the 
rhetorician to approach it. When the audience is composed of people of the 
same profession (e.g. cereal growers) or of one faith (Catholic Ireland), it is safe 
to assume that they will accept the validity of arguments based on certain types 
of proof and on certain authorities (law, political realities, Christian morality). 
The closer a rhetorician moves to addressing a universal audience (e.g. the 
intemational press), the harder it is to ensure that the various arguments do not 
appear to be in confiict with each other and that none of the starting points used 
will alienate particular subgroups of listeners. 
Premises / Arguments 
According to Perelman, it is essential and characteristic for the starting points 
and techniques of argumentation to be determined in accordance with the 
audience. These variable conditions alter the possibilities for argumentation. 
The starting points, or premises of argumentation refer to implicit agreements 
between the speaker and the audience; agreements which exist prior to the 
argumentation and are separate from it. In addition, they refer to the ways in 
which these agreements are made use of in argumentation (Perelman and Olbrects-
Tyteca 1969, 65-183). 
"In fact, the aim of argumentation is not, like demonstration, to prove the 
truth of the conclusion from premises, but to transfer to the conclusion the 
adherence accorded to the premises." (Perelman 1982, 21). These implicit 
agreements determine what can be taken as real and what are the principles that 
have to be followed if one wants to present convincing arguments. Perelman 
maintains that the actual choice of premises and their formulation, together with 
the adjustments involved, will rarely be without argumentative value: these 
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things provide a preparation for argument which not only establishes the elements 
but constitutes the first step in their utilisation for persuasive purposes. These 
premises also serve as a conscious or unconscious basis for deciding what 
arguments can be used or what style should be chosen. 
Among the points of agreement from which the speaker draws the premises 
for a discourse, it is important to distinguish those which bear upon reality (i.e. 
facts, truths and presumptions) from those which bear on preferable (i.e. values, 
hierarchies and the /oci of the preferable) (Perelman 1982, 23). Perelman thus 
contrasts opinions which are thought to express a known or presumed fact to 
those which express a preference, or which indicate what is preferable (ibid., 
26). 
It is typical for Perelman's epistemological attitude that facts are for him 
always contractual. In argumentation, it is not possible to classify this or that 
concrete datum as a fact, in any time or spatial context. On the contrary, the 
notion of "fact" is something that could be a point of agreement for a universal 
audience. Facts are thus the notions which are withdrawn, at least for the time 
being, from the argumentation. They could, however, be called into question 
later, and one of the parties to the debate may refuse to accept a particular 
affirmation by the opposite side as a fact (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 
67). 
Although "facts" and "truth" refer to objective elements that are supposedly 
accepted by a universal audience, i.e. they are common to ali, it is important to 
notice that the status of fact and truth in argumentation is not guaranteed 
indefinitely unless we accept an unerring authority, and these can be disproved 
in a debate. The most effective way of doing this is to show that the fact or truth 
is incompatible with other facts and truths that have been established with 
greater certainty. In other words, facts and truth are potentially questionable in 
argumentation (Perelman 1982, 23-24). 
Presumptions are also often used as bases upon which to build reasonable 
convictions. They refer to what normally happens and what can be reasonably 
counted upon. We are accustomed to think that what happens is normal, but one 
can still question, for example, whether a certain presumption is applicable to a 
certain set of circumstances. The immediate effect of a presumption is that it 
imposes the burden of proof upon the person who attempts to question its 
applicability (Ibid., 25). 
Premises concerning the preferable are based on the values, the value 
hierarchies and the loci that are important and precious for the audience. 
Sufficiently vague or abstract "universal" values, such as the true, the good or 
the just are useful in argumentation, because they allow us to present specific 
values, upon which groups reach agreement, as more determined aspects of 
these universal values (ibid., 27). Moreover, universal values can, in principle, 
unite the seemingly contradictory interests of a heterogeneous audience. Specific 
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values relating to concrete and unique entities, however, are usually more effective 
than universal ones after first being accepted — they draw on the personal and 
intimate experiences of each listener. 
Perelman underlines the importance of telling apart abstract values — such as 
beauty or justice — from concrete values, such as the Church. Concrete value is a 
characteristic of a specific being, object, group or institution. It emphasises 
uniqueness, whereas abstract values refer to rules that are valid for everyone 
and for ali occasions, such as justice, truthfulness, love or humanity, or the 
utilitarian principle of Bentham, which defines the good by what is most useful 
to the greatest number of people. Perelman argues that reasoning based on 
concrete values seems typical for conservative societies, while abstract values 
serve more easily as a basis for critiques of society, and can be used as 
justifications for change. (Perelman 1982, 27-28). 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) underline that it is often more important 
for the rhetorician to be aware of the hierarchical order of the values respected 
by his audience than of the numerous separate values in themselves. For example, 
knowing that the audience is in favour of both protecting their own market and 
free enterprise does not help one to determine which value will be preferred 
over the other if they appear to collide in a certain situation. Concrete values are 
understood as hierarchical in that human values are superior to those attached to 
things, while in the realm of abstract values what is just can be taken as superior 
to what is useful. Heterogeneous hierarchies relate values qualitatively, while 
homogeneous hierarchies are quantitative, giving preference to the greatest 
quantity of a positive value or the smallest quantity of a negative value (Perelman 
1982, 29). 
Finally, the broadest perspective on values can be described through the 
concept of loci of the preferable. This is analogous to presumptions and refers to 
the very general premises that serve as foundations for values and their 
hierarchies, to the typical forms of presenting an argument that the audience is 
already familiar with and approves. The general loci of quantity assert that what 
is good for the greatest number of people is preferable to what profits only a 
few. In a similar vein, what is durable is preferable to what is fragile. 
Correspondingly, the general locus of quality implies giving preference to 
something that is unique, rare and/or irreplaceable and favours the elite over the 
masses, and values what is difficult to attain or what must be done at the very 
moment. (Ibid., 29-31). 
There seems to be an implicit tendency in agricultural policy to draw on 
quantitative justifications when the grounds for policy suggestions are to be 
stated. Ordinarily suggestions concerning specific activities and the appropriations 
needed to finance them are presented as the results of calculation, which is an 
effective structure of argumentation as such, since numbers are often taken as 
incontrovertible without asking what were the premises for the calculation. A 
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familiar locus, such as emphasis on the irreplaceability of an individual or 
unique case (e.g. Ireland as an exceptionally agriculturally-oriented country) 
can lend plausibility to even quite strange arguments. 
Argumentation techniques: associative and dissociative strategies 
The starting points of argumentation and the actual argumentative techniques 
should be distinguished from the structures conditioning the argumentative 
situation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 190) present different techniques 
of argumentation, and analyse their persuasive efficiency and their occurrence 
in different argumentative contexts. According to them, ali argumentation can 
be characterized by processes of association and dissociation. 
By processes of association they understand schemes which bring separate 
elements together and allow us to establish a unity among them, which aims 
either at organising them or at evaluating them, positively or negatively, relative 
to each other. Processes of dissociation are techniques of separation which have 
the purpose of distinguishing elements which are regarded as forming a whole, 
or at least a unified group, within a certain system of thought. Dissociation 
modifies such a system by modifying certain concepts which make up its essential 
parts. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 190). 
The liaisons of concepts and attitudes can be created by verbal techniques 
which are distinguishable from one another. The maj or types of these techniques 
are quasi-logical arguments, arguments that are based on claims conceming the 
structure of reality, and arguments which establish this structure. 
Quasi-logical arguments claim to be rational because they resemble the 
pattems of formal reasoning. They get their strength from claiming similarity to 
logical, mathematical, formal thinking However, a quasi-logical argument differs 
from formal deduction in that it always presupposes adherence to nonformal 
theses which alone allow the application of the argument. The difference between 
these arguments and formal demonstration is that only an effort of reduction or 
specification of a nonformal character makes it possible for these arguments to 
appear demonstrative — this is why they are called quasi-logical. (Ibid., 193-
260). 
Quasi-logical arguments present the situation in a way that sets aside or 
marginalises competing interpretations and individual evaluation criteria. 
Examples of quasi-logical argumentation include the presenting of "analogous" 
situations, which minimises the inherent difference between two real-life 
situations, or the use of statistics and the calculation of probabilities when 
predicting future events (Perelman 1982, 53-80). 
Arguments that are based on the structure of reality depend on liasions which 
are believed to exist and generally accepted between elements of reality. Belief 
in the existence of such objective structures can be associated with a variety of 
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realities, including relations of causality or essences of which certain phenomena 
are merely manifestations. A crucial element in this is the existence of agreements 
which are not questioned and which the speaker uses to develop the argumentation 
(Perelman 1982, 50-51). 
Arguments based on the structure of reality make use of this structure to 
establish a solidarity between accepted judgements and others which it is intended 
to promote. This liaision can be formed by relations of succession, which unite a 
phenomenon with its consequences or causes, and also arguments which apply 
to the co-existence relations that unite a person with his or her actions, a group 
with the individuals who form it, and, in general, an essence with its 
manifestations (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 261-263). In practice, the 
causes of human acts are often complex and interwoven, and their consequences 
may be unforeseen and far-reaching. Similarly, it is scarcely possible to exhaust 
ali the conceivable causes of a given event. A pragmatic argument refers to 
causal chains demonstrated between elements, where value transfers between 
the elements can be carried out by proceeding from cause to effect or from 
effect to cause (ibid., 266). 
Moreover, arguments which establish the structure of reality are those which, 
starting from a known specific case, allow the establishment of a precedent, an 
earlier happening, model, or a general rule, so that they enable reasoning by 
model or example. This permits either the consideration of a particular case or 
reasoning by analogy. The use of models in argumentation relies on the particular 
case approach, while there are various types of argument by analogy that serve 
sometimes to structure an unknown reality and sometimes to take a stance with 
regard to it. Reasoning by analogy is based on establishing and exploiting a 
resemblance between two relationships which originally belong to different 
spheres. Metaphors are the most powerful form of this reasoning Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 350-410; Perelman 1982, 106-125). 
When using metaphors, we look for coherence with previous experiences. 
Metaphors combine reason (categorisation, entailment, inference) with 
imagination (seeing one thing in terms of another) to form an imaginative 
rationality. They create meaning and new realities in our lives, but by making 
events seem consistent they always hide the aspects of the situation that do not 
fit into the metaphor in question. There is no way of expresing something 
completely by paraphrasing it, because some of the meaning of the original 
experience is always lost or altered in the translation. 
Dissociative argumentation is fundamental to every deliberation which, 
seeking to resolve a difficulty raised by general thought, is required to dissociate 
the elements of reality from each other and bring about a new organisation of 
the data. By dissociating the real from the apparent among elements described 
in the same way, we can move in the direction of elaborating a philosophical 
reality which is opposed to the reality of common sense. Perelman refers to 
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pairs created in this way as "philosophical pairs", as opposed to "antithetical 
pairs" such as good and evil or "classificatory pairs" such as animalivegetable 
or north/south (Perelman 1982, 52). 
Essentially, dissociative argumentation is a technique involving separating 
things, people or events that seem to be naturally linked or that are linked by the 
opponent and showing the audience that, in reality, there is no equivalence 
between them. The act of dissociation is typically performed by separating the 
two terms of some classical philosophical pair, by arguing that appearances do 
not represent the deeper reality, for example, or that a theory does not work in 
practice, that an accidental occurrence does not reveal the true essence of the 
situation, that a particular case is not indicative of the rule, that something 
abstract is less important than something concrete, or that something relative 
must be subordinated to something absolute. In each case the first term in the 
pair, and its counterpart in the argumentative context, will have to be shown to 
be illusory or erroneous while the second is said to denote a deeper truth or 
underlying coherence (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 411-459; Perelman 
1982, 126-137). 
By dissociative argumentation, the rhetorician can claim that his opponent or 
audience has grasped only the immediately perceptible impression and missed 
the fundamental meaning behind it, or that the apparent simplicity of an unjustified 
interpretation has misled some people to disregard the various problems connected 
with its application to reality, or that there are several very basic differences 
between the two incidents that have mistakenly been connected. 
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4. CAP: The chain of reforms 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will provide a concise review of the origins, objectives, principles 
and development of the European Union Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
starting with a short discussion of its fundamentals. As this overview is meant as 
a historical background to the MacSharry reform debates of the 1990's, attention 
is primarily paid to the evolution of the policy. In this respect, the main logic 
applying to what has been regarded as problematic, how the problems have been 
approached and what policy measures have been chosen can be considered the 
most important aspects. 
In order not to become engulfed in detail, only the main features of the 
evolution of this policy will be presented. Thus the aim is not to present an 
exhaustive report29. Instead, the CAP policy changes are placed in the larger 
context of the history of European integration. The Common Agricultural Policy 
never developed in a vacuum, for there were political issues that were larger 
than agriculture alone which determined its original setting. Similarly, the further 
European integration has extended and deepened, the more important it has 
been to view the CAP as a part of a much larger project, in connection with the 
evolution of other EU objectives and policies. 
The chapter concludes with another essential feature of the MacSharry reform 
debate context, namely, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Officially, 
the reform had nothing to do with these trade talks, but they did in effect bring 
to an end the isolation of agriculture and agricultural policy within international 
politics. The final section introduces the reader to the main content of the 
MacSharry reform, as a background to the analysis of the debate. 
4.2. Origins and objectives of the CAP 
Agriculture has proved to be a petpetual problem in the context of European 
integration. When Belgium and Luxembourg formed an Economic Union (BLEU) 
in 1922, it turned out to be generally successful apart from the agricultural 
aspect (Tracy 1989, 243). Farmers in Luxembourg needed special treatment on 
account of both the unfavourable natural conditions and the inefficient farm 
structure. Moreover, agriculture had been protected much more in Luxembourg 
than in Belgium, a difference which was reflected in price levels (ibid., 243-
244). 
29  For an overview of the CAP, see e.g. Fennell (1987), Ritson and Harvey (1997). 
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After the Second World War, a wider union, that of the Benelux countries, 
incorporated the Netherlands into the emerging European integration movement. 
The new customs union came into force in 1948 without any transitional period, 
but again different arrangements had to be made for agriculture. In this case 
both Belgium and Luxembourg had difficulties in adapting to a harmonised 
agricultural policy with the Netherlands, and trade in the agricultural sphere 
continued to be subject to various restrictions (ibid., 245). 
In the 1950's, when the establishment of a common European market was 
being considered, experiences with the integrating of agriculture had so far been 
discouraging. Even though the agricultural sector was subject to heavy 
government intervention in ali potential member states, several proposals were 
made at that time regarding how the countries of Europe could organise their 
common agricultural markets, including the "Green Pool" discussions30. Two 
main issues caused differences of opinion: whether the member countries should 
give preference to each others' exports or not, and whether the proposed 
agricultural organisation should be independent or attached to the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, established in 1948). In addition, 
the Netherlands in particular was in favour of supranational control, whereas 
most of the other countries could accept only an inter-governmental authority 
with modest powers (ibid., 246-247). 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which came into being in 
1952, combined France, the German Federal Republic, Italy and the Benelux 
countries into an economic and political integration. Preparations for a general 
common market and action in the field of atomic energy were started among the 
ECSC in the mid-1950' s. After some setbacks these discussions ended up in the 
so-called Spaak Report, which formed the basis on which the treaty to establish 
the European Economic Community was built. The Treaty was signed by the 
Six in Rome in March 1957, and entered into force in the beginning of 1958. 
(Tracy 1989, 250; Fennell 1987, 5). In the following, it is good to keep in mind 
that although the creation of the Community was deeply rooted in the strategic 
military situation in Europe after the Second World War, the Community was 
basically an economic organisation. Economic cooperation and mutual control 
over resources were expected to prevent political and military conflicts in 
Europe and to boost economic growth in member states. 
The inclusion of agriculture in the common market had already been confirmed 
in the Spaak Report, but the way in which this would be organised was left 
30 "The Green Pool" proposals were made by the Council of Europe (established in 1949 by ten 
founding members: Belgium, Denmark, France, Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden), which involved a committee of ministers of national 
governments and an assembly of members of national parliaments (Urwin 1991, 35). For an 
overview of these proposals, see Tracy (1989, 246-248). 
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open. The report argued that specialisation in agriculture could bring significant 
benefits, and that it was necessary in order to balance trade advantages between 
the member countries (Tracy 1989, 251). The simple removal of quotas and 
tariffs would not have established a common market in the case of agriculture, 
however. As agriculture was already subject to detailed govemment intervention 
in ali member states, a common policy for agriculture was needed. 
As for the logic behind including agriculture in the common market, different 
interpretations have been given. Rosemary Fennell (1987, 5) refers first to the 
continued role of the agricultural sector as a major employer in the Europe of 
the1950's, to the great need to improve incomes in the sector, and to the already 
existing govemment intervention in agriculture. Dennis Swann (1990, 205-206) 
is inclined to stress the trade-off between Federal Germany and France, arguing 
that it was in the interests of West Germany to gain free access to the French 
industrial market and in the interests of France to make substantial inroads into 
the West German agricultural market (see also Heringa 1994, 28). A common 
policy was needed, Swann continues (1990, 205-206), because if agricultural 
policy had remained in the hands of the member states, it would have undermined 
the common policies pursued in other sectors. If national price levels had 
differed, countries with low levels would have enjoyed a competitive advantage 
in the sense that low food prices permit low industrial wages. 
The provisions applying directly to agriculture are found in Articles 38 to 47 
of the 248 articles contained in the Treaty of Rome, these ten articles forming a 
framework around which the actual common policy was to be erected later. 
However, as Fennell (1987, 7) has aptly pointed out, the Treaty of Rome as a 
whole is relevant to agriculture, and not only the ten Articles that relate to it 
directly. 
The treaty confirms the inclusion of agriculture in the common market, and 
the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy among the member states. By a 
common agricultural market it means "the products of the soil, of stock farming 
and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these 
products" (Article 38). It also states that tariffs on agricultural trade were to be 
removed over a transitional period of twelve to fifteen years and common 
extemal tariffs instituted. Moreover, by the end of the transitional period, a 
common organisation of markets was to be created. The treaty did not specify 
the nature of this organisation, but it listed the objectives of the common policy 
in the much-quoted Article 39.1 as follows: 
— to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical 
progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural 
production and the optimal utilisation of the factors of production, 
in particular labour; 
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to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, 
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture; 
to stabilise markets; 
to assure the availability of supplies; 
to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
Art. 39.2 of the treaty then required that when elaborating the CAP, attention 
should be paid to the social structures of agriculture and to the disparities 
between agricultural regions. It also pointed out that the necessary adjustments 
to agriculture had to be made by degrees, and that agricultural sector in the 
member states was closely connected with the economy as a whole. These 
arguments were evidently designed to place agriculture in its wider socio-
economic context. 
What stands out in these aims is that they leave a great deal of room for 
interpretation. This is often the case in similar statements of agricultural policy 
objectives in national legislation as well. Folmer et al. (1995, 12) suggest that 
this was a way to secure approval of the treaty in national parliaments. The 
description of the wide variety of policy instruments in Articles 42 and 43 is 
also expressed vaguely and in general terms, and Tracy (1989, 251) notes that 
these provisions would suggest a preference for structural measures rather than 
overall price support, but that this has not been the case in subsequent practice. 
Even so, clear emphasis was given to the role of the market (supply, stabilisation, 
consumer prices) and to the importance of productivity and "rational development 
of agricultural production". The dimension concemed with farmers' incomes is 
well established on the list, and consumers are promised that they will get their 
food "at reasonable prices". 
Articles 44-46 concemed procedures during the transition period and were 
relatively precise. Article 43, which outlined the concrete steps involved in 
establishing the CAP, indicated that the Commission31 should convene a 
conference to compare their existing policies and to make appropriate proposals 
for adoption by the Council of Ministers32. The Commission began its work 
under the leadership of the first Commissioner for Agriculture, the former 
31  The Commission may be regarded as the executive of the Community. The Commissioners are 
appointed by the member states, but are expected to work independently. They are supported 
by Directorates-General (DGs), which employ together thousands of officials. Directorate 
General VI was founded as the directorate for Agriculture. 
32  The Council of Ministers is the highest decision making body of the Community. The so-
called General Council consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ali member states. In 
addition, almost ali other ministers of the member states meet regularly, for example as the 
Agricultural Council, to discuss matters and take decisions in their respective fields of 
competence. 
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Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, and called a conference of the 
member states in Stresa in July 1958. 
Although the Stresa Conference took place in an enthusiastic spirit, basic 
differences remained and the final resolution only outlined general principles 
and aspects that the delegates regarded as important (Tracy 1989, 252). The 
resolution viewed the common agriculture basically in terms of production, 
trade and markets, and its was envisaged that the problems and shortcomings of 
disadvantaged regions and the family farm structure could be overcome by 
raising productivity (CEC 1958, ref. Fennell 1987, 10-11). The spirit of the 
times is obvious in the point made regarding rural issues: "The retraining of the 
agricultural labour force and the industrialisation of the rural regions under the 
greatest pressure would allow for a gradual settlement of the problems posed for 
marginal farms which were economically incapable of being made viable" 
(CEC 1958, ref. Fennell 1987, 11). 
On the basis of the Stresa resolution, the Commission continued its work 
towards concrete policy proposals. A balance had to be found between net 
exporting countries such as France and the Netherlands and net importing 
countries with a heavily protected agricultural sector, particularly Germany. 
The Commission made its detailed operational proposals in June 1960, and after 
intensive discussions in both the Parliament and the Council, they were decided 
upon in December 1960 (Tracy 1989, 253). 
The core of the system — although modified and adjusted several times 
during these years — is still the market and price policy. The most important 
policy instruments are measures directed at the organisation of markets for 
various products. In addition, there are structural measures. Until the early 
1970's, there was hardly any common structural policy on agriculture, but 
instead it was virtually a matter of coordinating national structural policies 
(Folmer et al. 1995, 24). 
The emphasis that the Commission gave to the CAP in its proposals was 
clearly on the technical and economic aspects of agricultural production, while 
it was more reserved in its handling of the social and structural dimensions of 
the new common policy. Numerous pages were devoted to structural problems 
in agriculture, but only a few concrete proposals were made, and these were 
relatively lacking in detail. The Commission made no practical suggestions on 
social policy, but only listed some social policy aims within agriculture. With a 
little good will, we can pick out from these general objectives the first documented 
ideas of rural thinking in the framework of the CAP: to improve rural housing 
and the social and cultural infrastructure of rural areas (Fennell 1987, 12). The 
main role of rural areas is understood to be that of acting as a pool of resources 
which provides agricultural products and excess labour for the use of other 
economic sectors. In the early CAP texts, in which price and market policy form 
the hard core, rural areas do not have any value of their own. 
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4.3. Prineiples of the CAP 
By 1 July 1968, the Community had established a single market for practically 
al133  agricultural products. This did not occur without difficulties, however. The 
major controversies concerned controlling imports from third countries, future 
Community price levels and financing of the future common market organisation 
(Tracy 1989, 252-266). For the most important agricultural products, the 
Community introduced market intervention coupled with a protective device 
which insulated the domestic market from the world market. Because of the 
structure of agriculture in the founding members of the Community, price 
support was directed towards cereals, beef and dairy products. This "bias" for 
northern products was to cause problems later, as the Community enlarged 
towards the south in the 1980's. Finance for the common policy was organised 
through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, 
also known under its French initials, FEOGA), which had been established in 
1962. 
By the end of the transitional period, the Community had managed to make 
three significant moves in agricultural policy: it had dissolved the national 
systems of support and replaced them with Community support systems (Swann 
1990, 213), it had done away protection between member states, and it had 
matched the common support system with a system of common prices. Creating 
a common policy was ali but easy. During the long negotiations in "marathon" 
sessions of the Council, the need to arrive at unanimity in the face of clashing 
national interests tended increasingly to produce compromise solutions (Tracy 
1989, 274). The experiences of constructing a common policy for agriculture 
showed that the reality was far from the supranational idea(1)s of the founders of 
the Community. According to Sicco Mansholt (interviewed 30.8.1992), the 
early years of the CAP were characterized by eventual compromises resulting 
from tough negotiations. In the same interview, however, he stated that the 
position of the Commission had been stronger then than at the beginning of the 
1990's. 
However difficult and sometimes even dramatic the first years of establishing 
the CAP had been, they succeeded in laying the foundation for its functioning. 
Illustrative of the character of this process is that the often repeated three 
principles of the CAP — market unity, Community preference and financial 
solidarity — originated in a 1960 Resolution of the Council which arouse out of 
its discussion on the Commission proposals (COM(60)105). Later they found 
their way into some of the early Community legislation on agriculture, and have 
thereafter been repeated c on stantly (Fennell 1987, 13; Tracy 1989, 257). 
33  Wine and tobacco were the main exceptions, common regulation for them was not adopted 
until April 1970 (Tracy 1989, 266). 
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Despite their somewhat vague origin, these principles give an idea of the 
logic of the CAP. Market unity means that there is a single market for ali CAP 
products, so that they can circulate freely, with a common organisation for each 
product applying the same mies in each member state. On the internal market, 
trade may not be hindered by customs duties or other protective measures. 
Community preference implies that products from inside the EU are given 
priority over competing products from non-member countries. In practice, this 
is achieved by Community Regulations, which counter price variations on imports 
and exports at the external frontiers of the Community by imposing levies on 
imports and refunds on exports in cases where Community prices differ from 
world market prices. The third principle, common financial responsibility, 
signifies both that the operation of the CAP is financed jointly by the EU and 
that likewise, the income generated by the policy contributes to the Community' s 
own resources as part of the Community budget. (Folmer et al. 1995, 13; Fennell 
1987, 13). 
Market unity functions through the "Common Market Organisations" (CM0s), 
an expression used for ali the basic regulations on agricultural products, without 
distinguishing between the methods available under the Article 40.2 of the 
Treaty. CMOs exist for nearly ali the important agricultural products. The 
schemes are not the same for ali products, and regulations have often been 
subject to change over the years. As a separate commodity regime was established 
for each product category, with its own legislation and set of measures, the 
system is diverse and complex. Ali in ali, there are over twenty market 
organisations, the details of which nevertheless lie beyond the scope of this 
work34. 
A further complication was created in 1969, when monetary compensatory 
amounts (MCAs) were created. The 1960's, when the CAP was established, was 
a period of relative currency stability, with fixed exchange rates operating 
throughout western Europe. As Tracy (1989, 268) points out, the whole system 
of common prices had been based on the assumption of exchange rate stability. 
A system of "green rates" to convert common prices to national currencies had 
been set up, in which these green rates equalled the market rates of exchange 
(Fennell 1987, 80). 
When a country devalued or revalued its currency, the subsequent differences 
between the national prices allowed for speculation and facilitated exports from 
a country with a devalued currency and permitted a country with a revalued 
currency to pay less for its imports. This happened for the first time when 
France devalued the franc by 11.11°Å in 1969, but decided not to change its 
green rate (Tracy 1989, 268). In order to prevent such "unfair" intra-Community 
34  Detailed descriptions of the market organisation schemes can be found in Harris et al. (1983), 
OECD (1987) and Fennell (1987). 
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trade, French agricultural exports became subject to an export tax — and the first 
compensatory amounts were introduced, albeit on the understanding that they 
would be only temporary. The breakdown of the gold standard and floating of 
national currencies against the dollar in the early 1970's threatened to destroy 
the whole system of common prices, and in order to avoid distortions of intra-
Community trade, a system of monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) was 
introduced to protect the intervention mechanism (Fennell 1987, 81). In practice, 
MCAs were levied or granted on a generalised and continuing basis on trade 
between member states and on trade with third countries from 1971 until the 
completion of the Single European Market by the end of 1992.35 The system 
allowed CAP support prices to diverge significantly between member states, 
and, as van der Zee (1997, 135-136) has remarked, actually implied a partial 
"renationalisation" of the CAP. 
What is important is that by virtue of these arrangements the Community had 
made two crucial choices (Fennell 1987, 95): it had chosen a managed market 
for agriculture instead of a free market (as for other sectors), and it had 
concentrated most of its efforts on the development of the market and price 
policies. The heavy reliance on the functioning of the market was theoretically 
based on the idea of comparative advantage, for since the price for agricultural 
products is (in principle) the same inside the Community, the geographical 
location of production will shift over a period of time so that different regions 
will produce the particular products for which they have a comparative advantage 
vis-å-vis other areas. Movement of the factors of production and the movement 
of production itself were expected to take care of this. In reality, the market 
approach to integration proved to have certain shortcomings and resulted in 
further intervention. The problems and attempts to solve them will be described 
below. 
4.4. Previous CAP reforms 
4.4.1. The Mansholt Pian 
Hardly had the common policy been completed and a single market achieved for 
practically ali agricultural products, when a reform was called for. The Common 
Agricultural Policy agreed on so far had basically36 been a price and market 
35 For a detailed description of the successive changes in the MCA system, see e.g. Fennell 
(1987, 80-94); Silvis and Mookhoek (1994); Ritson and Swinbank (1997). 
36  To be precise, the first structural policy programme was established under Regulation 17/64/ 
EEC, already in 1964. It included grants for investment costs pertaining to the production and 
marketing of agricultural products, ranging from land reparcelling and irrigation to the setting 
up of marketing structures. 
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policy, despite the fact that the Treaty of Rome (1957, Article 39 paragraph 2, 
line a) states that account shall be taken of"... the particular nature of agricultural 
activity, which results from the social nature of agriculture and from structural 
and natural disparities between the various agricultural regions". Moreover, the 
treaty laid down the objective of fostering technical progress in agriculture, and 
one-third of the resources of the EAGGF resources were meant to be used for 
structural policy purposes (Official Journal 30, 1962). In practice, structural 
policy was restricted to the mutual harmonisation of national structural policies. 
However, by 1968, the Community was encountering growing surplus and 
disposal problems in the case of many commodities. From the Commission's 
point of view, it would have been possible to go on with the common price and 
market policy only if the on-going structural change in agriculture had taken 
place much faster (van der Stelt-Scheele 1994, 102). 
In December 1968 the Commission published its "Memorandum on the 
Reform of Agriculture", which became generally known as the "Mansholt Pian". 
This was intended to set a major reform of agriculture in motion. Commissioner 
Mansholt warned that market support policies alone could not solve the 
fundamental difficulties of agriculture, and included in his pian a suggestion for 
a common structural policy aimed at a dramatic decline in the use of agricultural 
inputs during the period 1970-1980. It envisaged a 50% decrease in agricultural 
labour and the removal of 7% of the cultivated area from production (van der 
Stelt-Scheele 1994, 102). The idea was that this accelerated structural change 
would create "modern production units" using selective investment aids to form 
farms with 80-120 hectares of cropland, 40-60 cows, or similarly high targets in 
other Iines of production (Tracy 1989, 267). In addition to these modern units 
with an optimal combination of factors of production, the proposed policy 
instruments comprised the cessation of farming by elderly farmers, vocational 
training for farmers, afforestation, and a pricing policy which would serve better 
to guide production in line with demand (van der Stelt-Scheele 1994, 102-103; 
Tracy 1989, 267). 
The general logic of the Mansholt Plan was the following. Agricultural 
output had risen faster than demand. At the same time, incomes in agriculture 
were lagging behind those in other sectors. It was envisaged that agricultural 
structures had to be modernised in order to improve competitiveness and bring 
farm incomes more in line with other sectors of the economy. Agriculture was 
perceived solely as a sector of the economy which needed modernisation. Active 
Community intervention was needed to speed up the restructuring of the EU 
agricultural sector. The aim was to help about five million people (Tracy 1989, 
267) to leave agriculture during the 1970's, either through early retirement 
schemes or by means of retraining. Similarly, the land thus released would be 
directed either to new amalgamated farms or to afforestation. Modernisation 
thus came to mean the release of resources from both agriculture and rural areas, 
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and implied that the remaining agricultural units would become more efficient 
in economic terms. 
Moreover, it is worth underlining here that the novelty of the structural 
policy relative to other CAP measures lay in its focus on the factors of production 
rather than on agricultural production itself. Rather than thinking in terms of 
different products (dairy products, beef, pork, wheat, wine etc.), their prices and 
the amounts produced, the policy suggested by Commissioner Mansholt was 
constructed on the concepts of labour, land and capital. 
The Mansholt Pian encountered strong resistance and never materialised in 
the form in which it had originally been proposed. A diluted version was 
nevertheless approved by the Council in 1972 (van der Stelt-Scheele 1994, 
103), and three "socio-structural" directives37 were introduced, conceming the 
modernisation of farms (Dir 159/72/EEC), encouragement to cease agricultural 
activity and reallocate utilised agricultural land for structural improvement (Dir 
160/72/EEC), and provisions for socio-economic guidance for by persons engaged 
in agriculture and for their acquisition of new occupational skills (guidance 
services and retraining schemes) (Dir 161/72/EEC). These measures were 
horizontal, and could be applied throughout the EU. Their purpose was to create 
farms which could provide comparable incomes to those earned in other sectors. 
Moreover, the first structural measures under the CAP were linked in an 
interesting manner with the introduction of a new method of price determination, 
which took "viable" modemised farms as a basis for price increases (Tracy 
1989, 267). 
4.4.2. Modest reforms 
The Mansholt Pian was followed by several more modest plans for reform. The 
Improvement Memorandum (Commission 1973) was a cautious paper which 
did not even dare to call itself a reform, a word that was to remain politically 
incorrect for the next ten years (Tracy 1989, 303). Ali the Improvement 
Memorandum did was to introduce an "objective" method of price setting, as 
mentioned above in connection with the socio-structural measures. In actual 
fact, this became a historical document because of its passing reference to the 
contribution which the CAP could make to the protection of the environment. 
The Community's first environmental action programme had been adopted earlier 
the same year (Fennell 1987a). 
37  Contrary to Regulations, which are directly enforceable laws, applicable and binding in the 
member states, Directives must be implemented by supplementary national legislation and 
give the member states considerable flexibility in application, although the implementing 
legislation has to be approved by the Commission (Roney 1994, 49). Note that the common 
organisation of markets was legislated through Regulations. 
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A fourth socio-structural measure, known as the "Mountain and hill farming 
and farming in less favoured areas" (LFA) -Directive, 75/268/EEC, was 
introduced in the mid-1970's to complement the horizontal structural measures. 
This aimed at supporting farming in mountain areas, helping farming in small 
areas with natural physical handicaps, maintaining a minimum level of population 
and conserving the countryside in certain other less-favoured areas that were 
predominantly dependent on agricultural activity. 
Contrary to the fon-ner measures, this directive was regional and sectoral. Its 
aim was to put a brake on the agricultural and rural exodus which was threatening 
the maintenance of viable communities in these areas and the survival of the 
natural environment. This was the first time an explicitly territorial approach 
had been used in agricultural structural policy, and thereby introduced the 
whole concept of discrimination between regions, since the common market 
policy had been fundamentally the same for ali regions. Moreover, the LFA 
Directive also launched direct income support as part of the arsenal of CAP 
measures, making it possible to pay annual subsidies in the form of "compensatory 
allowances" (usually based on the amount of livestock per fann). 
In 1975 the Commission published a review of the CAP referred to as the 
Stocktaking (Commission 1975), but this document never led to any appreciable 
changes in policy (Fennell 1987a). In the meantime, the Community had enlarged 
itself, gaining three new member states, Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, in 1973. Greece submitted its application for full membership in 
1975, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1977 (Urwin 1990, 38). In anticipation 
of the expected enlargement to the south, the Community raised new issues on 
the CAP agenda. The first of this group of documents, Mediterranean Agricultural 
Problems (Commission 1977), addressed the CAP's bias toward "northem" 
products, the problem of growing regional income disparities and future problems 
concemed with applications for membership from Mediterranean countries. As 
a result, a "Mediterranean package" was adopted, which consisted of a series of 
measures acting in favour of these areas (Tracy 1989, 328). In effect, this was a 
regional approach to agricultural structures which aimed at integrating agricultural 
development activities into the rural economy. It was not long before almost ali 
member states had obtained EAGGF aid for regional schemes of some kind 
(Tracy 1989, 329). The regional aspect of the CAP still remained rather sporadic, 
however, "... with little prior analysis of the economic requirements of the 
region and little or no consultation at the regional level" (ibid.). 
A qualitatively new approach emerged during the late 1970's and the early 
1980's in the form of "Integrated Development Programmes" (IDPs, Fennell 
1987, 207). A limited number of regions (the Outer Hebrides in Scotland, Loz&e 
in France and less-favoured areas of Belgium) were brought under integrated 
regional programmes, the objectives and priorities of which were defined 
alongside the operational means needed to achieve them. Although the 
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programmes were still centred on agriculture, the multi-sectoral organisational 
approach was a novelty which went beyond the agricultural sector and coordinated 
interventions between ali three Structural Funds38 (the European Regional 
Development Fund ERDF, the European Social Fund ESF, and the EAGGF 
Guidance Section). This approach was later extended to the Mediterranean 
regions of Greece, the South of France and South-Central Italy under the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (Regulation 2088/85). This package 
enabled multi-annual projects to develop and modemise the socio-economic 
structure of these areas in order to aid their integration into the broader European 
economy and to improve their competitive status in the new situation brought 
about by the enlargement towards the south. 
4.4.3. Attempts to cut overproduction 
Market imbalance and support costs had already become a problem during the 
1970's, and the situation became even more acute when the British complained 
about the large proportion of the Community budget taken up by the CAP 
(Tracy 1989, 306). The Commission paid special attention to open-ended price 
guarantees as a cause of market imbalances, and its "Reflections on the Common 
Agricultural Policy" (Commission 1980) reviewed the criticism levelled against 
the policy, even discussing the problem of income disparities between rich and 
poor farmers (Fennell 1987a, 62). As a concrete remedy, it put forvvard the 
concept of producer co-responsibility, which had in fact already been in use in 
the sugar sector for many years and had recently been introduced for milk, but 
not as a general or permanent principle of the policy (ibid.). Co-responsibility 
implies that if production exceeds a certain level (a "guarantee threshold"), a 
levy or support price cut will apply. The following year yet another memorandum 
was issued by the Commission, called "Guidelines for European Agriculture" 
(Commission 1981), which made hardiy any concrete proposals but warned 
about a fundamental change in the rural sector as a whole. 
The Commission's contemplations of agricultural surplus problems yielded 
some results in subsequent years, however , and its proposals for "guarantee 
thresholds" for a number of products were introduced in 1982/83 (Tracy 1989, 
306). The need to control agricultural expenditure had become more urgent by 
38  The establishment of the European Social Fund (ESF) was included already in the Treaty of 
Rome (Article 3i, more in detail Articles 123-128). Its aim was to improve possibilities for 
employment and the standard of living of workers. Agreement on the establishment of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was reached in the Paris Summit of 1972 
(Urwin 1991, 14), and established in 1974 (Alvarez and Navarrete 1990, 104). The aim of the 
ERDF was to channel Community resources to the development of bacicwards regions. As 
Alvarez and Navarrete (ibid.) point out, by the creation of the Regional Fund the Community 
implicitly admitted that market forces alone were not able to resolve regional imbalances. 
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this time because of the accession of Greece in 1981 and the approaching 
moment when the Spanish and Portuguese39 were to join the Community. These 
enlargements implied an inevitable growth in the CAP budget. The Commission 
therefore came up with yet another new report, "Adjustment of the Common 
Agricultural Policy" (Commission 1983), which advocated the introduction of a 
restrictive price policy, and foresaw price cuts. Concrete measures for cutting 
production were difficult for the Ministers of Agriculture to accept, however 
(Tracy 1989, 306-309), and in this sense the introduction of a quota system in 
the dairy sector in 1984, in connection with a number of price cuts, was a major 
achievement in the fight against growth in the CAP budget (for more details, see 
Petit et al. 1987). 
The new measures introduced to deal with CAP problems were still isolated 
ones and implied no fundamental changes, and it was only in 1985 that the 
Commission produced a new overall review of the CAP, a discussion document 
entitled "Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy"4° (Commission 
1985). This tried "... to identify the principal fields in which political choices 
are required." (Commission 1985, 1). The Commission saw these choices as 
existing in connection with two broader issues: prices and markets, and the 
position of agriculture in society. 
As before, prices and markets received more attention than agriculture in 
society. But as Rosemary Fennell (1987a, 64) has underlined, the attitude that 
the Commission adopted towards rural areas had changed. Agricultural policy 
makers had so far welcomed out-migration from the countryside, and had 
concentrated on increasing the income of those who remained in agriculture, 
whereas they now felt the need to emphasize the role of agricultural employment 
as an essential element in the maintenance of the social fabric of rural areas. 
This document was by no means a revolutionary one, however, and it made 
only a limited contribution to solving the price and-market policy problems. The 
Commission still clearly preferred price adjustments to supply management 
measures, and new issues such as agriculture and the environment, regional 
development and direct income aids were similarly subordinated to price and 
market policy and considered only in the context of those adjustments rather 
than as independent issues. The main aim was still to maintain farm support at 
the existing level, but this had become more difficult. New arguments were 
sought for in both rural and environmental issues. As Fennell (1987a, 77) 
concludes, one feature of the CAP had been "... the tradition of discussing the 
policy in economic terms to the virtual exclusion of ali other considerations" — 
possibly partly because it was based on productivist principles which were 
discussed in connection with the Marxian criticism of neo-classical agricultural 
economics referred to above (section 2.2.3). 
39 Took place in 1986. 
40 Also known as the ."Green.Paper". 
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Meanwhile, European integration was proceeding elsewhere in more general 
terms, so that it could not fail to impinge upon agriculture. The Single European 
Act, signed in 1985, which came into force in July 1987 and made the first post-
signature amendments to the Treaty of Rome, was significant for the CAP, since 
it assigned top priority to completion of the internal market by 1992. Its main 
aim, however, was to give impetus to concrete progress towards European unity 
and a single, unified market. It facilitated decision-making in the Council of 
Ministers by allowing qualified majority voting in a number of situations, and 
strengthened the powers of the European Parliament. 
Both regional policy and protection of the environment were finally given an 
official status by incorporating them into the Single European Act (Urwin 1991, 
191; Roney 1994, 23-24), and environmental considerations were incoorporated 
into many other policies, testifying to the increased political value attributed to 
the environment (Liefferink 1995, 10-13). 
As for regional policy, the act contained a general admonition which led in 
February 1988 to a doubling of the resources available to the Structural Funds 
between 1987 and 1993 (Marks 1992, 191). A part of the strengthening of the 
common regional policy consisted of the incorporation of the concept of 
"economic and social cohesion" into the constitutional provisions for the 
Community (Nugent 1989, 45). The more official explanation for the concerns 
over regional disparities has been that they should he tackled because they 
hamper further integration, but as Gary Marks (1992, 205-206) has argued, the 
underlying motivation has been the Community's need to gain the loyalty of 
individual citizens, who expect the policy to express basic moral commitments 
to justice and equality. 
Despite the gradual steps taken to strengthen the institutional structure of the 
Community and the new dimensions added to the CAP discussion itself — such 
as the environment and the partial decoupling of agricultural support from 
pro duction in the form of direct income aid — expenditure on agricultural market 
support remained an immediate and crucial issue in the Community. At the 1984 
Fontainebleau summit, the European Council increased the VAT (value added 
tax) contributions of the member states to the Community budget to 1.4% 
(Urwin 1991, 188). Although the Agricultural Council froze the prices for most 
commodities during the years 1986-1988, expenditure continued to rise (Tracy 
1989, 308), partly because of the declining value of the dollar, which 
automatically increased the cost of export subsidies (Urwin 1991, 189). Since 
the Community had to rely on its "own resources"41, and could not borrow to 
41  According to a decision taken in 1970, the funding of the Community's budget was changed 
from a system of national contributions to "own resources", which at that time consisted of 
customs duties, agricultural levies, and a proportion of Value Added Tax (VAT) up to a 
1 percent ceiling — further increased to 1.4% in 1984. In 1988, a fourth "own resource" was 
added. It consists of the application of a rate to a base which represents the sum of Member 
States' Gross National Product at market prices (see more in detail Nugent 1989, 259-261). 
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cover its increasing deficit, for example, an overall package deal was prepared, 
known as the Delors I package. 
This package deal was an agreement on how to combine reform of the 
Structural Funds42 and the new budgetary resources (see footnote 41) with a 
revised "financial guideline" for agriculture (Tracy 1989, 308-309). The package 
was decided upon at the February 1988 Brussels Summit, and imposed a 
budgetary guideline on EAGGF (Guarantee) expenditure. The rate of increase 
in the guideline from 1988 to 1992 was limited to 74% of the annual rate of 
growth in the Community gross national product (Fearne 1997, 50). For the 
CAP, the package included, the introduction of additional stabilisers, which 
brought with them a system of maximum guaranteed quantities (MGQs) for a 
number of products. The system varied somewhat from sector to sector, but 
primarily it meant that if actual production exceeded the MGQ, support prices 
for the following year were to be automatically reduced in proportion to the 
overshot (ibid.). This mechanism was to ensure that any further increases in 
production would not cause additional support expenditure (Tracy 1989, 309). 
In addition to these "automatic" stabilisers, the package included structural 
measures aimed at curbing the growth in agricultural produce and compensating 
farmers for the loss of income, including provisions for setting aside arable 
land, extensification, conversion to non-surplus products or other activities 
relevant to rural society, and early retirement. According to van der Zee (1997, 
141), the Delors I package was significant in the sense that it came to mean a 
hardening of the soft budget constraint which had applied to the CAP up to that 
time. 
By the end of the decade a spirit of deepening integration prevailed in the 
Community, and in 1991 the European Council decided to establish a Cohesion 
Fund to assist less-developed member states to achieve the convergence criteria 
required for economic and monetary union (EMU) (Roney 1994, 57). In the 
Delors II package, which determined the financing framework for the years 
1993-1999, this decision was put into effect. By using the Cohesion Fund and 
Structural Funds together to support less-developed regions in matters such as 
agriculture and environmental protection. 
4.5. The MacSharry reform: Context and content 
A number of measures were thus taken by the EU during the 1980's to curb 
rising agricultural production, but they had fallen short of the mark. 
42  The Brussels Summit also reformed the Structural Funds. In the future, the Structural Funds 
(EAGGF Guidance Section, ESF and ERDF) were to share and to concentrate development 
efforts on five objectives in stra. tegic multi-annual programmes; simultaneously their financial 
resources were doubled over a five-year period (van der Zee 1997, 150). 
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Simultaneously, the CAP measures were also coming under increasing extemal 
pressure from trading partners, largely within the context of the Uruguay Round 
of GATT trade negotiations, although officially the MacSharry reform had no 
connection whatsoever with the GATT negotiations. 
4.5.1. Context: the GATT Uruguay Round 
The "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (GATT) was originally a part of 
a post-war pian for creating three key institutions — one to oversee commercial 
relations, one to provide a framework for monetary relations, and one to mobilise 
resources for reconstruction and development. The last two resulted in the 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, better known as the World Bank) 
at Bretton Woods in 1947. The planned International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
was still-bom, as the agreement for establishing it was never ratified (Greenaway 
1991, 365-366). 
The enabling treaty which had been prepared to clear the way for the ITO in 
fact became a set of GATT rules goveming world trade, a 38-article treaty 
signed by 23 countries in Geneva in 1947 that came into effect in 1948. By 1994 
the number of signatory states was 114, accounting for about 90% of the 
world's trade (CAP Working Notes 1995, 7). The primary objective of the 
GATT has been to provide a framework for the orderly conduct of trade and a 
process within which systematic liberalisation of trade can take place. This 
process is expected to contribute to economic growth, development and human 
well-being. The main means of achieving the objective have been the reduction 
of tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions and subsidies on trade. The GATT 
serves its Contracting Parties (CPs) as a forum for Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN "rounds") which periodically bring the CPs together to agree on a package 
of trade measures (Greenaway 1991, 366-367; Harvey 1997, 377-378). 
The history of the GATT can be characterised in terms of three phases 
(Harvey 1997, 377-378). During the first phase (1947-1955, including four rounds 
of negotiations), it was decided which commodities and sectors should be 
included in-trade liberalisation, and agreed that the means for doing this should 
be freezing and binding of existing•tariff levels. During the second phase (1959-
79, including three major rounds) tariff cuts were achieved on a request/offer 
basis and through agreement on formulae and codes goveming the use and level 
of trade impediments. The third phase was the Uruguay Round, which opened in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 20th September 1986 and ended with the official 
signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15th, 1994. 
The Uruguay Round forms a phase of its own in the history of the GATT 
because the negotiations included the largest and most complex list of issues 
ever addressed so far. It began with fifteen negotiation areas, fourteen of which 
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concerned various aspects of trade in goods and the remaining one the provision 
of services — whereas until then the GATT rounds had covered primarily tariffs 
(CAP Working Notes 1995, 13). Agriculture had in effect been left out of the 
1947 agreement, so that the Uruguay Round was also intended to end the special 
status of agricultural trade within the GATT. 
The fact that the GATT countries had been reluctant to impose any firm 
discipline on trade in agricultural products has been attributed to a fear that the 
rigours of international competition would cause unacceptable social and 
economic disruption for a declining sector (OECD 1995, 10). In any case, the 
sector was given a number of general or country-specific derogations or 
exemptions as a result. The most important exemption was that the use of export 
subsidies and quantitative import restrictions (quotas) was permitted in situations 
where domestic production was also subject to quantitative restrictions (ibid.). 
Moreover, GATT had also proved unable to enforce the existing mies on farm 
policies. Mechanisms such as variable import levies, which clearly violated the 
principle of bound tariffs, had not been successfully challenged up to the time of 
the launching of the Uruguay Round (Harvey 1997, 379; OECD 1995, 10). In 
general, GATT principles had suffered an erosion, and there was a real danger 
of multilateralism being completely replaced by either minilateralism (based on 
the three major trading blocs), or greater bilateralism (Greenaway 1991, 371). 
By 1986 the situation had become unbearable. The special treatment accorded 
to agriculture was not in line with the liberalisation of trade in other sectors. 
World prices for agricultural products were declining and the costs of protecting 
and supporting domestic production were growing in the developed countries. 
Tensions were arising around agricultural trade, while agricultural exporters in 
particular were calling more vociferously than ever for more discipline in farming 
trade policies. Without such an agreement, the whole GATT package would be 
rejected by the US and the countries led by the Cairns Group43. 
At the same time, the OECD was developing tools for analysing and 
quantifying the links between domestic agricultural policies and trade (OECD 
1987). Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents were used during the 
Uruguay Round to measure the transfers generated by agricultural policies. The 
most significant aspect of the new approach to agricultural trade was the 
reinterpretation of what was a domestic trade issue (and thus a sovereign matter), 
and what was an international one. This approach created a link between domestic 
support and trade distortions. Since the launching of the Uruguay Round, ali 
direct and indirect subsidies have come under scrutiny as to their possible 
distorting effects on trade. 
43  Cairns Group consists of 14 small and medium sized developed and developing agricultural 
exporters: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. The group is named after the 
location of their first conference. 
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David Harvey (1997, 380) draws attention to the significance of embedding 
agricultural negotiations in a wider, multilateral package of world trade issues. 
The fact that a number of countries declared that agreements in other negotiating 
areas were contingent on an agreement on agriculture, increased interest in farm 
policies beyond the sphere of the farming (and finance) ministers. This has been 
seen as a sign of increasing pressure on special interests within agriculture. In 
addition, the negotiating of many issues on one list increased the scope for 
bargained solutions in which countries losing out on one front could offset this 
with gains on other fronts. It also had the effect that highlighting the Iines of 
battle between industry and agriculture within many of the developed countries 
or groupings such as the EU. 
The main traders involved in the agricultural negotiations lay far apart in 
terms of their initial positions. The United States, backed by the Cairns Group, 
required the elimination of ali agricultural policy measures by the year 2000. 
This "zero option" position had three major targets: 
an end to ali domestic production aid within 10 years (the 
proposal in 1990 had been a 75% cut in domestic support); 
an end to ali export subsidies within 5 years (the proposal in 
1990 had been a 90% reduction in export subsidies); 
an end to all protection measures at the border within 10 years 
(CAP Working Notes 1995, 15). 
The EU, followed by Japan and the Nordic countries, rejected the US position 
out of hand, and the EU put forward more cautious proposal involving a modest, 
phased reduction in support for agriculture. "Rebalancing" was its key demand 
throughout the negotiations, implying that it would grant access concessions on 
cereals only in return for a reciprocal concession allowing it to replace the zero 
tariff on non-cereal animal feeds to which it had been bound in an earlier round. 
The problem was that imports of non-cereal animal feeds had displaced EU-
grown cereal supplies in EU livestock production (OECD 1995, 12, 63). The 
United States and its supporters were ready to accept only decoupled support, 
i.e. support which distorts neither production nor trade, and declared that 
agreements in other negotiating areas were contingent on an agreement over 
agriculture. 
The round was envisaged to end in a formal signing in Brussels in early 
December 1990. According to Greenaway (1991, 374-376), there were several 
reasons why things did not work out that way. As mentioned, the scale of the 
issues was enormous, and there were powerful intersectoral linlcages. Offers of 
concessions in one area were held up because of lack of progress in other, 
linked issues. Moreover, the combining of issues made monitoring of the overall 
outcomes very complex, and the number of old and new issues also encouraged 
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cross-coalitional activity. Among the many things that went wrong with the 
negotiations, one effect undoubtedly arose from the fact that the EU was 
preoccupied to a large extent with its single market programme. 
Even reaching an agreement on a mid-term package, in Geneva in April 
1989, proved to be extremely difficult. Under the heading of short term measures, 
it was agreed to freeze current domestic and export support and protection 
levels. The negotiation partners were able to agree on the long-term principle of 
providing for substantial progressive cuts in agricultural support and protection, 
although there were notable differences of opinion in matters of detail. A 
foundation was nevertheless laid for the three main elements — import access, 
export subsidies and domestic support — which later formed the three pillars of 
the Agreement on Agriculture, and the idea of proceeding separately on the 
three fronts gained ground at this stage. But even so, the EU was among those 
who continued to pursue the idea of a single discipline based on a measure of 
domestic support (OECD 1995, 12-13). This was the situation in the Uruguay 
Round at the time when the MacSharry reform proposals were being prepared. 
The Brussels talks collapsed in December 1990, at a meeting which was 
supposed to bring the round to a close. The incorporation of disciplines on 
export subsidies proved to be the most difficult issue, since the EU in particular 
was reluctant to accept specific limitations. This was one major reason for the 
failure in Brussels (OECD 1995, 13). It took five more years before the Final 
Agreement was concluded, and discipline in each of the three main elements 
mentioned above was achieved only in 1991. Arthur Dunkel, then Secretary-
General of the GATT, put forward a Draft Final Act in December 1991, and 
negotiations proceeded on the basis of his proposals, which covered ali the main 
elements, although the suggested reductions were no more than modest ones. 
The EU nevertheless found them too high and required that utilisation of the 
various CAP instruments needed to be protected from challenge within the 
GATT once agreement had been reached on the three fronts. Finally, it was only 
after protracted bilateral discussions between the US and the EC in November 
1992 that an agreement was reached, known as the Blair House Accord. (OECD 
1995, 13-14; CAP Working Notes 1995, 16-17). 
Agriculture became disciplined in four fronts. First, ali border restrictions 
must be converted into tariffs, and these tariffs have to be reduced by 36% over 
a six-year period beginning in 1995. In addition, a minimum of 5% of the 
domestic market was to be opened to foreign competition by the end of this 
period. Secondly, subsidised exports were to be cut by 36% in value and 21% in 
volume relative to the average for the period 1986-1990. Thirdly, the overall 
value of agricultural support was to be reduced by 20% relative to the period 
1986-1990. This measure did not include "decoupled payments", however, i.e. 
payments which do not influence farmers' production decisions. To assist 
acceptance of the agreement, a "Peace Clause" was included to protects certain 
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("green box") policies from challenge under GATT and to exempt other "blue 
box" policies from ali but countervailing duties, as long as support did not 
exceed 1992 levels. The fourth element covered sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, but was technically a separate matter from the Agreement on 
Agriculture. (Harvey 1997, 384-385; OECD 1995, 15-19). In addition, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) includes a specific 
commitment to a multilateral review of progress, beginning in 1999 (ibid., 390). 
According to Harvey (1997, 384), the most important fact was that the 
signatories accepted two principles: that agriculture is no longer a special case 
within the GATT, and that domestic farm policies are subject to international 
govemance through the GATT and to binding intemational commitments itemised 
in country schedules, especially on border measures. 
4.5.2. Content: the MacSharry reform 
Within the EU itself, measures were needed in order to cope with the problem 
of growing over-supply and the increasing cost of the CAP. A restrictive pricing 
policy was tried first, followed by output control through quota regimes, co-
responsibility levies and other adjustments to the support mechanisms. A series 
of measures aimed at stabilising output were approved in the late 1980's, when 
the European Council fixed a ceiling for agricultural expenditure up to the end 
of 1992 and measures were adopted to ensure that this was not exceeded. As van 
der Zee (1997, 141) has remarked, the growth in the policy measures in operation 
under the CAP had increased by the end of the 1980's both in its intransparency 
and the budgetary costs involved. 
The first rumours of a radical reform of DGVI leaked out in December 1990, 
and the Commision submitted a communication to the Council on "The 
Development and Future of the CAP" at the begirming of February 1991 (CEC 
1991a). 
In their analysis of the problems faced by the CAP, the early reform proposals 
(ibid.) emphasised two factors: that the volume of agricultural production was 
growing faster than consumption, and that the distribution of CAP benefits 
amongst farmers was unequal, because income support was built on price 
guarantees. "The effect of this is that 80% of the support provided by FEOGA is 
devoted to 20% of forms which account also for the greater part of the land used 
in agriculture" (ibid., 2). Arguments connected with the environment and rural 
development also played an important role in the suggestions. 
The original proposals extended to ali the major sectors of agriculture in the 
EU, it was the-proposals for the arable sector that lay at the core of the reform. 
The basic elements were to reduce levels of price support in the cereals and beef 
sectors, bringing them closer to world market levels, and to compensate farmers 
for their loss of revenue through a system of (direct income) acreage payments 
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based on historical average yields and a base area per region. In the early 
versions of the reform, the intention was to "modulate" the compensation so that 
it would have favoured small and medium-scale producers through headage and 
hectarage limits on compensation. The reform originally covered measures 
affecting milk production as well, but the suggested substantial (and again 
modulated) reductions in milk quotas were fairly soon forgotten. The first 
refiection paper also referred to a reform of the sugar and tobacco sectors "in 
the immediate future" (ibid., 14). The market measures were to be accompanied 
by a series of forestry reforms, an early retirement scheme for farmers over 55 
years old, and various agri-environmental measures. 
No member state welcomed the proposals in full, but no one argued for the 
status quo, either. The Commission made several proposals before final agreement 
was reached in May 1992. The final version (European Community 1992) 
watered down the concept of modulation and concentrated mainly on the cereals 
sector. Support prices for cereals and beef were cut, but less than had initially 
been suggested. Price support for oilseeds was abolished, and payments per 
hectare were cut. It was decided to reduce the price for cereals by 29% over a 
period of three years. Compensation for these price cuts by means of direct area 
and livestock payments was linked to supply control measures, in that cereal 
and oilseed growers were required to take 15% of their land out of pro duction to 
qualify for the compensation. Furthermore, compensation was based on past 
average yields, which was fi-ozen, thereby breaking the link between farm 
support ant the increasing amounts which it incites farmers to produce. Instead 
of modulation, which had been furiously attacked by the lobby of larger farmers, 
small-scale farms were exempted from setting land aside. At the same time, the 
role of intervention support was greatly reduced, which affected the beef sector 
in particular. 
Livestock was less affected by the reform than cereals, but here again, 
intervention prices were reduced by 15% in three steps. Compensation payments 
for beef and mutton were limited to a fixed number of animals based on 
historical herd sizes and limited by quotas. Livestock payments were also linked 
to a maximum stocking density limit to promote extensification. Only modest 
changes were agreed on in the dairy sector, involying a reduction in general EU 
quotas and a 3% reduction in the intervention price for butter by 1994/5. The 
price of skimmed milk powder remained unchanged. There were many other 
major products that were not included in the reform, notably sugar, fruit and 
vegetables, wine, olive oil, pork and poultry. 
There was a lot of debate during the reform negotiations as to how radical 
the reform was, whether it would solve the problems of the CAP and what was 
in the end new about it. It is clear that the final result was less radical than the 
initial proposals, and many of the new elements brought into the discussion 
were also diluted eventually. The MacSharry reform did establish direct income 
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subsidies as a policy measure, however, and it also strengthened the status of 
environmental and rural issues on the agenda, although the concrete policy 
measures connected with these issues remained vague and left the member 
states room for manoeuvring as to how far to implement them. 
Having said this, it is important to continue with the fact that the reform left 
the core of the "old" CAP, commodity regimes and price guarantees, almost 
intact. This core has lost little of its force, but the cost of the policy has been 
shifted further from the consumers to the taxpayers. It must also be noted that 
the fundamental principles of the CAP — price unity, community preference and 
financial solidarity — were not questioned. 
Furthermore, the reform altered the image of the CAP to some extent, by 
making its policy instruments more transparent. This was especially clear in the 
case of arable farming, since the reform made the long-standing support for 
cereals visible, whereas it had previously taken the form of trade restrictions 
and intervention buying (Winter 2000, 50). According to Lowe et al. (1999, 15), 
increasing transparency has opened up the debate on the CAP and brought 
additional policy actors into play beyond the traditional agricultural community. 
Other observers (e.g. Cox et al. 1985, 1988; Clark et al. 1977; Winter 2000) 
conclude cynically that what happened with the new issues was that the traditional 
agricultural community adopted a new, more persuasive way to articulate its 
interests rather than opening the agricultural policy debate up to outsiders. The 
changes that have taken place in EU agriculture since the MacSharry reform lie 
beyond the scope of the present investigation. 
4.6. Conclusions 
European economic integration inherited an isolated and protected agricultural 
sector from the founding member states and established a common market and 
price policy in accordance with the same logic. Policy measures broadened 
gradually from products to production factors, and from the goal of increased 
productivity to that of production control and supervised reductions. The change 
was a cautious one, however, being mainly directed towards countering the 
negative effects of the price support policy. Similarly, the new issues 
(environment, regional and rural problems) did not appear on the EU agenda out 
of the blue, but first emerged as marginal notes in discussion papers and gradually 
gained more status as arguments. In the case of environmental and regional 
issues, they gained independent significance in EU policies outside the CAP, as 
the Structural Funds were strengthened and the EU gradually developed its 
common environmental policy. Rural policy is still more or less "subsidiary" to 
the common policy for agriculture. 
The CAP was originally essentially an income policy for the farmers, as 
reflected in particular in the strong position of market and price policy within it. 
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A common organisation of markets is legislated for through a set of regulations 
which are directly enforceable laws. The strong position of market and price 
policy is reinforced by including the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF in the 
compulsory expenditure of the EU Budget, which is the domain of the 
Commission and the Council, leaving the EU Parliament with little influence or 
control over the CAP (Fennell 1987, 69-72). 
It is essential to note, as De Benedictis et al. have aptly remarked, that during 
the history of the CAP up to the 1990's, the reason for reform was not the 
outcome of a desire to modify the goals of the policy of intervention but rather 
the necessity to reduce the negative effects of the CAP itself (De Benedictis, De 
Filippis and Savatici 1990, 177). 
The history of the CAP objectives and reforms also shows how the EU as an 
economic community grew and took on a new shape around the ofiginal common 
policy for agriculture. When assessing the changes that have been made to the 
CAP, it is indeed essential to bear in mind that the whole community, of which 
the CAP is only a part, has fundamentally changed in nature in the course of the 
decades. We will return to this point more in detail in the conclusions in 
Chapter 9. In a similar vein, the GATT Uruguay Round took agricultural policy 
into a new era in the sense that domestic policies came under the scrutiny of 
international trade policy and were connected more closely with trade and 
policy in other sectors of the economy. 
83 
5. The national case studies: Similarities and differenees 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides background information for the presentation and analysis 
of the case studies and discusses the main structures and features of policy-
making and agriculture in the two countries, the Netherlands and Ireland. As it 
is meant to reconstruct the context for the case debates, agriculture in the two 
countries will he presented in the light of figures applying to the early 1990's. 
The purpose of this chapter is not only to present the information needed in 
order to give meaning to the analysis of the national debates but also to create a 
picture of the complex framework in which the Common Agricultural Policy 
has to exist, be formulated and implemented, and exercise its impact. 
5.2. The Netherlands 
5.2.1. Dutch politics 
The Netherlands is located on the North Sea, around the Rhine/Meuse estuary44. 
It has an area of about 42,000 square kilometres, and is inhabited by a population 
of 15 million. With an average of more than 400 people per square kilometre, it 
is one of the world' s most densely populated countries (Andeweg and 
Irwin 1993, 1; Roney 1994, 250). This population density means that it is one of 
the few countries in the EU where rural depopulation is not a notable problem. 
Instead, land and space are scarce resourees, a fact reflected in the price of land, 
which in tum has consequences for agriculture. 
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. 
The Dutch Parliament, officially ealled the States-General, comprises two 
chambers, the First Chamber, with 75 members elected indirectly by 
representatives of the provinces, being subsidiary in importance to the directly 
elected Second Chamber, the real political arena, with 150 members (The 
Netherlands in Brief 1997, 14-15). With the introduction of universal (male) 
suffrage in 1917, proportional representation replaced the former geographical 
representation in elections, and since then the whole country has been treated as 
a single electoral district (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 86-87). The members of 
legislative bodies at four levels are chosen by election: municipal councils, 
provincial legislatures, the Second Chamber of Parliament and the European 
Parliament (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 80). 
" The Kingdom of the Netherlands actually also comprises two other parts: the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba in the Caribbean. The present discussion is restricted to the Netherlands in 
Western Europe. 
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The Prime Minister is appointed by the monarch, who also appoints the other 
members of the Council of Ministers on the Prime Minister's recommendation. 
The monarch and the ministers constitute the government, although as the 
monarch is inviolable under the constitution, it is the ministers that are responsible 
for her actions and are alone accountable to Parliament (The Netherlands in 
Brief 1997, 15). The ministers together form the Cabinet, which is the main 
executive body. Governments may also appoint state secretaries, or junior 
ministers, who are politically accountable for their portfolios. 
The political system in the Netherlands is such that most governments are 
coalitions. The electoral system based on proportional representation enables 
even small parties to win seats in Parliament, so that in the early 1990's there 
were nine parties with one or more seats (ibid., 16). As no party could form a 
majority government alone, the Lubbers III government consisted of the Christian 
Democrats (CDA) and the Labour Party (PvdA) (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 
119), with both the Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, a catholic, and the Minister 
of Agriculture, Piet Bukman, a protestant, representing the Christian Democrats. 
This Christelijk Demokratische Appel (CDA, Christian Democratic Alliance), 
which is usually located towards the centre of the Dutch left-right continuum, 
consists of three confessional groups, the Catholic group, de Katholieke 
Volkspartij, and two protestant groups, de Anti-Revolutionaire Partij and de 
Christelijk-Historisch Unie, which merged to form one party in 1980 (ibid., 50-
53). According to gallup polls, most farmers vote for Christian Democrat 
candidates or for the VVD (Hoetjes 1990). After the election of 1989 the 
Christian Democrats formed the largest party in the Second Chamber of 
Parliament. 
De Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, the Labour Party), a social democratic party, 
gained the second largest number of votes in the 1989 election (The Netherlands 
in Brief 1997, 16), followed in third place by Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie (VVD, the People' s Party for Freedom and Democracy), a 
conservative-liberal party, sometimes interpreted as "more conservative than 
liberal" (Righart 1992, 58), and in any case the most conservative of the current 
major Dutch parties (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 56). The fourth major party is 
Democraten '66 (D66, Democrats 66), often regarded as a progressive-liberal or 
"liberal protest party" (Righart 1992, 52). Groen Links (the Green Left) was 
formed in 1989 by the merger of two leftist Christian Democrat parties and two 
Labour parties, including the former Communists. It provides strong support for 
environmental and Leftist social policies (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 60-61). 
Dutch policy-making is centralised in territorial terms relative to that in 
many other West European countries, the provinces being intermediate between 
the local and national authorities lacking any significant impact on policy-
making, while the municipalities are dependent on centrally controlled funds 
(Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 158-163). On the other hand, the Netherlands is said 
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to be functionally decentralised into largely autonomous policy sectors, each 
composed of interest groups, advisory boards, a government department and 
specialised parliamentary committees (ibid., 164-186). The incorporation of 
interest groups into the decision-making process strengthens this functional 
decentralisation and subsequent sectorisation of policy-making and reinforces 
departmental fragmentation, another phenomenon typical of the Dutch political 
culture. The ministries retain a great deal of autonomy (van den Bos 1991, 67). 
One remarkable feature of Dutch political culture until recently has been the 
segmentation of society into four subcultures, known as zuilen, pillars, — namely 
the Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and Liberal pillars (on pillarisation, see Lijphart 
1968). These groups not only provided the constituencies for the major political 
parties, but acted as tightly organised social groups or subcultures that structured 
nearly ali aspects of social life in the Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 
27). In practice, this Ted to a social "apartheid", in which movement between the 
pillars was rare. The need to maintain a delicate balance between the interests of 
the different groupings has, according to Andeweg and Irwin, led to non-decision-
making in issues where yes/no decisions are inescapable. Different means have 
been employed to avoid difficult decisions: postponing the decision, defusing 
the political dispute by the use of technical arguments (depoliticisation), or 
shifting responsibility away from the govemment. According to Arendt Lijphart 
(1975), the elites of the different pillars govemed the country through a "politics 
of accommodation" in which social heterogeneity at the mass level was 
compensated for by cooperation rather than competition — between the elites at 
the top. Although this pillarisation has been fading away since the 1960's for 
many reasons, Andeweg and Irwin (1993, 49) argue that the accommodationist 
practices still prevail.45  
According to Frouws (1993, 53-74), pillarisation has been typical of the 
Dutch neo-corporatist "agricultural model". Agriculture is organised in conformity 
with three confessional (levensbesclzouwelijke) trends: the Catholic, Protestant 
and non-confessional groupings, a division based on socio-cultural differences 
in identity rather than politico-economic confrontation. The devotion to one's 
own group typical to pillarisation and obedience to the elite facilitate cooperation 
at the top. The various farmers' organisations form a special interest group, het 
Landbouwschap, which also exercised public authority in certain agricultural 
policy issues. The depoliticising dimension of pillarisation can be recognised in 
the inclination of the agricultural elite to emphasise a technical approach to 
45There has been a lively-discussion on the role of consensus and the transformation of pillarisation 
in Dutch politics. Van Schendelen (1978), for example, has a different explanation for 
pillarisation from that of Lijphart and places more emphasis on the goal of political control. 
Van Praag (1993) argues that a lot of the characteristics of the pillarised political stnictures 
still remain in the Netherlands, but the passive masses do not exist any longer. For this debate, 
see Becker (1993). 
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agricultural policy rather than an ideological one. What Andeweg and Irwin 
(1993, 179) say about policy-making in the Netherlands in general also holds 
true for agriculture: it has a distinctly technocratic flavour. In order not to 
offend any of the minorities, decisions are often based on technical rather than 
ideological motives. Similarly, civil servants must be specialised in a particular 
policy area rather than in more general managerial skills (ibid.). I shall return in 
more detail to the transformation of the Dutch "green front", as the irmer circles 
of the country's agricultural policy have been called, in Chapter 7, on themes. 
5.2.2. Dutch agriculture 
An essential characteristic of Dutch agriculture is its intensity. Despite the small 
area of the Netherlands, it is one of the largest exporters of agricultural pro duce 
in the world. In the early 1990's, about 65% (2,010,000 ha) of its land area was 
being used for agriculture, 35% as grassland, 25.6% as arable land and 3.3% for 
horticulture (Facts and Figures 1992, 9). Because of this intensity of production, 
farm size in hectares is not a good measure of the extent of Dutch agriculture, 
not least because non-land-using industrial systems have expanded, especially 
in meat production. If we exclude horticultural holdings, which may be tiny in 
terms of area but substantial in economic terms, the average size of a Dutch 
agricultural enterprise in 1991 was 19.1 hectares (OECD 1994, 227). 
General natural conditions in the Netherlands are particularly suitable for 
dairy farming. The terrain is flat, the soils are deep, there are ample water 
supplies and the climate is temperate (Ibid., 173). Agriculture is regionally 
differentiated, however, with the north and west of the country consisting mainly 
of flat, low-lying areas, often reclaimed from water bodies, with mainly clay 
soils, while the east and south are in part hillier and drier, and the soil type is 
mainly sand. Most of the arable farms are located in the new polders, as the 
areas reclaimed from the water are called, and also in the extreme north-east of 
the country. 
The maun arable crops are wheat, sugar beet and potatoes. Horticultural 
holdings, particularly glasshouses, are generally concentrated near urban areas 
in the "Randstad" region in the west of the country. This is the most regionally 
concentrated major sub-sector of Dutch agriculture. By contrast, intensive animal 
production has developed mainly on sandy soils in the central, eastern and 
southern regions, whereas dairy farming is the least geographically concentrated 
of the major industries, being spread widely over the centre of the country. 
Silage maize growing for animal feed has also expanded substantially in the 
dairy farming areas. (Pictorial Atlas of the Netherlands 1977; OECD 1994, 178, 
190; Facts and Figures 1992, 21). 
There were 125,000 farms and horticultural holdings in the Netherlands in 
1990, 98,200 of which were full-time businesses (LEI 1991, 231). According to 
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Eurostat statistics, this was one of the three EU countries where less than 25% 
of the farmers had any other gainful activity in 1995, along with Belgium and 
Luxembourg (ref. in Peltola 2000, 67). A total of 290,000 Dutch people were 
regularly employed in agriculture in the early 1990's, accounting for 4.6% of 
the total working population and 4.5% of its GDP (OECD 1994, 169). 
Intensive livestock production entails keeping the animals in stalls and buying 
fodder from outside the farm, a procedure which has created a severe 
environmental problem in the form of urine and manure surpluses, as also 
experienced on many dairy farms. The damage to the environment takes the 
form of both groundwater pollution (from urine) and soil acidification (by 
manure). As different Iines of production are concentrated in different parts of 
the country, however, the situation vades regionally. In eastern Brabant, for 
example, the surplus of animal waste in 1991 represented two-thirds of the 
farmers' needs (Agra Europe, 13 December 1991). There have been attempts to 
develop pig production into closed systems, isolating these enterprises from the 
environment as much as possible, while another solution has been to install 
manure banks and to process the manure for export, although this has not been 
economically sustainable on a larger scale. It now seems that reducing the 
numbers of cattle (and, unavoidably, the numbers of farms) may be the only 
option from the point of view of the government, whereas the farmers' union 
would prefer to solve the problem without closing any farms (NRC Webpagina's, 
11.9.1999). 
Livestock production, dominated by dairy products, is the largest element 
contributing to the gross value of production, followed in importance by 
horticulture and arable crops (OECD 1994, 170). The food, drink and tobacco 
industry accounted for more than a quarter of the country's total industrial 
turnover in 1991, making it one of the most important industrial sectors in the 
country, and at the same time provided 16% of ali industrial employment (Facts 
and Figures 1992, 50). 
A market-oriented approach to trade in general is a well-known feature of the 
Netherlands — and agriculture is no exception. Dutch agriculture and its food 
industry are highly export-oriented, so that 90% of the veal produced in the 
country in 1989-91 was exported, 75% of the cut flowers and cheese, 70% of 
the eggs and lamb and 60% of the pork and poultry meat (OECD 1994, 171). 
Agricultural products accounted for 17.5% of the total value of merchandise 
exports in 1990, and 12.7% of that of merchandise imports (OECD 1993, 349). 
The close relation between exports and imports of agricultural products reflects 
the fact that intensive meat and dairy production within a small area of land is 
possible only because of imported fodder, mainly maize. The port of Rotterdam 
has been the largest in the world for more than 30 years (The Netherlands in 
Brief 1997, 33), and most of the fodder imported into Europe enters by this 
route. In addition, many other basic materials for the food, drink and tobacco 
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industry are imported into the Netherlands, processed there, and re-exported. 
Dutch products -command a leading position in the world market for many 
products: flower bulbs, cut fiowers, veal, live pigs and eggs in the shell — and 
the country's exports of cut fiowers account for approximately 70% of world 
trade in that product (OECD 1994, 170). 
Dutch agriculture benefits from a favourable location relative to transport 
corridors and densely populated areas with a high demand for foodstuffs. The 
size and density of the surrounding population provides the sector with a large, 
steady market for its produce, and economies of scale have been pursued in 
large-scale processing and marketing in the livestock product industries and in 
the arable root-crop industries, in horticulture, in the auctioning of produce and 
in sales promotion. (Ibid., 173). The EU as a whole is a significant market for 
the Dutch: in the beginning of the 1990's about 75% of the agricultural produce 
and foodstuffs exported were sold on this intemal market; the largest single 
customer being Germany (Facts and Figures 1992, 47). 
In addition to the more physical and territorial characteristics of Dutch 
agriculture, another remarkable dimension is the thoroughness of its organisation. 
Dutch farmers are linked both horizontally and vertically to a broader institutional 
structure, comprising commodity boards (produktschappen), industry boards 
(bedriffschappen) and farmers' unions (organised under the Landbouwschap). 
The commodity boards are vested with public authority, especially conceming 
quality control and the implementation of EU market measures in all segments 
of the production chain — producers, wholesalers, processors and retailers — and 
also coordinate industrial interests in a vertical direction. There are seven product 
groups: arable crops; poultry and eggs; livestock and meat; dairy products; 
margarine, fats and oils; fruit and vegetables; and ornamental plants. Membership 
of one or more commodity boards and of the Landbouwschap is compulsory, 
but the members are free to decide on the form and structure of these 
organisations. The industry boards provide a form of horizontal regulation, as 
they have powers to issue orders with respect to ali those involved in the same 
trade or activity, e.g. retailers of vegetables. The Landbouwschap is responsible 
for the promotion of the whole agricultural sector (OECD 1994, 176; Frouws 
and van Tatenhove 1993, 222). 
This organisation around the sector and its subsectors, which include the 
whole chain from the farmers to the input industries and processing industry, 
can be seen as a part of the Dutch agricultural model (Frouws 1993, 59-60) and 
its neo-corporatist system. Agricultural pressure groups no longer view policy-
making from outside, but are incorporated into the process and defend the 
outcomes before their members (Irwin and Andeweg 1993, 164). It may be 
difficult for outsiders to understand that the govemment bears no responsibility 
for the regulations issued by such boards, which regulate their particular sectors 
of the economy (ibid., 167). This system functioned for a long time among the 
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well-organised agricultural interests and the ministry responsible for the sector 
in a manner isolated entirely from the rest of society, deciding its own affairs 
and following the Calvinist principle of "sovereignty within own circles" 
(soevereniteit in eigen kring46 ). It is environmental problems that have now 
broken down this isolation in practice (Frouws 1993, 217-218). 
The dominant form of industrial organisation in the processing and marketing 
of agricultural products and foodstuffs is the cooperative, as in many other 
countries, but it is only in the case of starch potatoes that one cooperative 
exercises control over the entire market for a single product (OECD 1994, 176). 
When discussing the success of Dutch farming, reference is often made to 
the "golden triangle" of well-organised cooperation between research, extension 
and education (Heijman et al. 1991, 60). To a large extent, deliberate government 
policies are responsible for establishing and encouraging this system, which 
enables the quick application of new technical knowledge. The system is 
institutionalised through interlocking memberships among the commodity boards, 
farmers' unions and agribusiness companies and the boards that direct the work 
of the extension services and •research stations (OECD 1994, 177). This "triangle" 
makes its own contribution to the building of "inner circles", which for a long 
time ensured that agricultural issues were discussed and decided exclusively by 
those who were "directly involved" (on the Dutch agricultural model, see Frouws 
1993). 
5.3. Ireland 
5.3.1. Irish politics 
Aire, the Republic of Ireland, is located on the island of Ireland, in the extreme 
north-west of Europe. Its shores are washed by the Irish Sea in the east and the 
Atlantic Ocean in the west. Six counties in the north of the island form Northem 
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom. The Republic of Ireland has an 
arca of 70,000 square kilometres and 3.6 million inhabitants (Facts about Ireland 
1995, 3, 9). Its first official language is Irish, English is the second — an order is 
affirmed in the constitution (ibid., 11). 
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy in which the national parliament 
(Oireachtas47 ) consists of the President and two Houses, the House of 
Representatives (Dc'til åreann) and the Senate (Seanad åreann) (ibid., 37). The 
President is elected by direct vote of the people for a term of seven years. The 
46This doctrine was established by the founder of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, Abraham 
Kuyper, and has been very influential in Christian Democrat politics. 
47 Some Irish political institutions are commonly called by their Irish names. This practice is also 
followed here. 
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office was held by Mary Robinson at the time of the case study. The President is 
the Head of the State only, without executive functions, and normally acts on 
the advice and authority of the government, although with the additional duty of 
acting as guardian of the constitution (Facts about Ireland 1995, 37: Ireland in 
Brief, 25). 
Legislative power is vested in Parliament, where both houses may examine 
and criticise government policy, but the government is responsible only to the 
Dåil (Facts about Ireland 1995, 38). The Dåil åreann has at present 166 members, 
who are called Teachtai Dåla (TDs), while the Seanad åreann has 60 members, 
eleven nominated by the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), forty-three elected from 
five vocational panels, the Cultural and Educational Panel, Agricultural Panel, 
Labour Panel, Industrial and Commercial Panel and Administrative Panel, and 
the remaining 6 elected by citizens who have received a degree from one of two 
universities, the National University of Ireland and the University of Dublin. 
The powers of the Seanad are in general less than those of the Dåil, as although 
it may initiate or amend legislation, the Dåil has the power to reject any such 
amendments or proposed legislation (Facts about Ireland 1995, 38-39, 42; Ireland 
in Brief, 26). 
Executive power is in the hands of the government, led by the Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister), who is appointed by the President after nomination by the 
Dåil. The Taoiseach, Tånaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Finance 
must he members of the Dåil, but there may not he more than two Ministers who 
are members of the Seanad. The government acts as a collective authority 
responsible to the Dåil. In addition to the ministers, who head the various 
Departments of State, there may he ministers of state, who are not members of 
the government but assist specific ministers in their work (Facts about Ireland 
1995, 40). 
The electoral system in Ireland is one of proportional representation by 
means of a single transferable vote (PR-STV) in multi-member constituencies. 
Both Irish and British citizens over the age of 18 years and ordinarily resident in 
the given constituency may vote in Dåil elections. Single-party Fianna Fåil 
governments were most common in the past, but coalition governments have 
become the norm over the last 20 years. After the 1989 elections, there were 
seven parties represented in the Dåil (Ireland Constitution and Government 
1995, 6). 
The party map of Ireland is somewhat peculiar, since the two largest parties 
have both arisen out of disagreements in the independence movement on 
nationalist issues concerning Commonwealth or republic status, the extent of 
the state, and constitutional symbols and forms (Chubb 1993, 91). England had 
dominated Ireland politically for centuries until an Anglo-Irish Treaty was 
signed in December 1921, as a result of which 26 counties gained independence 
in the form of the Irish Free State. A civil war (1922-3) followed between the 
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new government and those who opposed the treaty, and the two major parties 
perpetuated the split: Cumann na nGaedheal (later Fine Gael), which supported 
the treaty, and Fianna Fåil, which opposed it (ibid., 92). Although the country 
severed its last constitutional links with Britain in 1948, when Ireland officially 
became a republic, party politics continued to hinge on attitudes and approaches 
towards Britain and the partition issue. Competition among the parties has not 
taken place along the ideological dimension of left-right, but rather on a primarily 
nationalist dimension. The absence of a large communist, socialist or even 
social democratic party distinguishes Irish politics from that of the rest of 
Western Europe. 
Fianna Fåil ("The Soldiers of Destiny") has consistently been the largest 
party in the Dåil since 1932, attracting the support of four to five out of every 
ten members of the electorate (Chubb 1993, 95). Given such a strong position, it 
has, according to Basil Chubb (ibid., 96), become accustomed to seeing itself as 
more than a party, something of a national movement. For decades it commanded 
a dominant position within the party system and provided the basis for stable 
(majority or minority) single-party government. This position was in practice 
strengthened by its no-coalition stance, which became a "core value" especially 
for the loyal traditionalists in the party (ibid., 95-98; Mair 1989, 138-139). It has 
been described as the most traditionalist Irish party: Catholic, nationalistic and 
populist, but gradually having to change its image from nationalist republican 
purity towards a party concerned with managing a successful capitalist economy 
(O'Leary and Peterson 1990, 135). Fianna Fåil gained support in its earliest 
days mainly from the rural areas and from among the small farmers, along with 
the members of the urban working class who had recently moved to the towns, 
and also middle-class people with a small-farmer background. Since the forties 
it has been a "catch-ali" party, managing in 1989, for example, to achieve more 
support than the other parties not only among ali classes, — except for the large-
scale farmers, but in ali regions and in both urban and rural areas (Chubb 1993, 
99). In the European Parliament, Fianna Fåil is a part of the European Democratic 
Alliance, in an uneasy combination with the French Gaullists. Except for a 
common commitment to the CAP, the two maun components of this group have 
only few natural points of agreement and identity, but they have been reluctant 
to linIc up with more established Centre-Right groupings (Nugent 1989, 128). 
At first Cumann na nGaedheal (from 1933 Fine Gael, "The People of the 
Gael") was the party of the treaty, of law and order, and in support of 
Commonwealth status. In those days it attracted the business world, shopkeepers 
and professional people, and the more wealthy farmers (Chubb 1993, 100). Like 
Fianna Fåil, Fine Gael changed its image towards that of a "catch-all" party, 
consistently gaining the second highest vote in elections, and performing well 
ali over the country, even though its support is more class-based than that of 
Fianna Fåil (ibid., 101). Even though its core constituency is still a right-wing 
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one, it has moved cautiously towards the welfare state and pursued social 
democratic policies, especially in coalition governments with the Labour Party. 
There was a period in the 1970's and up to the mid-1980's which marked an 
attempt to make the party less conservative, but this was clearly incompatible 
with the views of some of its members and ran into difficulties (ibid., 97). In the 
European Parliament, Fine Gael is a member of the Christian Democrat group 
called the European People' s Party (Nugent 1989, 127). 
The Labour Party was established before independence by trade-union leaders 
as an alliance of trade unionism and socialism, but the prolonged dominance of 
national and constitutional issues after the civil war left it without any basis for 
mass support. In effect, partition of the island into the mainly rural Catholic 
republic and the more industrialised, protestant Northern Ireland (Ulster) divided 
the potential constituency of the Labour Party and marginalised any left-wing 
opposition to conservative parties in both parts (Boylan et al. 1988, 153). 
Ideologically, the Labour Party can be considered a mildly left-wing party 
(Chubb 1992, 33), and in contrast to the two larger parties, its support is clearly 
class-based and focussed on urban areas only. What is more remarkable, both 
Fianna Fåil and Fine Gael used to attract more working class votes than the 
Labour Party until the early 1990's (Chubb 1992, 101). 
In addition to the above three parties, which have dominated Irish politics 
since the late twenties, there were two other parties of some significance in the 
in the early 1990's: the Workers' Party (since 1992 the Democratic Left) and 
the Progressive Democrats. The Workers' Party has its origins both in republican 
trends and radical leftist elements, but abandoned extreme tactics in the early 
1970's in favour of a socialism of the Euro-communist kind (Chubb 1992, 93-
94). Later, it moved further towards the political centre. 
The Progressive Democrats were formed in 1985 by leading Fianna Fåil 
dissidents, who were later joined by leading Fine Gael dissidents (Facts about 
Ireland 1995, 44; Mair 1989, 137). It advocates a liberal position in terms of 
social policy and traditional morality, but is simultaneously markedly conservative 
in economic terms and has drawn support from among the middle class, the 
traditional heartland of Fine Gael (Mair 1989, 137). The Progressive Democrats 
were expected to become rapidly re-absorbed by the Fianna Fåil (Mair 1989, 
132), but this has not been the case, although at the turn of the millennium the 
party was in government with Fianna Fåil. 
By the late 1980's it had become evident that Fianna Fåil's position was less 
dominant than it had been. It seemed as if there was a more conventional 
Western European pattern of ideological and class politics developing in Ireland. 
The year 1987 marked a watershed in Irish party politics, for several reasons. 
The Dåil åreann had been enlarged in 1981 to 166 seats instead of the former 
148, accompanied by changes in constituency boundaries (O'Leary and Peterson 
1990, 129), and this meant that it was more difficult for any party or coalition to 
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win an overall majority. Also, the ideological compatibility that had made it 
possible for Fine Gael and Labour to promote electoral alliances since the 1973 
election had begun to bear fruit among the electorate, which became aware of 
the possibility of an altemative to Fianna Fåil (Mair 1989, 136-137). It had 
been possible in the 1970's for Labour and Fine Gael to find common ground in 
the development of a moderate social-democratic philosophy (Mair 1989, 138), 
but in the 1980's the small Worker's Party challenged the Labour Party to fight 
for working class votes, and the new Progressive Democrats attracted right-
wing votes away from the Fine Gael. The ideological compatibility suffered, 
and by 1987 it again looked as if there were no altematives to Fianna Fåil. 
When Fianna Fåil failed to gain a majority in the 1989 elections, the successive 
defeats induced its leaders to abandon the half-century-old policy of going it 
alone and to enter into a coalition with the Progressive Democrats 
(Chubb 1992, 98). This was the party political situation in Ireland during the 
period studied here. 
The Irish political system has frequently been described as a Catholic, morally 
conservative, clientelist, egalitarian and agrarian social order, a form of parish-
pump politics in which parochialism is reflected in a powerful localism on the 
part of rural voters and in a tendency for rank-and-file members in particular to 
raise matters of local interest in order to gain publicity in their home territories 
(Carty 1981; O'Leary and Peterson 1990; Chubb 1992). Localism in Irish politics, 
according to Lee (1989, 547), is partly due to the fact that Ireland has almost no 
serious local self-government: "It is less the intensity of localism that is peculiar 
to Ireland than the mechanisms devised to elevate the local to the national. The 
prominence of the local at national level is the reverse side of the coin of 
administrative centralisation." Decisions conceming policing, education, health 
and conservation, which often come under local control elsewhere, have crucial 
implications for local welfare, but in Ireland they are decided at the national 
level. 
Irish local government was originally designed on an Anglo-Saxon, 
decentralised pattem, but has been modified several times and is nowadays 
overlain by different elements, either of home manufacture or imported from 
non-English sources (Roche 1982, 9-11). At present, local government is a 
genuine government in the sense that it is based on locally elected representative 
authority, but it is heavily dominated by the central authorities. The British 
concept of local government was that of legislative dominance and independence 
between authorities, in contrast to the French pattem of a centrally commanded 
hierarchy of authorities and executive dominance combined with legislative 
subordination (ibid.). 
The democratic element in local government still exists at the county level in 
Ireland, but it has been severely weakened by a number of arrangements. Local 
bodies are little more than the agents or outposts of the central government in 
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many matters (Roche 1982, 293-294; Chubb 1992, 272), and local govemment 
is to a large extent administration, concemed with the provision of services that 
are decided upon elsewhere. This may in a sense give it executive strength, 
however (Roche 1982, 11). The formal position of local govemment is weaker 
in Ireland than in the Netherlands, for following the tradition of British common 
law, local govemment does not have a constitutional status in Ireland as it does 
in most European countries, and this is one of the few countries which has not 
signed the European Charter of Local Self-Govemment adopted in 1985, which 
provides that local authorities should have general competence (Chubb 1992, 
267). As in most countries which have developed welfare policies, the pattem of 
increasing financial dependence on central govemment has undermined the 
autonomy of local govemment, which is often responsible for implementing 
these policies at the local level. Moreover, the local authorities' room for 
manoeuvre in determining expenditure is limited, since the centre has virtually 
taken over local taxation (Chubb 1992, 274). 
Local govemment is primarily county council govemment, which means that 
the unit of govemment is fairly large by comparison with the situation in other 
European countries, as there are an average of 31,000 people per county council 
(Chubb 1992, 271). In addition to the 29 county councils, there are 5 county 
borough corporations, 5 borough corporations, 49 urban district councils and 26 
boards of town commissioners, which together form the instruments of local 
govemment (Facts about Ireland 1995, 51). Traditionally, Trish local govemment 
did not include any regional level, but 9 regional authorities were established as 
statutory bodies in 1994 to contribute to the implementation of EU Structural 
and Cohesion Fund programmes. According to Chubb (1992, 263), "... the 
creation of regional bodies owes nothing to a democratic desire to devolve 
political power or increase popular participation: on the contrary, they exist for 
bureaucratic convenience". 
Debate on reforming local govemment has been going on in Ireland for 
decades (Roche 1982, 299-309; Facts about Ireland 1995, 51), but the difficulties 
of carrying through significant reforms are extensive. In order to improve 
efficiency, functions have been concentrated in fewer authorities, but these 
modifications have been accompanied by bureaucratisation in the form of 
increasing central govemment control, the creation of a single local government 
service and the institution of a manager system (Chubb 1992, 272). 
In spite of the fairly weak formal structures, regional policy is a more 
important issue in Ireland than in the Netherlands, since there is a growing 
concentration of the population in the capital region. Large rural areas in the 
north and east are suffering from depopulation, which is an issue in national 
politics as well as being a target of many EU policies implemented in Ireland in 
connection with economic and social cohesion or as part of rural development 
programmes such as Leader. 
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Irish central government has been characterized by a high degree of 
departmental autonomy (Chubb 1992, 312), in addition to which the highly 
autonomous departments have not been interested in systematically developing 
any coordinating institutions or procedures for long-term strategic policy 
evaluation or formation, at least not formally (ibid., 316). However, one should 
not underestimate the importance of informal networks of communication in a 
relatively small country which is ethnically and religiously fairly homogeneous 
(Breen et al. 1990, 163). 
A certain analogy can be found between the levels of decision-making, 
proceeding from local and national to supranational. Most politicians, according 
to Chubb (1992, 315), are inclined to see the EU as "over there", their view 
being that of the periphery, and Community's ideals and spirit are not embedded 
in the Irish political culture. In general, a certain "national bias" can he found at 
the EU level as well. 
(Neo-)corporatist arrangements have never developed to such a level of 
political significance in Ireland as they have in the Netherlands. Both trade 
union and employer federations have suffered from the inability to sustain a 
strategy which transcends sectionalist interests (Breen et al. 1990, 180). 
Furthermore, successful neo-corporatist arrangements require a space created 
for political exchange. In corporatist systems, such as in Sweden, the trade 
union movement has gained access to political power via the social democrat 
party, which has dominated govemment. In the Dutch case, a number of parties 
have exercised command over a major part of the electorate not accessible to 
competing parties, but there has been a commitment to negotiating over political 
differences. In Ireland, the space for exchange has remained limited, since party 
politics have been based on political ideologies which deny the importance of 
the class conflict. (Ibid., 167-168). 
To the extent that corporatist arrangements have taken place, farmers have 
been involved formally, or informally. They did not participate in national wage 
agreements in the 1970's, but they did wield influence through their direct 
relationship with the Department of Agriculture (ibid., 204). Farmers are normally 
represented by two major organisations, the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers' 
Association (ICMSA) and the Irish (formerly National) Farmers' Association 
(IFA). While the ICMSA promotes the interests of dairy farmers, the IFA is a 
much larger body which represents farmers regardless of the commodity they 
produce (Breen et al. 1990, 202-203). Even though it has been impossible to 
merge the two organisations, they have managed between them to safeguard the 
interests of their members much better than has the Irish trade union. The IFA is 
regarded by many as the country's most effective pressure group (Boylan et al. 
1988, 202; Chubb 1992, 113). 
As in the Netherlands, the cooperative movement is a dominant force in 
agriculture. Eight out of every ten farmers were members of at least one 
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cooperative in the early 1990's. Cooperatives are particularly important for the 
marketing of dairy and livestock products, although Irish agricultural cooperatives 
have confronted similar difficulties to cooperatives in general, and major changes 
in their organisational and operational structures have taken place in order to 
compete with other companies. Some cooperatives have created Public Limited 
Companies under their control to generate additional funds. The ICOS (Irish 
Co-operative Organisation Society) is the leading body promoting the cooperative 
movement in the country. (Ireland Agriculture and Food, 27). 
5.3.2. Irish agriculture 
Irish agriculture is extensive by compared with that in the Netherlands, and is 
even more dominated by livestock production. Where the total area devoted to 
agriculture in 1989 was 5.7 million hectares, about 3 million hectares of this 
was pasture land, almost 1 million hectares rough grazing (Ireland Agriculture 
and Food, 2), 1.2 million hectares under hay (including silage), and only half a 
million hectares used for the cultivation of crops and fruit (ibid.). While there is 
great variation in farm size, the average size in terms of land area, according to 
the 1991 Census of Agriculture, was 26 hectares (Matthews 1995). Forests cover 
8% of the land area (Facts about Ireland 1995, 95). 
A mild climate coupled with a well-distributed rainfall favours the growth of 
grass in particular, and the fertile soil ensures a long grazing season (ibid., 3, 
94). There are regional differences in both farm size and production. In the east 
and south-east with good fertile soils and the least rainfall, crops such as wheat, 
barley, potatoes and sugar beet are produced (Ireland Agriculture and Food, 2, 
17). Larger farms dominate in the south and east, whereas the proportion of 
smaller farms, mostly engaged in cattle rearing and milk production or in sheep 
production on the mountains, is greater in the west and north-west (Matthews 
1995). The south and south-west are the main milk producing areas of the 
country, and sheep farming is also important in the hilly and mountainous 
regions of the east and south (Ireland Agriculture and Food, 3). Pig production 
is primarily located in the southern and north-eastern regions (ibid., 16), and is 
increasingly becoming concentrated in a reduced number of units. Specialisation 
is also significant in the poultry industry (ibid., 17). 
According to the 1991 Census of Agriculture, there were 170,000 farms of 
more than 1 hectare in size (Matthews 1995), and agriculture accounted for 
15.0% of total civilian employment in 1990 (OECD 1993, 352), and contributed 
about 10% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1989 (Ireland Agriculture and 
Food, 4). Agriculture and the food industry combined accounted for 14% of 
GDP and about 18% of total employment in the same year (OECD 1994, 84). 
These figures reveal the significance of agriculture for the structure of the 
Irish economy, and particularly for employment. Hannan and Breen (1987) 
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estimated that 25% of farmers in 1987 were part-time, but it is likely that these 
figures conceal a significant amount of under-employment. When farms were 
classified on the basis of their labour requirements48, only 37% were regarded 
as full-time ones, whereas at the same time 42% of the farmers depended on 
agriculture for their main source of income (OECD 1994, 87). In addition, there 
were still about 20,000 assisting relatives (not spouses) engaged in agriculture 
in 1986 (ibid., 89). This represents to a great extent the absence of work 
opportunities outside farming rather than a conscious decision to opt for farming 
(ibid., 90). The country became industrialised fairly late, and it is still the case 
that the public sector accounts for about one third of ali non-agricultural 
employment (ibid., 84). Emigration has been a dominant feature of Irish society 
since the Great Famine in the 1840's, albeit with some interruptions. 
As in the Netherlands, livestock production makes the largest contribution to 
the gross output fi-om agriculture, as livestock and livestock products together 
accounted for 89% of the total output in 1993, and their importance has grown 
steadily (Matthews 1995). Cattle dominate livestock production, and milk 
accounted for some three-eights of total output in 1991 (OECD 1994, 85-86). 
Crops, consisting of cereals, potatoes and sugar beet, but with cereals (wheat, 
barley and oats) the most important, made up about one-eighth of the total 
agricultural output in 1991 (ibid.). — The food processing and drinks sectors 
represented 25% of ali employment in manufacturing industry in 1989 (Ireland 
Agriculture and Food, 4), and food and agriculture accounted for one-seventh of 
the national income in the early 1990's and one-sixth of ali jobs (OECD 1994, 
121). 
Again similar to the Netherlands, Irish agriculture is highly export-oriented. 
Food and drink products represented about one quarter of total Irish exports in 
1990 (Ireland Agriculture and Food, 4), and more than 80% of the dairy and 
beef output was exported (Matthews 1995). The principal export market for 
Irish agricultural products was the United Kingdom, which accounted for 32% 
of the total in 1990 (Annual Report 1991, 11). There has been a marked change 
in the destinations of exports after Ireland became a member of the EU, however, 
in that it has become more closely integrated into the international economy and 
has begun to disengage itself from its earlier heavy reliance on Britain. As the 
UK market share fell, amounts exported to other EU countries increased and the 
role of non-EU markets grew substantially (Matthews 1995). 
Here a difference can he observed relative to Dutch agricultural exports, 
which go mainly to other EU countries. The Netherlands is geographically more 
favourably located in the surroundings of large population centres. Likewise, 
transportation always gives rise to extra costs, and Ireland's relative distance 
48 A full-time farm is one that requires more than 0.75 Standard Labour Units to operate. 
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from its main markets leads to another peculiarity of its agricultural exports, the 
use of intervention as an outlet for agricultural produce (NESC 1989, 96-97). 
Intervention in sales requires no marketing, but the prices are lower than the 
general EU market level. As Matthews (1995) has pointed out, an important 
consequence of sales to markets outside the EU — which is only possible with 
export subsidies — is that Ireland is particularly vulnerable to changes in 
agricultural support arrangements. As was discussed in Chapter 4.5.1, the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations targeted these subsidies, in particular. 
Seasonality of production is an often-mentioned chara' cteristic of Irish 
agriculture. Especially from the point of view of the food processing sector, this 
seasonality has been regarded as a weakness of the agricultural sector (NESC 
1989, 97). Actually, seasonality is intertwined with other elements in Irish 
agriculture. It is at least partly a deliberate strategy, which has more sides to it. 
As Boyle (1992, 157-162) argues, the competitive advantage that Irish agriculture 
enjoys is based on relatively low feed and overhead costs, which in turn stem 
from the grass-based production system. Ireland is strong in (low cost) commodity 
production, because the abundant factor it possesses is grass growth, which is 
by nature highly seasonal. According to Boyle (ibid.), Ireland has preferred this 
low cost strategy to product differentiation. 
Breen et al. (1990, 192-195) refer to the impact of state policy in shaping 
Irish agriculture towards utilisation of this comparative advantage. Between the 
late 1930's and the mid-1960' s extensive "ranching" operations were encouraged 
in order to increase export earnings from the cattle trade, but this trend was 
directly responsible for a decline in the farm population, as the structure of Irish 
farm holdings did not suit an extensive cattle industry in many respects. 
Furthermore, the major policy instrument by which agriculture was directed was 
already price support before EU membership, and the effect became even stronger 
after access to EU guaranteed prices, which were especially favourable to dairy 
products and beef. When the support was coupled to prices, those who produced 
most also gained the most support. The two policy choices thus contributed to a 
polarisation in Irish agriculture. Membership of the EU gave it a boost, but the 
fruits were spread unevenly. The increased output achieved in the 1970's was 
the work of a minority of farms, about 25-30% (NESC 1989, 97), and according 
to Breen et al. (1990, 199), variation in incomes in the early 1990's was greater 
in the farming sector than in the non-farming sector. 
The food processing industry is a major factor in the Irish economy, so that 
employment in the food processing and drink sectors represented 25% of ali 
those employed in manufacturing industry in the early 1990's, (Ireland Agriculture 
and Food, 4). Food processing and trading companies are significant economic 
actors in the country, and as in other EU countries, the food industry is becoming 
more and more centralised. There were 39 plants licensed to process milk in 
1990, but over 50% of the milk was produced by 6 large cooperatives (ibid., 9). 
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A cooperative central marketing organisation An Bord Bainne (the Irish Dairy 
Board), best known for its branded sales under the "Kerrygold" label, is 
responsible for most of the export business, and its counterpart in the beef 
processing industry is CBF, the Irish Livestock and Meat Promotion Board 
(ibid., 13). Irish agriculture and its food industry are organised, but not as 
thoroughly as in the Netherlands. Agricultural research and training are combined 
under TEAGASC — the Agricultural and Food Development Authority, which 
has statutory responsibility for providing advisory, training, research and 
development services for agriculture and the food industries (ibid., 26). 
5.4. Conclusions 
The main features of Dutch and Irish national politics and agriculture have been 
described above. As for the political scene in the two countries, the main 
differences have to do with the remnants of pillarisation in Dutch politics, 
which are still recognisable in a certain sector orientation and in a tendency to 
turn controversial issues into technical questions. The historical but still influential 
basis ofparty politics in Ireland differs from the more ordinary Westem European 
structure of the left-right continuum in the Netherlands. In both countries the 
Christian religion still has a greater hold on both party politics and agricultural 
interests than in the Nordic countries, for example. In the Netherlands, the CDA 
still has to respect the confessional element among its supporters, and especially 
in the so-called Bible Belt in the centre of the country, orthodox Calvinism has 
still some hold over farmers, although this is diminishing. In Ireland, the Catholic 
Church is declining in importance, but it is certainly not insignificant, particularly 
in the countryside. 
Regional problems are more closely connected with rural issues in Ireland 
than in the Netherlands, where the main bone of contention is the use of scarce 
land resources for the needs of housing, traffic, recreation and agriculture. The 
polity to which agricultural policy is related in the two countries differs somewhat, 
particularly as regards politicisations. Rural and regional aspects are a part of 
Irish agricultural policy, whereas it is the environmental issue that is politicised 
in the Dutch polity for agriculture. In both polities the producer/product dimension 
is more thoroughly politicised than the consumer/commodity aspect of agriculture. 
Agriculture in both countries is export-oriented, and in both cases livestock 
production is a major source of agricultural income. Dutch production is more 
intensive, however, whereas Ireland has more extensive livestock production. 
Consequently, Dutch agriculture also causes more environmental problems. The 
Dutch sell most of their agricultural produce to the EU market, while Ireland is 
more dependent on third-country markets and sells large quantities of produce 
via intervention. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the Dutch agricultural 
produce is not dependent on the CAP market and price policy, or at least not 
100 
directly so, and only pork and poultry are indirectly affected by the CM0 of 
beef as a subsidiary product, whereas the wealthy markets in seeds and many 
horticultural products lie completely outside the CAP regime. Irish agriculture 
is much more dependent on the CAP. 
The above description of politics and agriculture in the two case countries 
also serves the purpose of displaying a fraction of the complexity of the CAP 
framework to the reader. It has to do not only with the difficulty of finding 
agreement on what is a problem and what ought to be done, but also confronts 
the policy in the implementation phase. Sicco Mansholt said in an interview 
(30.8.1992) that the problem for the EU lies not in the power of Brussels 
bureaucracy, which he considered modest, but in the complexity of the CAP, 
which implies that it is in effect impossible to control the common policy 
implemented in the member states at the union level. 
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6. Actor structure 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses how the political aspect of the CAP discursive field is 
reflected in the actor structure. The analysis focuses on which politicians, civil 
servants, lobbyists, experts, farmers etc. and organisations, parties, institutions 
etc. had most to say in the debate, and equally importantly, examines who were 
mentioned as subjects acting in it. In that they were referred to in these quarters, 
they may be recognised as important even if they did not necessarily participate 
in the debate themselves. In addition, the analysis aims at showing which 
potential actors are missing. The actor structure investigates whose business the 
Common Agricultural Policy was in the two countries. 
In order to organise the debate, I have first divided it into two sub-fields: the 
national scene and the EU scene. On the national scene, the actor has been 
active in predominantly a national context, representing domestic interests and 
contributing to the discussion mainly from the domestic point of view. The 
division is only a tentative one, however, and is not clear-cut in ali cases (as a 
person acting predominantly on the national scene may sometimes have performed 
on the EU scene as well, expressing ideas relevant to the whole Community), 
but it is enough for the present purposes. The role of a minister of agriculture, 
for example, is analysed on the domestic scene because he was clearly working 
for domestic interests even though he also performed regularly on the EU scene 
as well. Likewise, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are discussed 
in the context of the EU scene even though they also talked about the effects of 
the reform on their own country' s agriculture, for example. The third and final 
part of the actor analysis consists of an examination of the geography of the 
debate: which countries, international groupings or regional units were mentioned 
in it, where the centre of the Common Agricultural Policy lies and what constitutes 
the periphery. 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, each actor mentioned in the debate has been 
picked out, but each actor is listed only once for each piece of text, even though 
the names are often repeated several times. I chose to ignore the number of 
occurrences in a text for two reasons. First, I do not consider it a reliable sign of 
the importance of an actor. Writers have different styles of writing, which affect 
how often they repeat names, and in this case, the two parts of the debate took 
place in different languages, which may also affect the frequency of mentioning 
names. Similarly I was not interested in how important one writer regarded each 
actor as being, but rather the analysis was focussed on the overall picture. 
Secondly, since the text corpus is large, one recorded mention of each actor per 
text is enough to show who and what are regarded as most essential subjects in 
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the debate. The main data will therefore concern the numbers of texts in which 
the various actors were mentioned. 
6.2. Actors in the Dutch debate 
6.2.1. The domestic scene 
The analysis proceeds here in the following order: 1) state organs, 2) farm 
organisations, 3) parties and their representatives, 4) research organisations and 
other experts, 5) other interest groups involved and 6) the shop-floor level: 
farmers. 
State organs 
Since Commissioner MacSharry was not included, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Piet Bukman (19349),5° was the most prominent actor in the Dutch debate. He 
was mentioned in 193 articles, interviewed 6 times51, and had one article published 
in his name52. His importance in the reform debate gives reason to take a closer 
look at him. Son of a market gardener, Mr Piet Bukman, M.Sc., is a member of 
49 The numbers in brackets refer to the frequency of mentions in the material. In order to make 
the references shorter, the texts contained in the material are referred to by codes, i.e. 
combinations of letters and numbers. The texts are classified into opinions (0), news (N) and 
expert articles (E). Some codes may be of the form 0-022a, where the small "a" distinguishes 
between two texts aceidentally assigned the same code. There is a list at the end of the book 
showing which article each code refers to. In order to differentiate between the Dutch texts 
and the Irish ones, the latter are printed in italics, in cases of possible misinterpretation. 
5° N-003, 0-010, 0-012, N-007, 0-017, 0-020, 0-022, 0-027, N-010, N-011, N-012, 0-035, 
N-018, N-020, N-021, N-022, N-023, N-027, N-031, N-032, N-033, N-035, N-036, 0-043, 
N-040, N-043, N-044, E-004, N-045, N-046, E-006, 0-048, 0-049, 0-050, N-053, 0-051, 
N-055, N-056, E-007, E-009a, 0-057, N-060, N-061, N-063, N-070, 0-065, 0-067, 0-068, 
N-072, 0-072, 0-073, N-077, N-078, N-076a, N-078a, N-086, N-086a, N-088, N-089, 
N-090, N-091, 0-074, N-092, 0-075, N-095, N-097, N-098, N-099, N-102, E-010, E-011, 
E-012, N-107, N-109, 0-079, 0-080, E-015, E-016, N-120, N-121, N-122, N-123, E-017, 
N-125, N-126, N-127, E-018, N-128, N-130, N-131, N-133, N-134, N-135, 0-086, 0-087, 
N-136, 0-090, N-140, N-141, 0-091, N-148, N-150, N-151, E-025, 0-096, N-155, N-161, 
N-163, 0-101, 0-102, N-173, 0-103, N-174, N-178, N-179, N-186, 0-106, N-188, N-189, 
N-190, N-192, N-193, N-196, N-197, N-198, N-199, N-200, N-201, N-202, N-203, N-205, 
N-210, N-211, N-214, N-215, 0-113, N-216, N-217, N-218, N-219, N-220, 0-116, 0-117, 
0-119, N-226, 0-120, N-230, N-231, N-233, N-234, 0-121, N-235, N-236, 0-122, N-237, 
0-122, N-237, 0-123, 0-124, 0-125, N-240, N-242, 0-126, N-243, N-244, N-245, N-246, 
N-247, 0-129, N-249, N-252, N-253, 0-136, N-256, N-258, 0-141, N-264, N-265, 0-142, 
0-143, N-267, N-268, 0-144, N-270, N-271, N-272, N-273, N-274, N-275, N-276, N-277, 
N-279, N-286, N-287, N-289. 
51  0-011, 0-016, 0-021, 0-025, 0-084, 0-114. 
52 0-147. 
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the Christian Democrat party, CDA..He had been working for the protestant 
farmers' organisation NCBTB (Nederlandse Christelyke Boeren- en 
Tuindersbond) first as its first secretary and later as its President, until 1980, 
when he left agricultural circles and became fully engaged in national politics. 
In the "rooms-rode" coalition govemment of the Christian Democrats (CDA) 
and the Labour Party (PvdA) with Ruud Lubbers as Prime Minister, he received 
the post of Secretary of State for Finance (Staatssecretaris van Economische 
Zaken) in 1989; When his fellow party member Gerrit Braks had to resign after 
a fishery scandal in September 1990, Piet Bukman was nominated as Minister 
of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries. 
Piet Bukman' s role as minister was to represent the govemment in the 
debate. Interestingly, he had to do this almost alone, because the other ministers' 
opinions were not considered as legitimate as his and the govemment as such 
was not regarded as an important actor in the discussion. It was mentioned only 
occasionally (3)53. Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (13)54, the Minister for Finance 
Wim Kok (5)55 and the Minister for the Environment Alders(1)56 were the other 
ministers mentioned. It was symptomatic of the Dutch debate that the rest of the 
govemment did not always seem to back up the Minister of Agriculture. The 
other ministers, and especially Premier Lubbers, approached the reform proposals 
more often from the context of the GATT trade talks. Farm leaders even 
questioned the authority of Mr Lubbers to talk about agricultural policy at ali, 
and thus belittled his role as a competent practitioner.57 
The reform proposals were naturally also discussed in the Dutch parliament, 
mostly in the Second Chamber (9 mentions)58 rather than the First Chamber 
(2 mentions)59. However, one cannot say that parliament was a primary platforrn 
for the debate, as the Ministry of Agriculture was mentioned almost as many 
times (5)60, and its top civil servant, Gerrit Meester, was interviewed once61. 
The Queen was also mentioned once62. 
53 N-053, 0-067, N-088. 
54 N-009, N-042, N-053, 0-082, N-157, N-161, N-163, N-165, N-167, 0-101, N-169, 0-132, 
N-258. 
55 0-063, N-263, N-265, N-266, N-271. 
56 0-080, E-025. 
57 N-042. 
58 0-064, N-090, E-020, N-198, 0-136, 0-143, N-271, N-271, N-293; 9 times. 
59 N-257, 0-138. 
60 N-094, E-019, N-278, N-292, N-293. 
61 E-012. 
62 0-084. 
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Farm organisations 
The second most frequent actor in the Dutch debate was the Landbouwschap 
(Board of Agriculture) (68)63, the co-ordinating organisation for the national 
farmers' unions (the Catholic KNBTB, the liberal KNLC and the protestant 
NCBTB) and the agricultural representatives of the trade unions (FNV and 
CNV). The Landbouwschap was the official• representative of Dutch agriculture 
at the time of this debate, and was invested with public authority. The farmers' 
organisation part of the Landbouwschap (the CLO's, Centrale 
Landbouworganisaties) was mentioned only a few times (4)64. 
Presumably because the Landbouwschap is not a single farmers' organisation 
like the IFA and ICMSA in Ireland, it was represented by more than one leader. 
Even though its President, Jef Mares, was mentioned more often than the other 
farm leaders (3265, one interview66), he was also acting at the same time as 
President of the Catholic KNBTB. Correspondingly, other national or regional 
farm leaders could equally well perform partly on behalf of the Landbouwschap 
and partly in support of farming in the Netherlands as a whole.67 
In addition, the Landbouwschap was represented by its leading functionaries.68 
One revealing fact about the division of labour inside the Landbouwschap is 
63 N-003, 0-010, 0-011,0-012, 0-017, E-001, 0-027, 0-037, N-016, N-017,0-039, 0-042, 
N-037, 0-044, N-043; E-005,0-058, N-060, N-077, N-078, N-079, N-078a, N-080a, N-084, 
N-091, 0-074,0-076, N-104, N-109,0-084, N-133, N-140, 0-091, E-025, N-158, N-159, 
N-160, 0-099, 0-100, 0-110, N-209, 0-111,N-211, N-225, N-226, N-228, N-229,0-120, 
N-231, N-232, N-233, 0-122, N-237, 0-124, N-240, N-254, N-255, 0-142,0-143, N-274, 
N-286, N-287, N-291, 0-150, N-292, N-293. 
64 0-058, N-135, N-157, N-168. 
65 N-043, N-044, N-049, E-009a, 0-061, N-067, N-078, 0-063, 0-064, 0-066, 0-067, 0-075, 
N-078, N-078a, N-084, N-108, 0-091, N-158, N-159, N-161, 0-107, N-198, 0-110, N-231, 
N-233, 0-122, N-237, N-251, N-286, N-288, N-291, 0-150. 
66 N-254. 
67 These included Marius Varekamp (President of the KNLC) (11 times, 0-010, N-042, N-043, 
N-044, 0-060, N-108, N-159, 0-107, 0-115, N-226, N-237), Gerard Doornbos (President of 
the protestant NCBTB) (10 times, N-108, N-159, N-160, 0-101, N-226, N-228, 0-120, 
N 237, N-240, N-251), Pe Miedema (chairman of the department for cattle, chairman of the 
commission for foreign affairs at the Landbouwschap, and chairman of the Frisian CBTB) 
(7 times, 0-043,,N-13-3,' 	N-135, 0-090, N-159, N-228, W237), Jans Leeuwma (chairman of 
the department of arable fanning at the Landbouwschap) (5 times, E-009a, N-104, E-025, 
N-228, N-293), P. Blokland (chairman of the department of dairy and cattle breeding) (once, 
N-104), Aike Maarsingh (chairman of the department of arable farming at the Landbouwschap, 
chairman of the CBTB Veenkolonien) (6 times, 0-043, N-042, 0-075, 0-090, 0-101, N-233), 
H.J. Slijkhuis (Overijsselsche Landbouw Maatschappij) (2, N-076a, 0-101), H. Schaap, of 
the same organisation (once, N-060), Huib van der Maas (Zuidelijke Landbouwrnaatschappij) 
(once, 0-099) and Mr Lanting (Groninger Maatschappij van Landbouw) (2 times, N-164, 
0-101). 
68 Cees de Bondt (assistant secretary general) (once, 0-014), Chris Floris (foreign affairs expert) 
(twice, 0-011, N-101), and J.H. Egberink (acting secretary general of the Landbouwschap) 
(once, 0-079). 
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that when it finally decided to accept the MacSharry reform proposals in May 
1992, it was Pe Miedema, chairman of the foreign affairs committee, who wrote 
an article about it, and not Mares69. Finally, the young farmers' organisation 
NAJK (Het Nederlands Agrarische Jongeren Kontakt) and its chairman Arian 
Kamp7° were mentioned a couple of times. Furthermore, Dutch farming interests 
were represented nationally by means of agricultural products, in the 
Produktschappen (6)71. 
The impressive list shows that the Dutch agricultural world was highly 
organised and that the representatives of different organisations, both national 
and regional, were visible on the domestic scene. It also implies that the farm 
organisation body, the Landbouwschap, had connections with more than one 
leading person in this debate. The people in the Dutch farm organisation seemed 
to be both ready and able to participate in the public debate in fairly large 
numbers. Horizontal representation of its interests via the Landbouwschap was 
more important than vertical representation via the Productschaps. 
Political parties 
Four political parties were regularly connected with the debate: the Christian 
Democrats CDA, the Social Democrat party PvdA, the Liberal-Conservative 
party VVD, and, somewhat less, the Green party Groen Links. The CDA, PydA 
and VVD are among the largest parties in the Netherlands. The CDA and PydA 
were in the Cabinet, while the VVD and Groen Links were part of the 
parliamentary opposition. 
Ali the main parties had a spokesman on agricultural policy who took a stand 
on the reform proposals. This division of labour inside the parties seems to have 
been rather strict, because the same names appeared frequently. The only 
exception was the CDA, which, according to the gallup polls, gained most 
support among the farmers, together with the VVD (Hoetjes 1990), and also 
paid most attention to the farming community The Christian Democrat spokesman 
in the Second Chamber, Jan van Noord (1972, one interview73), was not the only 
69 0-127. 
70 0-066, 0-101. 
71  E-001, N-077, 0-075, N-076a, 0-077, E-014; The beef sector was represented in the debate 
by Rob Tazelaar (once, 0-077), dairy products by the chairman, F. Beekman (once, N-084), 
and later by the new chairman, Schelhaas (twice, 0-011, N-274), and poultry and eggs by 
Tazelaar (1, N-198). The chairmen of the Produktschappen for beef, Tazelaar (E-013), and 
for dairy products, Schelhaas (E-014), were also interviewed. 
72 
73  
0-022, N-041, 0-064, 0-066, 0-067, N-093, N-108, E-018, 0-090, 0-091, 0-110, N-211, 
N-231, 0-126, 0-136, 0-138, 0-143, 0-146, N-286. 
0-106. 
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CDA actor in the debate, however.74 On the other hand, the party was usually 
represented by a spokesman, and was only mentioned 6 times without any 
connection with a specific person75. 
The politician Jan van Zijl (1576, one interview77) was the PvdA agricultural 
policy spokesman in parliament, and only two other names were mentioned: 
Servaes Huys (3)78 and Ad MelLkert (1)79. The party appeared without a spokesman 
7 times 8°. 
The VVD spokesman on agricultural policy in the Second Chamber, Piet 
Blauw, was the most visible actor (21)81 among ali the parliamentary politicians, 
and his role as chairman of the standing committee for agricultural policy gave 
his words a certain extra emphasis. David Luteijn (4)82, another prominent 
VVD politician in the debate, was actually not only a member of the First 
Chamber and a former President of the KNLC, but also chairman of the 
administrative council of one of the largest agricultural cooperatives in the 
country, Cebeco Handelsraad. The VVD as a party was mentioned in 6 articles83. 
The Green party, Groen Links, was mentioned in 4 articlesm, but no individual 
politician acted as its spokesman on agricultural affairs. On the EU level the 
MEP Herman Verbeek wrote actively on the subject, as did Tim Verhoef (a 
Dutch staff member of the Green Group in the European Parliament), but they 
were clearly acting in an EU context and not in that of national agriculture, and 
they will thus be discussed in the next chapter. Of the rest of the Dutch parties, 
only the fundamentalist Calvinist RPF (Reformatorische Politieke Federatie) 
was mentioned in one article85. 
A couple of politicians who had retired from the day-to-day politics were 
still active in the discussion. By far the most important on both the national and 
74 In addition to van Noord, the CDA members in the First Chamber (Senate), Boorsma (1, 0-050), 
P. Coenemans (twice, N-257, 0-138) and Jos van Gennip, a director of the scientific institute 
of the CDA and responsible for writing party programmes (1, N-259), expressed their opinions. 
Moreover, the CDA politicians Biesheuvel (1, 0-090), Latijnhouwers, as well the chairman 
of NCB Brabant (2, 0-090, N-237), Hakvoort (1, 0-090) and Rene van Linden (1, N-271) 
were mentioned. 
75 N-085, N-122, 0-093, 0-106, 0-128, 0-143. 
76 0-022, 0-027, N-041, 0-049, 0-060, 0-063, N-071, N-108, N-198, 0-110, N-210, N-211, 
N-231, 0-143, 0-146. 
77 0-028. 
78 0-060, 0-146, N-286. 
79 N-270. 
80 N-064, 0-073, N-100, N-122, E-018, E-020, 0-143. 
81 0-043, N-041, E-009a, 0-064, 0-066, 0-067, 0-072, N-085, N-102, N-107, N-108, E-017, 
0-110, N-211, 0-120, N-231, 0-126, 0-136, N-286, N-287, N-289. 
82 N-050, N-051, 0-092, 0-110. 
83 N-086a, N-090, N-102, N-257, 0-143, N-287. 
84 N-105, N-122, 0-128, N-257. 
85 N-257. 
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international scene was the first EU Commissioner for Agriculture (1958-1972), 
the former Minister of Agriculture and the 6minence grise of Dutch and European 
agriculture, Sicco Mansholt. The text corpus contains two articles86 written by 
him, he was interviewed once87, and 12 articles carry references to him88. The 
former Farm Minister Gerrit Braks (9)89 was still regarded as a competent actor 
as well. Furthermore, two former Ministers for the Environment, P. Winsemius 
and E.H.T.M. Nijpels, took part in the reform debate (3)90. 
Research organisations and experts 
Apart from politicians and the farming lobby, several research institutes and 
numerous experts were regarded as legitimate practitioners in the field of 
agricultural policy. The most important research institute which was expected to 
provide scientific calculations on the effects of the reform proposals on Dutch 
agriculture was the LEI (Landbouw Economisch Instituut; Institute for 
Agricultural Economics) (31)91. In addition, the CPB (Centraal Planbureau) was 
mentioned in 6 articles92, and a third research institute, SOW-VU (Stichting 
Onderzoek Wereldvoedselvoorziening at the Amsterdam Free University) featured 
in 4 articles93. The researcher.Max Merbis was the SOW-VU agricultural policy 
expert. Two foreign research institutes were mentioned: the Belgian LEI (1)94 
and the Irish Teagasc (1)95. 
In addition to research institutes, there were a number of experts from 
universities and other organisations, some of whom participated in the discussion 
several times and made contributions that added greater depth- to the debate. 
Among the most visible experts on the national platform was Prof. Jan de Veer, 
former Director of the research institute LEI and Emeritus- Professor of 
Agricultural Economics at the University of Amsterdam. He was interviewed 
once96 and mentioned in 9 articles97. Another prominent expert was Jerry de 
86 
87  
E-007, 0-059. 
0-010. 
88  0-014,E-001, N-057, 0-060,0-077, 0-089, N-145, E-025, 0-096, 0-097, 0-101, 0-110. 
89 0-010, 0-016, 0-049, 0-050, 0-080,0-084, 0432, N-259, 0-138. 
90 0-077, 0-097, E-025. 
91  0-018, E-001, N-077, N-080a, 0076N403, N-104, 0-080,E-015, N-112, N-113, N-114, 
N-115, N-116, N-117, N-118, N-119, 0-081, E-017, 0-095, E-025, N-154, 0-101, N-180, 
N-182, 0-107, N-194, N-197, 0-120. N-240, N-254. The director of the LEI, Prof. L.C. 
Zachariasse (E-011) and two researchers, F.H. Bethe (E-015) and the Head of the Agricultural 
Depaitment, Jan Blom (N-112), were interviewed. 
92 N-054, N-180, N-182, 0407, N-197, 0-150. 
93  N-180, N-181, N-182, 0-107. 
94 N-183. 
95  N-106. 
96 0-047. 
97 0-015, N-181, 0-097, 0-110, 0-114,0-126, 0-132,0-138, E-031. 
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Hoogh, Emeritus Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Agricultural 
University in Wageningen. He wrote one article98, was interviewed once99 and 
was referred to in 7 articlesloo.loi  Most contributors from universities were 
agricultural economists. Practitioners from other related departments were not 
interested in participating in the debate, or else they were not considered 
competent actors — except for one rural sociologist from Wageningen, Dirk 
Roep102. 
Besides university people, there were experts who were more closely 
connected with interest organisations or companies. Gert van Dijk, Professor of 
Cooperative Studies at the Wagenigen Agricultural University and director of 
the NCR, the national umbrella organisation for agricultural cooperatives, was 
interviewed once103 and mentioned in 5 articlesl". An expert at the cooperative 
bank Rabobank, J.J.G. Geurts, also wrote an article105. Two environmental 
experts can be mentioned, Wouter van Dieren, director of the Institute for 
Environmental and Systems Analysis (Instituut voor Milieu- en Systeemanalyse) 
wrote an articlel°6, and R. van der Berg, researcher at a state institute for the 
environment (RIVM, Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygienie) 
was interviewedl°7. In addition, the nature and environment organisation 
"Stichting Natuur en Milieu" was mentioned in one articlel08. In another article, 
four experts were mentionedl°9. Thus, a few environmentalists participated in 
the debate, but their voice was rather weak by comparison with the contributions 
of the farm organisation representatives, for example. 
98 E-006. 
99 0-020. 
100E-009a, E-025, 0-101, 0-115, 0-132, N-145, N-257. 
101Furthermore, Professor Cees Veerman (5, N-145, 0-101 0-110, 0-114, 0-126), former 
chairman of the National Cooperative Council (NCR, Nationale Cooperative Raad voor 
Land- en Tuinbouw) and former director of the LEI, was a professor in Agrarian Economics 
and Sociology at the Catholic University of Brabant and at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
A specialist in arable farming, P.C. Struik (4, E-009, E-009a, E-025, E-031), and Professor 
Rudy Rabbinge (3, E-023, E-025, 0-097) of the Department of Theoretical Production 
Ecology represented the Wageningen Agricultural University. Arie Oskam and Arie 
Kuyvenhoven of the Department of Agricultural Economics at the same university together 
wrote one article (E-009). 
1°2E-002. 
1030_039.  
1°40-114, 0-115, 0-126, N-259, E-031. 
1°5E-003. 
1060..077.  
1°7N-221. 
1080_052.  
1090-078: Manus van Brakel (Vereniging Milieudefensie), A.J.A. Bijl (docent economie aan de 
Hogeschool van Den Bosch), F.D. Loon (NMB-Postbank), Coen van Beuningen (humanistische 
medefinancieeringsorganisatie Hivos). 
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Other interest groups involved 
The voice of the agro-industry and other businesses connected with agriculture 
was also heard. The major co-operatives were the most visible,11° whereas 
organised consumer viewpoints were less prominent. Only two articles made 
reference to the Dutch Consumentenbondill in the national part of the debate. 
Farmers 
The most visible among the farm spokesmen was a Frisian farmer, Klaas Dijkstra 
(8)112, also known as a member of the "groep-Emmeloord", a farmers' action 
group based in the Frisian village of Emmeloord. He had some previous 
experience of acting in a farmers' movement, and quickly became a spokesman 
for the Northern Dutch farmers who demonstrated in front of a hotel where the 
European Farm Ministers were holding a meeting with Commissioner Ray 
MacSharry in autumn 1991. This incident was the only one which brought 
farmers into the debate as subjects, allowing them to occupy the leading role for 
a couple of hours113. 
In general, farmers were not subjects in the debate, nor even objects, since 
the discussion was about agriculture, not about farmers. Only a couple of times 
did the discussion touch upon reality at the farm level, when arable farming and 
the northern provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe and Veenkolonien 
where it mainly takes place in the Netherlands were discussed114. In two articles 
farmers representing different Iines of production were interviewed about their 
opinions of the reform proposals115. Farming women were mentioned in two 
articles116, and animals were noted in one article117. 
110 Cebeco-Handelsraad was mentioned twice by others (0-077, 101), a member of its directie, 
H. de Boon, wrote an article (E-008), and one of its directors, J.H. Peltjes, was interviewed 
(0-039). Avebe (E-020), Cavo Latuco (0-101), the cooperative marketing organisation for 
poultry (Cooperatief Afzetorgaan voor Slachtpluimvee) (0-101), the dairy cooperative 
Campina-Melkunie (N-084) and Rabobank (N-260) were ali mentioned once. Suiker Unie 
was mentioned in one article (N-260) and the Union for Dairy Products, FNZ (Koninkl(ke 
Nederlandse Zuivelbond) in three articles (N-076a, 0-077, 0-092). The Organisation for the 
Food and Agrarian Industry VAI (Verenigde Voedsel en Agrarische Industrie) was mentioned 
in two texts (N-093, 0-141), and there was even one text written by its representaive, Chris de 
Koning (0-141). 
111N-079, N-078a. 
1120-060, 0-067, N-132, N-133, N-134, N-135, N-140, N-157. 
113E-023, N-131, N-130, N-132, N-133, N-134, N-135, 0-086, N-140. 
-, E-010, N-113, N-113, E-018, E-020, N-142, E-023. 
115E-021, 0-124. 
UD 0-104. 
1170_057.  
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Table 6.1 Actors on the Dutch national scene. 
LEVEL 
	
ACTORS 	 FREQUENCY 
State organs 
Farm organisations 
Political parties 
Research1nstitutes and 
experts 
Other interest groups 
involved 
Farmers 
The Queen 	 1 
The Government 	 3 
Prime Minister 13 
Minister of Agriculture 	 193 
Minister of Finance 5 
Minister of the Environment 	 1 
First Chamber (Pari.) 	 2 
Second Chamber (Pari.) 9 
Ministry of Agriculture 	 5 
Landbouwschap 	 68 
- Chairman Jef Mares 	 32 
Marius Varekamp (KNLC) 	 11 
Gerard Doornbos (NCBTB) 10 
Produktschappen 	 6 
CDA 	 6 
-Jan van Noord 	 19 
PvdA 	 7 
- Jan van Zijl 	 15 
- Servaes Huys 3 
VVD 	 6 
- Piet Blauw 	 21 
David Luteijn 4 
Gro en Links 	 4 
LEI 	 31 
CPB 6 
SOW-VU 	 4 
Prof. Jan de Veer 	 9 
Prof. Jerry de Hoogh 7 
Prof. Cees Veerman 	 5 
Prof. Gert van Dijk (NCR) 	 5 
Agro-industrial co-ops: 
- Cebeco-Handelsraad 	 2 
- Avebe 	 1 
- Cavo Latuco 	 1 
poultry marketing co-op 	 1 
Campina-Melkunie 	 1 
Rabobank 	 1 
Suiker Unie 1 
FNZ 	 3 
VAI 2 
Consumentenbond 	 2 
Klaas Dijkstra 	 8 
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6.2.2. The EU scene 
Another part of the debate dealt primarily with Community policy. Here the 
actors can be grouped as follows: 1) EU organs, 2) members of the Commission, 
3) members of the European Parliament, 4) politicians from different member 
and non-member countries, 5) national civil servants, 6) farm organisations, and 
7) CAP experts. 
On this level the writers could either choose to stress a deliberate actor or 
not. By this I mean that there exists a choice between talking about the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, or of the European Parliament, which ali 
refer to existing concrete institutions, or talking somewhat ambiguously about 
"the EC" or "Brussels", which are indeterminate concepts. "The EC" is too vast 
and unclear, for it embraces ali European Union institutions, the national 
govemments and the whole geographical area of the Community As will be 
shown in the next chapter, on geographical cormotations, the "EC" often referred 
at that time to the whole of Europe, which further increased its ambiguity. It is 
often used as a counterpart to the US, as a comparable actor in international 
politics. "Brussels" can easily take on a slightly pejorative connotation, referring 
to a faceless bureaucracy factually responsible to no one. Both expressions were 
nevertheless used. 
EU organs 
Among the EU decision-making bodies, the Commission (38)118 was by far the 
most important actor in the Dutch debate, while the European Parliament (13)119 
and the Council of Farm Ministers (13)120  were mentioned equally frequently. 
The European Council (1)121, i.e. the Council of Ministers, composed of the 
heads of state or govemment of the member states, was not an important actor. 
"Brussels" was commonly mentioned as an actor (20)122, as was "the EC" 
(15)123.  
118N-004, N-007, N-013, N-017, N-018, 0-040, N-028, N-034, E-044, 0-046, N-048, 0-051, 
N-058, 0-056, N-073, N-074, N-076, N-079, N-080, N-083, N-084, N-086a, N-096, N-106, 
E-013, 0-079, N-120, N-126, E-019, E-022, N-195, N-208, N-261, N-262, N-267, 
N-292. 
119N-052, N-143, N-166, N-175, 0-109, N-206, N-207, N-207, 0-112, N-293, 0-123, N-239, 
N-241. 
120N-016, N-048, N-125, N-130, N-132, N-133, N-134, N-141, 0-091, N-150, N-169, 
N-199. 
1210_079.  
1220-016, N-018, N-051, N-058, 0-057, 0-065, 0-070, N-077a, N-105, 0-081, 0-084, 0-086, 
0-087, E-021, 0-102, 0-106, N-195, 0-122, 0-128, 0-135. 
123N-014, 0-037, N-017, N-018, 0-042, E-009, 0-083, E-019, 0-087, 0-092, E-024, 0-096, 
N-194, E-028, E-030. 
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Commissioners 
The Commission thus received the highest frequency of mentions among the EC 
actors. But when one takes a closer look at what was understood by the 
Commission, it becomes obvious that only a few names were mentioned. Two 
members were considered to be clearly more important than the rest of the 
Commission124: the President, Jacques Delors (35)125, and the Dutch 
Commissioner, Frans Andriessen (34126, plus two interviews127). The attention 
paid to Jacques Delors as an actor can partly be explained by the fact that he 
was generally regarded as a strong leader. His importance in this particular 
debate was partly indirect, however, being related to the connection seen between 
the CAP reform and the GATT trade negotiations. Delors was occasionally seen 
as being behind the reform proposals, but his role was more prominent in the 
GATT connection. 
The significant role adopted by Frans Andriessen in the discussion can be 
explained by three factors. First, he was the Dutch nation's "own" commissioner, 
and as such came to be considered a prominent figure in the debate. Secondly, 
he was the Commissioner for External Trade, one of the most powerful positions 
in the Commission, a status that was further enhanced by the fact that he was 
responsible for the GATT negotiations. Thirdly, he was regarded as a prominent 
figure in the CAP because he had been the Commissioner for Agriculture before 
Ray MacSharry. Since he had tried to solve the overproduction problem by 
means of stabilizers during his own term of office, he was still seen as being 
both involved in the debate and a competent actor in this field.128 
Since the reform proposals were marketed by Commissioner MacSharry as 
having an environmental aspect, the Italian Commissioner for the Environment, 
Ripa di Meana (3),129  was indirectly invited to perform as a competent actor in 
124Note that the Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry, is not included in this analysis. 
He would naturally have been the most important Commission actor in matters concerning the 
reform proposals. 
1250-011, N-006, N-007, N-008, 0-019, N-009, N-010, 0-032, N-012, 0-040, 0-041, N-046, 
E-005, 0-082, N-167, 0-108, N-192, N-196, N-202, 0-109, 0-112, 0-116, N-238, N-242, 
N-247, 0-132, N-256, N-261, N-265, N-266, N-268, 0-144, N-270, N-271, N-277. 
126N-008, 0-019, 0-024, 0-027, 0-032, N-012, N-015, 0-034, 0-035, 0-038, N-019, N-020, 
N-024, 0-040, N-028, N-035, N-036, N-037, E-005, E-006, 0-055, 0-057, 0-073, N-082, 
N-090, N-091, N-092, N-101, N-082, 0-096, N-155, N-170, 0-132, N-288. 
1270-023, 0-053. 
128In addition to Commissioner Andriessen, his cabinet chief, Hans Wijnmalen, was also an 
actor (1, 0-055, plus two interviews, 0-038, 0-123). When Andriessen had completed his 
term as a commissioner, he was succeeded by Hans van den Broek (Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs). van den Broek did not have time to assume such a prominent role in this 
debate, however (2 times, 0-082, 0-123). 
129N-033, N-037, N-082. 
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the discussion. The anticipated effect of the reform proposals on the EU budget 
made the opinions of three other Commissioners relevant to the discussion,13° 
the Dane Henning Christophersen in monetary affairs (4)131, the German Peter 
Schmidthuber in budgetary matters (2)132  and Christiane Scrivener in questions 
of taxation (1).133 
Members of the European Parliament 
Only three political groupings in the European Parliament were mentioned in 
this debate: the largest group, the Socialists, were mentioned most often (7)134, 
followed by the Christian-Democrats (3)135 and the Greens (3)136. On the level 
of individual MEPs, representation was centralised, and ali the MEPs mentioned 
were Dutch. The socialist MEP Eisso Woltjer (1 3 137, plus one interview138) was 
most conspicuous.139 
Politicians from other EU and non-EU countries 
Farm Ministers from various member states were the most prominent politicians 
who were active in the debate, but they were not ali equally significant. One 
preliminary observation is that the larger the country, the more important its 
representative. The Dutch followed most carefully what the German Minister, 
Ignaz Kiechle (35140 , plus one interview141) had to say, and the second most 
130In addition, only the Vice-President of the Commission, Martin Bangemann (2, N-026, 
N-091), from Germany and the British Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan (4, 0-032, N-012, 
N-014, 0-040) were mentioned. 
1310_019, N-081, N-081, N-090. 
132N-090, N-238. 
1330-035. 
1340.-022, N-062, N-064, N-156, N-166, N-207, N-223. 
135N-166 N-207, N-223. 
136N-166, 0-109, 0-140. 
1320-022, 0-060, N-077, N-091, N-092, N-101, N-156, N-166, 0-101, N-184, N-192, 0-110, 
N-210. 
1380-049. 
139The Christian Democrat MEP Jan Sonneveld (7, 0-090, E-025, N-091, N-166, N-184, 
N-192, 0-110) also wrote one article himself (0-083) and was interviewed once (0-093). The 
Green MEP Herman Verbeek (4, N-092, N-101, N-166, N-168) was regarded as a slightly 
less important actor by others, but wrote 3 articles (0-057, 0-118, 0-153, and was interviewed 
once (0-128). The Greens used newspapers more often than the other EP groups for presenting 
their point of view. In addition to Mr Verbeek, a Dutch agricultural policy adviser on the 
Greens' staff, Tim Verhoef, wrote 2 articles (0-109, 0-140). 
N-020, N-026, N-062, N-077, N-077a, N-086, N-086a, N-087, N-089, N-091, N-124, 
N-132, N-134, N-136, E-020, N-148, 0-101, N-173, N-179, N-188, N-197N-199, 
N-205, N-211, N-215, N-220, 0-116, N-230, 0-126, N-249, N-253, N-275. 
140N-018, 
N-128, 
N-202, 
1410_039.  
114 
attention was paid to the French Minister, Louis Mermaz (29)142, followed by 
the British Minister, John Gummer (23143, plus two interviews144). The next 
most important actor, however, was neither Minister Romero from Spain (one 
interview145), nor one of the Italian Farm Ministers, although these are the 
major southem countries, but rather Arlindo Cunha, the Portuguese Minister of 
Agriculture, who outnumbered them with references in 21 articles146. It would 
nevertheless be a mistake to name him as one of the CAP heavyweights in his 
own right, as the attention paid to him is explained by his position as chairman 
of the Council of Ministers meetings during the critical period from January to 
the end of June 1992 when the final negotiations over the reform were taking 
place. 
Thus, the preliminary criterion that ministers were regarded as more competent 
when they represented larger member states has to be modified. It seems that 
ministers from adjacent large countries were regarded as the most important, 
and in this case they also happen to be Germany and France, which are 
traditionally seen as forming a poweraxis in the EC. In the reality, the picture 
can easily become somewhat more confused, because the political arena is 
always open to isolated incidents. The significance of the Italian representative(s), 
for example, grew disproportionately during the final moments of the debate, 
when they made a scene out of milk quotas, so that two of their ministers, 
Giovanni Goria147 and Giovanni Fontana148 were mentioned in a total of 14 
articles, ali in May 1992, - whereas no Italian minister of agriculture had been 
visible in the Dutch debate previously.149 
Although the CAP is primarily an arena for agricultural politicians, it attracts 
other prominent political actors from time to time. The German Federal 
Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was mentioned once in connection with the Dutch 
N-132, 142N-018, N-020, N-029, N-032, N-077a, N-085, N-086a, N-089, N-091, N-097, N-131, 
N-136, N-146, N-147, N-148, N-152, N-156, N-169, N-179, N-188, N-197, N-204, N-249, 
N-253, N-269, N-273, N-281, N-285. 
143N-029, 0-051, N-071, N-085, N-086, N-086a, N-087, N-088, N-089, N-090, N-097, N-128, 
N-132, N-146, N-150, N-171, N-196, N-245, N-264, N-272, N-286, N-289, 0-152. 
1440-039, 0-048. 
1450_039.  
146N-132, N-175, N-178, N-186, N-188, N-189, N-192, N-197, N-199, N-200, N-212, N-215, 
N-216, N-217, N-220, 0-114, N-230, N-231, N-236, N-240, N-244. 
147N-244, N-249, N-252, N-253, N-261, N-262, N-267, N-272. 
148N-285, N-286, N-289, N-290, N-291, 0-148. 
149Among the representatives of the smaller countries, the Belgian Minister of Agriculture, Paul 
De Keersmaeker, was mentioned in 3 articles (N-029, N-087, N-090) and his successor, 
Bourgeois in 7 articles (N-213, N-220, 0-114, 0-130, N-272, N-275, N-276). The Danish 
minister Toemaas was mentioned only once (N-245), and the Irish minister Michael O'Kennedy 
appeared in one article (N-101) and was interviewed once (0-039). The ministers of agriculture 
of Luxembourg and Greece were not mentioned in the Dutch text corpus. 
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debate150, and the Minister for Finance, Jiirgen Möllemann, in 3 articles151. The 
French President, Francois Mitterrand, was mentioned in 3 articles152, and two 
Prime Ministers, Rocard153 and Edith Cresson154, were also mentioned. In 
addition, the Gaullist politician Jacques Chirac, ex-president Val6ry Giscard 
d'Estaing and the extreme -right-wing leader Jean-Marie Le Pen were mentioned 
in one article155. The British Prime Minister John Major was involved in the 
discussion in 3 articles156, and even his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, was 
mentioned in 2 articles157. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, was also implicated 
in the Italian milk quota interlude158.159 
The world of agricultural policy is not restricted to EU-politicians, however, 
not even when EU policy is being discussed. The GATT negotiations, for 
example, influenced the actors present in this field To the extent that Arthur 
Dimkel (22)160, President of the GATT, was prominent, As was the US GATT 
team: the Minister of Agriculture, Ed Madigan (6)161, the leading GATT 
negotiator, Carla Hills (4)162, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, James Baker 
(2)163, and President George Bush (3)164.  The GATT connection even brought 
the Australian Minister of Agriculture, Neil Blewitt, into the Dutch debate on 
one occasion165. 
Furthermore, there were a few Dutch national politicians visible on this 
scene. As shown above, Sicco Mansholt was a prominent figure when the 
reform proposals were being discussed in the national context, and he also 
1500-051. 
151N-124, N-197, 0-116. 
1520-041, 0-051, 0-082. 
153N-010, N-011. 
1540-082. 
155N-138. 
156N-101, N-187, N-251. 
157N-238, 0-139. 
158N-245, N-249, N-261, N-262, N-264, 0-148. 
1590f the representatives of the smaller member states, Prime Minister Dehaene (N-213) and the 
Minister of Trade and EC Affairs, Urbain (2, N-213, N-216) of the neighbouring country of 
Belgium were mentioned, but not as prominent actors. The same can be said of the Irish 
Prime Minister, Charles Haughey (N-101). The Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva 
(2, 0-116, N-262), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joao de Deus Pinheiro (2, N-170, 
N-242) were recognised because their country occupied the presidency at the time. Again, the 
actions and opinions of the Greek, Luxembourgian, Spanish and Danish politicians never 
crossed the publicity threshold in the Dutch debate. 
1600-024, 
0-109, 
0-096, 
0-113, 
0-101, 
0-115, 
N-169, 
0-116, 
N-170, 
0-132, 
N-174, N-176, N-178, N-184, 0-106, 
N-256, N-261, N-265, N-266, E-030. 
N-192, N-195, 
 N-165, N-169, N-170, N-195. 
162N_091,  N-170, N-195. 
163N-169, N-170. 
164N_,  io N-169, 0-116. 
165N_077.  
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commanded considerable authority on the broader EU scene, being mentioned 
in 15 articles166 and interviewed once167. The Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, 
was mentioned in 7 articles168,  and the Minister of Finance, Wim Kok, once169. 
Two secretaries of state, Yvonne van Rooy (8)170 for foreign trade, and P. Dankert 
(6)171  for EU affairs, were similarly involved in the discussion.172 
National civil servants 
Although a significant proportion of the negotiations took place among high 
officials from the EU member states, these were seldom directly visible as 
actors in the debate, in spite of the fact that their contribution was crucial for 
progress in the Council of Farm Ministers meetings. Evert Pierhagen (5)173, 
Secretary (directeur-generaal) at the Ministry of Agriculture, represented his 
country in the negotiations a couple of times, when the minister, Piet Bukman, 
was in the chair. On the other hand, there were two high officials from the 
Department of International Affairs at the Dutch Ministry for Agriculture 
(Internationale Agrarische Aangelegenheden en Marktordeningsvraagstukken 
van het Ministerie LNV), Gerrit Meester and Werner Buck, who had a more 
visible and independent role in the discussion, so that in the end it transpired 
that the ministry was able to agree with the MacSharry proposals before its 
minister, Piet Bukman, was prepared to do so. This meant that at a certain 
moment Mr Meester and Mr Buck intervened in the discussion to explain their 
point of view.174 
N-155, 0-112, N-235, 0-130, 0-145, E-027, 1660-033, 0-073, N-080, N-101, 0-085;0-095, 
E-031, 0-149, 0-154. 
1670-132. 
168N-010, N-035, N-040, N-179, N-272, N-287, 0-148. 
169N-247. 
170N-045, N-161, N-167, N-169, N-197, N-203, N-205, 0-116. 
171N-010, N-091, 0-082, 0423, N -242, N-270. 
172Among the party spokesmen we find the same names as in the national debate: Piet Blauw of 
the VVD (E-016) and Jan van Zijl of the PvdA (E-018) were both interviewed once and Jan 
van Noord of the CDA twice (E-017, 0-115), while the VVD Senator David Luteijn wrote an 
article (0-177). The former Minister for Agriculture, Gerrit Braks (CDA), was interviewed 
once (0-041). 
173 4r Pierhagen was mentioned in 5 articles: N-010, N-086, N-088, N-097, 0-092. 
174Gerrit Meester wrote one article with a couple of officials from his department (Maarten 
Mookhoek and Petra Berkhout) (E-026), was interviewed once (0-143) and was mentioned in 
6 articles (N-215, 0-113, N-219, N-220, 0-114, 0-142). Werner Buck was mentioned in 
4 articles (0-113, N-219, N-220, 0-114). In addition, there was one ex-top official from the 
Ministry of Agriculture who was active in the discussion: Aart de Zeeuw. He was a former 
secretary at the Ministry for Agriculture and the chairman of the Agricultural Committee in 
the GATT negotiations. He was interviewed once (0-133) and mentioned in 4 articles 
(N-057, 0-040, E-030, 0-077). 
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Farm organisations 
Several farm organisations were regarded as competent actors in the debate, as 
could be expected. According to Fennell (1987, 55-57), the COPA (Comitj. des 
Organisations Professionelles Agricoles) was the most influential among these, 
but it was also more in contact with the Commission. In particular, the national 
producers' organisations were more important than COPA in terms of lobbying 
power as far as the Council is concemed. COPA was mentioned in 30 articles in 
the present materia1175, and was frequently represented by its German chairman, 
Constantin Freiherr Heeremann176. The Dutch farm leader, the NCBTB chailinan 
Gerard Doombos (10177, plus one interview178) was Vice-President of the COPA 
during the negotiations, and he often participated in the Dutch discussion in that 
role. The COGECA (Comitd Gn&al de la Co-op&ation Agricole) was mentioned 
in only one article179. 
Of the foreign farm organisations, the French and British ones appeared most 
often in connection with the Dutch debate.18° In addition, two Dutch farmers, 
Huib Rijk and Henk Besten, representing a critical farmers' group (Kritisch 
Landbouw Raad) wrote one article together181. The President of the KNLC, 
Marius Varekamp, wrote one article182 that has to be classified as a EU scene 
contribution, since he was presenting the reasons why the Landbouwschap 
finally altered its position with respect to the reform proposals. 
N-056, N-059, N-077, N-078, N-078a, 0-074, E-011, 0-092, 1750-029, 0-031, N-044, N-047, 
N-144, N-145, N-160, N-161, N-162, N-163, 0-101, N-172, N-174, N-176, N-177, N-187, 
N-197, N-210, 0-113, N-222, 0-118, N-257. 
176Mentioned in 6 articles: N-161, N-174, N-176, N-187, N-197, N-222, and interviewed once: 
0-039. 
177N-043, N-044, E-005, N-059, 0-074, N-161, N-163, N-176, N-177, N-190. 
1780-031, 0-129. 
179N-174. 
180 The French FNSEA (Federation Nationale Des Syndicats D 'Exploitants Agricoles) (5, N-091, 
N-251, N-269, N-281, N-285) was mentioned most often, and its chainnan, Raymond Lacombe, 
was interviewed twice (0-039, N-077a). Two other French farm bodies appeared in the 
debate: the organisation for young farmers, CNJA (2, N-269, N-077a), and Coordination 
Rurale (3, N-269, N-281, N-077a). The British were represented by the NFU (National 
Farmers Union) (3, (N-091, N-129, N-187), and the Portuguese (N-251) and German (N-157 
a) farmer organisations, together with the association for environmentally critical farmers in 
EC (Europese Boeren Vereniging EBV, 0-094), were mentioned in one article each. The 
Belgian farm leader, Jan Hinnekens, was mentioned in one article (N-047). 
181 0-104. 
1820-119. 
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Table 6.2. Actors on the Dutch EU scene. 
LEVEL 
	
ACTOR 	 FREQUENCY 
EU organs Commission 	 38 
European Parliament 	 13 
Council of Farm Ministers 	 13 
European Council 	 1 
Brussels 	 20 
The EC 15 
Commissioners 	 Jacques Delors (President) 	 35 
Frans Andriessen (External Trade) 	 34 
Henning Christophersen (Monetary Affairs) 	4 
Carlo Ripa di Meana (Environment) 	 3 
Peter Schmidthuber (Budget) 	 2 
Christiane Scrivener (Taxation) 1 
Martin Bangemann (Vice-President) 	 2 
Leon Brittan (Trade) 	 4 
Members of 	 Socialist group 	 7 
the European Parliament - Eisso Woltjer 13 
Christian Democrat group 	 3 
- Jan Sonneveld 	 7 
Greens 	 3 
- Herman Verbeek 	 4 
Politicians from EU and 
non-EU countries 
Ministers of Agriculture 
Ignaz Kiechle (Ger.) 	 35 
Louis Mermaz (Fra.) 29 
John Gummer (UK) 	 23 
- Arlindo Cunha (Port.) 21 
Arthur Dunkel (GATT) 	 22 
Sicco Mansholt 	 15 
National civil servants 	Evert Pierhagen (directeur-generaa, LNV) 	5 
Gerrit Meester (Dept of International Affairs) 	6 
Aart de Zeeuw (Agricultural Committee, 
GATT) 	 4 
Farm organisations 	COPA 	 30 
FNSEA (Fra.) 	 5 
CNJA (Fra.) 2 
Coordination Rurale (Fra.) 	 3 
NFU (UK) 	 3 
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CAP experts 
Finally, a number of experts were active in the debate.183 Those regarded as 
competent actors in the CAP discursive field were in most of the cases the same 
ones who participated in the national discussion about the effects of the CAP. 
The overwhelming majority of them were agricultural economists. 
6.2.3. Geography 
Two member states were mentioned noticeably more often than the others in the 
Dutch debate: France and Germany. Contrary to the frequency of mentions of 
the respective ministers of agriculture, France as a country was mentioned more 
often (75)184 than Germany (68)185. On the other hand, Germany was discussed 
in greater detail, and its different regions were better known and taken into 
account. The former DDR (11)186, Bavaria (3)187, Schelswig-Holstein (1)188 and 
Nordrhein-Westphalen (1)189 were mentioned separately, whereas Bretagne (2)190 
183Cees Folmer of the CPB and Max Merbis of SOW-VU together wrote one article (E-028), as 
did Arie Oskam and J.J. Stolwijk of the Agricultural University (E-029), and Arie Oskam was 
interviewed once (0-104). Professor Jan de Veer wrote two articles ( E-019, E-027) and was 
interviewed once (0-107), and Professor Cees Veerman wrote an article (E-027), and was 
interviewed once (E-027). He was also one the co-authors in an article (E-022), together with 
Professor Jerry de Hoogh, Hans August Liikcer and Sicco Mansholt. Professor Gert van Dijk 
wrote two articles (E-024, E-027), and was interviewed once (0-071), and Paul Struik of the 
Agricultural University wrote one article (0-145). Two foreign experts participated in the 
debate: Brian Gardner, director of a scientific institute for studying the CAP, who was 
interviewed twice (0-048, N-195), and the Irish Professor of Agricultural Economics Seamus 
Sheehy was interviewed once (N-137). 
1840-014, 0-022, N-011, 0-032, N-013, N-015, N-018, N-029, E-004, N-045, N-048, N-050, 
N-051, 0-048, N-056, N-066, N-077, N-079, N-077a, N-080a, N-086a, N-091, 0-074, 
N-096, N-106, E-012, E-013, N-114, N-115, N-116, N-119, 0-081, 0-082, E-018, N-131, 
N-134, 0-086, 0-087, E-020, N-138, N-139, 0-092, N-147, N-148, N-150, N-152, 0-096, 
N-154, 0-098, N-165, 0-101, 0-103, N-174, N-180, N-192, N-199, N-200, N-203, 0-112, 
N-212, N-214, N-244, N-249, 0-134, N-256, N-263, N-267, N-273, N-275, N-276, E-029, 
N-281, N-285, N-286, N-290. 
1850-014, 0-032, N-015, 0-033, 0-036, N-018, 0-041, 0-042, N-029, N-033, N-043,.0-046, 
0-047, N-048, E-005, N-050, 0-051, N-056, 0-056, 0-062, N-079, N-077a, N-080a, N-086a, 
N-089, 0-074, N-094, N-097, E-012, N-113, N-114, N-116, N-124, E-019, 0-086, 0-087, 
E-020, 0-090, N-146, N-148, N-150, N-151, 0-096, N-154, N-157a, 0-101, 0-103, N-174, 
N-197, N-199, N-200, N-205, 0-112, N-212, N-215, 0-113, N-218, N-227, N-234, N-249, 
0-134, N-256, N-263, N-265, N-267, N-275, E-029, E-031. 
1860-046, 0-047, 0-056, 0-062, N-077a, E-019, E-020, 0-090, N-256, N-265, N.:275. 
1870-014, N-015, N-154. 
188N-154. 
189E-029. 
199E-013, E-029. 
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was the only province denoted by name in France. Otherwise there was simply 
talk of northern or central France (2)191. 
The countries ranking next in the debate were the United Kingdom (56)192 
and Denmark (51)193. These were referred to evenly throughout the discussion, 
but in less detail than Germany. Only south-east England was mentioned once194. 
The above four countries - Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Denmark 
- formed the core of the EU as far as the Dutch debate was concerned. It is 
interesting that these comprised three large member states and one minor one, 
Denmark. The inclusion of the latter may be partly explained by its location 
close to the Netherlands, and by the belief that the Danes shared the same 
interests as the Dutch themselves. In addition, Denmark is also an important 
agricultural producer in the EU, of course, especially with respect to livestock. 
The fifth most commonly mentioned member state was Italy (45)195, but its 
position was confused by the milk quota dispute in May 1992. Without this 
incident, which gained a lot of negative attention in the Netherlands, the country 
would not have ranked so high in the Dutch debate. Italy's performance in this 
case was something unfamiliar and disturbing for the Dutch, thus making the 
emotional distance even greater than the geographical distance. 
For a close neighbour partly sharing the same language, Belgium (36)196 
ranked fairly low. Its geographical position was not enough to bring it into the 
inner circle of Dutch EU geography. In fact, Ireland (30)197 was mentioned 
almost as many times. This can he explained by the extra interest paid to the 
homeland of Commissioner MacSharry, and one may presume that Ireland 
would otherwise have been somewhat more marginal in the debate. 
191N-066, E-020. 
1920-014, 0-019, 0-021, 0-025, 0-027, 0-033, N-018, N-029, N-038, N-043, E-004, N-045, 
0-046, 0-051, N-056, N-061, N-064, N-066, N-085, N-090, N-097, N-106, E-012, N-113, 
N-114, N-116, 0-081, N-134, 0-087, E-020, N-146, N-154, N-171, N-180, N-197, N-199, 
N-201, N-205, 0-112, N-212, N-214, 0-114, 0-116, N-230, 0-123, N-238, N-244, 0-134, 
N-252, N-263, N-268, E-027, N-287, N-289, N-290, 0-152. 
1930-019, 0-021, 0-025, 0-027, 0-033, N-018, N-029, N-038, N-043, E-004, N-045, 0-048, 
N-056, N-061, N-085, N-097, N-106, E-012, E-013, N-113, N-114, N-119, N-201, N-205, 
0-112, N-212, N-214, N-215, N-217, N-218, 0-114, E-027, N-285, N-287, N-289, N-290, 
0-148. 
194E-020. 
1950-019, 0-033, N-043, E-004, N-050, 0-063, N-097, E-012, N-119, E-020, N-154, 0-098, 
0-101, N-174, N-197, N-200, N-211, N-212, N-214, N-215, N-243, N-244, N-245, N-249, 
0-134, N-252, N-254, 0-136, N-261, N-262, N-263, N-266, N-267, N-268, N-272, N-273, 
N-274, N-276, N-285, N-286, N-288, N-289, N-291, 0-148, 0-152. 
1960-019, 0-033, N-029, N-033, N-043, N-056, N-097, N-106, E-012, N-119, N-174, N-197, 
N-199, N-200, N-201, N-205, N-212, N-213, N-214, 0-113, N-216, N-217, N-218, 0-114, 
N-230, 0-123, N-244, N-252, N-263, N-275, E-027, E-029, N-285, N-287, N-289, N-290. 
1970-014, 0-019, 0-021, N-013, N-015, 0-033, 0-036, N-029, N-039, N-043, N-051, N-056, 
0-065, N-097, N-101, N-106, E-012, N-119, 0-081, N-180, N-212, N-224, 0-116, N-238, 
N-253, N-263, N-273, E-027,.0-148, N-292. 
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Table 6.3. EU countries involved in the Dutch debate. 
COUNTRY 	 FREQUENCY 
France 	 75 
Germany 68 
United Kingdom 	 56 
Denmark 	 51 
Italy 	 45 
Belgium 36 
Ireland 	 30 
Spain 24 
Portugal 	 23 
Greece 13 
Luxembourg 	 12 
Spain (24)198 and Portugal (23)199 seemed to be equally important in the 
Dutch debate. This picture is misleading, however, as Portugal must have attracted 
more attention than normal because of its chairmanship of the EU at the time. 
One may expect it normally to be more peripheral than Spain, which should gain 
more attention simply because of its size. 
Greece and Luxembourg lay on the ultimate periphery of the Dutch debate, 
though for different reasons. Luxembourg (12)200 because of its size, and Greece 
(13)201 because of its location, and possibly also because of its language. No 
Greek was mentioned by name in the public debate, which also implies that the 
country is not very well known in the Netherlands. 
The above analysis indicates that there is a northern core in the EU as far as 
the Dutch are concerned, comprising Germany, France, Great Britain and 
Denmark. The periphery consists of more southerly countries, most probably 
also including Ireland. Belgium is located somewhere in between, whereas 
Luxembourg is not taken very seriously in the political geography of the CAP. 
We can also analyse the centre-periphery construction from a slightly different 
point of view. Namely, there are places in the texts at which the speakers or 
writers tried to explain the structure of the EU and the balance of power within 
it by grouping the member states into categories. The most important line of 
demarcation for the Dutch evidently ran between the south and the north. People 
1980-014, 0-022, 0-033, N-029, E-004, 0-063, N-097, E-012, N-114, N-116, N-119, 0-081, 
E-020, N-154, 0-101, N-211, N-238, N-244, N-245, N-246, N-254, 0-136, N-263, N-292. 
1990-033, N-029, E-004, 0-063, N-097, E-012, N-114, N-119, E-020, 0-101, N-178, N-200, 
N-202, N-212, N-213, N-218, N-238, N-261, N-263, N-272, N-276, N-282, N-284. 
200 N-005, 0-019, 0-033, N-029, N-043, E-004, N-106, N-119, N-212, N-214, N-244, N-265. 
201N-029, E-004, N-097, N-119, 0-101, N-211, N-238, N-244, N-245, N-254, 0-136, N-263. 
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spoke of "Southern Europe"(2)202,  "the southem member states" (3)203, "the 
Mediterranean countries" (2)204,  or "the three most southerly countries" (1)205, 
although sometimes this group was defined slightly differently, as "the poorest 
member states" (1)206,  which then excluded Italy but included Ireland. Thus 
Ireland' s position was ambiguous. It was easily lumped together with the poorer 
Mediterranean countries, although its geographical location is much further 
north. Furthermore, considering Ireland in the CAP context, it contributes to the 
surplus of northem "problem products" (dairy and beef) rather than to "southem 
products" (fruit, vegetables, wine and olive oil). Ireland does, however, share an 
interest in Structural Fund resources together with the southem member states, 
but it seems that this aspect is overemphasised in the Dutch consciousness, 
biassing the local picture of Ireland as a member state. 
It seems to he more important to define "the other" or "them" in cases of this 
kind, whereas the group referred to as "us" is usually taken for granted. In fact, 
there were only a couple references to the "northem member states" (2)207. This 
means in practice that it is common to speak about the "southem member states" 
without making it clear whether the remaining countries ali belong to the 
"northem member states". Of all the possible divisions, that into south and north 
was the most common (11)208.  The west-east dimension inside the EU was 
mentioned in only a couple of articles (2)209, and there was one interesting 
reference to "small countries" in the EU sense - not to Luxembourg or Ireland 
as one might think, but to the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark210. 
Moreover, there was another important line of demarcation: the east-west 
division between the EU and non-EU countries in central and southem Europe. 
Eastem Europe (17)211 was mentioned far more often than Westem Europe 
(2)212, and with a general undertone of inferiority or a lower level of development 
than the West, but this was seldom expressed explicitly. In only one article was 
the pejorative term "Eastem Block"213 mentioned, referring to communism and 
the totalitarian system. Of the Eastem European countries, Poland(3)214, ukraine 
2020-087, 0-090. 
2030-112, N-212, 0-149. 
204N-186, 0-134. 
2°5N-043. 
206N-266. 
207N-085, N-244. 
208E-004, E-005, 0-055, 0-056, E-012, N-136, E-021, N-242, N-243, N-256, N-287. 
209E-019, E-031. 
21°N-218. 
2110_-,  E-005, E-009, N-114, 0-081, 0-083, N-132, N-134, 0-087, 0-090, N-139, 0-091, 
N-143, 0-093, N-147, 0-115, 0-132. 
2120-085, 0-091. 
213N-134. 
u 0-082, E-020. 
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(3)215, Hungary (2)216, Czechoslovalcia (1)217 and Romania (1)218 were mentioned 
by name. 
The rest of Eastern Europe - Russia and other former Soviet republics, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - was not considered relevant, and the same was true 
of the Nordic countries. EFTA as a group was mentioned twice219, and Austria22° 
and Switzerland once each221. 
Overwhelmingly the most important actor outside the EU was the USA 
(44)222, its role in CAP politics no doubt being underlined by the ongoing 
GATT negotiations. The same could also be said of Australia (3)223, New 
Zealand (2)224, Argentina(1)225, Thailand (2)226 and about Cairns group (2)227. 
Japan (5)228 was the second most frequently mentioned individual non-EU 
country. Countries which were less industrialised and located far away from the 
EU were either referred to vaguely (Southern Asia229) or totally neglected. Only 
three other Latin-American countries in addition to Argentina were mentioned, 
for example (Cuba, Nicaragua and Brazi1230), and the continent as a whole was 
mentioned in only one article231. Among the African countries, Kenya and 
Tanzania232, and in Middle East, Saudi Arabia233 were mentioned, each once. 
These areas were lumped together under the terms "developing countries" (3)234 
or "the Third World" (1)235. 
2150-081, 0-115, E-031. 
2160-082, E-020. 
217E-020. 
2180_1 53.  
2190-090, E-030. 
2200-118. 
221 0-1 1 8. 
2220-015, N-005, 0-020, 0-028, N-024, 0-042, N-033, E-005, N-060, 0-060, N-080, N-076a, 
N-086a, E-013, E-014, 0-080, N-132, 0-087, 0-092, 0-093, N-147, N-152, E-023, E-024, 
0-096, 0-098, N-169, N-173, 0-104, N-184, N-192, N-194, 0-113, N-216, 0-116, 0-129, 
0-132, 0-133, 0-134, N-252, 0-137, 0-140, E-028, E-030. 
223N-005, E-023, 0-116. 
2240-087, E-031. 
225E-03 1. 
2260_113, E-028. 
2270-015, 0-096. 
2280-018, E-009, E-013, 0-146, E-030. 
229E-014. 
2300-092, Brazil also in E-028. 
231N-024. 
232both in 0-092. 
2330.-1 16. 
234E-009, E-002, E-023. 
235N-1 12. 
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Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to an interesting phenomenon, 
the reduction of "Europe" to "the EU". There were as many as 28 articles236 in 
which Europe was used as a synonym for "the EU". This may have been 
connected with the tendency towards outlining the world in GATT terms, where 
only the USA and the EU were seen as competent partners, the rest of the world 
being expected to follow the decisions of these major powers, it does cause an 
identity problem for the other European countries, leaving them in a "no man's 
land", as it were. This could be interpreted as harmless nonchalance, but it may 
equally well be a deliberate way of mitigating the political importance of the 
European countries which are not members of the EU. 
6.3. Actors in the Irish debate 
6.3.1. The domestic scene 
We will discuss the actors on the national scene in the same order as in the 
Dutch debate: 1) state organs, 2) farm organisations, 3) parties and their 
representatives, 4) research organisations and experts, 5) other interest groups 
involved, and last, 6) farmers. 
State organs 
As in the Netherlands, the Minister of Agriculture occupied an important role in 
the Irish debate. During the period studied here, there were actually three 
Ministers of Agriculture, succeeding each other in the following order: Michael 
O'Kennedy, Michael Woods and Joe Walsh, ali Fianna Fåil politicians. 
O'Kennedy and Woods were both ministers in Charles Haughey's government, 
in which Joe Walsh was Minister of State for Food. In Albert Reynold' s cabinet 
Joe Walsh held the post of Minister of Agriculture. Michael O'Kennedy's term 
as a minister was the longest of the three, and consequently he was referred to 
most often (101)237, and interviewed once238, whereas Michael Woods was 
2360-014, N-017, N-019, N-046, N-063, 0-073, E-011, 0-077, 0-083, N-141, 0-095, E-023, 
0-096, N-157a, 0-100, N-176, N-178, 
0-134, N-252, N-257, 0-145. 
N-187, 0-109,  0-116, 0-117, 0-121, N-248, 
237N-002, N-004, N-020, N-022, N-024, N-026, N-027, N-028, N-037, N-038, N-039, N-040, 
N-041, N-042, N-043, 0-010, N-044, N-051, N-053, N-055, 0-015, N-059, N-061, 0-017, 
0-016a, 0-019, N-064, 0-021, N-065, N-066, N-067, 0-025, N-069, N-071, 0-037, N-085, 
N-086, N-087, N-088, N-098, N-090, N-092, 0-041, 0-042, N-096, N-097, N-I00, 0-053, 
N-102, N-109, 0-069, N-118, 0-093, 0-094, N-131, 0-097, N-146, 0-103, 0-108, 0-109, 
N-I52, 0-113, N-154, 0-115, 
0-128, N-168, N-170, N-172, 
0-117, 
N-173, 
N-156, 
N-174, 
0-121, 
0-130, 
N-163, N-I64, N-165, 
N-175, N-176, 0-136, 
N-I66, N-167, 
N-183, N-184, 
N-185, N-186, N-189, N-200, 0-161, N-209, N-210,  N-213, N-215, 0-167, N-216, 
N-230, 0-179, N-231, N-236, 0-231. 
2380056 
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mentioned in 16 articles239. Joe Walsh was mentioned as Minister of Agriculture 
in 28 articles24° and interviewed once241. 
The Irish Prime Minister, the Taoiseach, seemed to inspire more respect as 
an actor in the agricultural policy field than his Dutch college, and he participated 
actively in the discussion and was regarded as an influential Irish politician in 
the CAP context, sometimes even more important than the Minister of 
Agriculture. Charles Haughey was mentioned as Taoiseach in 58 articles242 and 
his successor Albert Reynolds in 4 articles243. Unlike the situation in the Dutch 
debate, the Taoiseach pursued the same Iines of thought as his Minister of 
Agriculture throughout the discussion. Actually, the whole government seemed 
to share the same opinion regarding the proposa1s.244 
The government (30)245 was also considered a competent actor, whereas the 
President, who has only a ceremonial role in the Irish Republic, similarly lay 
outside this debate, being mentioned in only one article246. The Dåil (Parliament) 
N-244, N-247, N-248, N-249, N-250, N-251, N-253, N-256, 239N-238, N-239, N-240, N-242, 
N-258, 0-197, N-262, 0-231. 
240N-263, N-265, 0-204, N-274, N-279, N-280, N-282, N-283, N-284, N-287, 0-210, N-288, 
N-289, N-290, N-29I, 0-215, 0-216, 0-218, N-293, 0-218, N-295, 0-219, 0-223, N-298, 
0-228, E-026, N-301, 0-231. 
2410_199.  
242N-012, N-017, 0-020, N-023, N-040, 0-012, N-051, N-055, N-058, N-068, N-076, N-077, 
N-080, N-082, N-088, 0-048, 0-058, N-118, N-125, 0-092, N-130, 0-096, N-131, N-132, 
E-012, N-I34, N-136, N-140, N-141, N-145, N-147, 0-108, 0-109, N-I51, N-152, N-154, 
N-157, N-164, N-166, N-185, N-186, N-189, N-147, 0-151, 0-152, N-192, N-193, N-I95, 
0-160, N-207, N-2I9, N-228, N-236, N-240, 0-195, 0-204, N-274. 
243N-291, N-292, N-295, 0-231. 
244Among the other ministers, Joe Walsh had already been active in the discussion as Minister of 
State for Food (N-051, N-055, N-100, N-101, N-I24, 0-101, N-235, N-236). The Minister of 
Finance in Haughey's cabinet, Albert Reynolds, was mentioned in 6 articles (0-015, 0-068, 
0-092, N-I32, 0-108, N-I86), and the Minister of Horticulture, Seamus Kirk (N-203), and 
the Minister of Horticulture and Rural Development, Liam Hyland (N-302), were both 
mentioned once. The Minister of State for Agriculture and Food, John Brown, was mentioned 
in one article (N-28I), Des O'Malley, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, appeared in 
four articles (N-001, N-065, N-084, N-092). Likewise, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gerry 
Collins (0-092, 0-231), and the Minister of EU Affairs, Maire Geoghegan Quinn (N-140, 
0-231), were both mentioned in two articles. The Energy Minister, Bobby Molloy (0-209), 
the Minister of State at the Department of Marine, Michael J. Noonan (N-200), and the 
Minister of State for Trade and Marketing, Mary O'Rourke (0-223), were mentioned in one 
article each. This list of names indicates that a relatively large number of ministers or junior 
ministers found the CAP reform debate important enough to participate in even though it was 
not directly connected with their own field of politics. 
245N-023, 0-017, 0-031, 0-057, 0-061, 0-066, N-121, 0-090, E-011, 0-096, E-012, 0-097, 
N-142, N-146, N-I48, 0-105, 0-108, N-175, N-188, N-192, N-196, 0-155, 0-177, 0-180, 
N-236, E-022, 0-210, E-024, 0-214, 0-227. 
2460-0/8. 
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was mentioned in seven articles247, the Cathaoirleach (Speaker) in one248, and 
the Senate in one249. The Oireachtas, the Joint Committee on Secondary 
Legislation in the EU (2)250, had a minor role in the debate, too.25I 
Farm organisations 
There are two major farm organisations in Ireland, the IFA (Irish Farmers' 
Association) and the ICMSA (Trish Creamery Milk Suppliers' Association), of 
which the former is the larger. In addition, there is a young farmers' organisation 
called Macra na Feirme, and a new organisation for small farmers', the UFA 
(United Farmers' Association). 
The IFA was most prominent of ali the farm bodies in this debate (152)252, 
and its President, Ian Gillis (113)253, who wrote one article himself254 was a 
247 0-058, 0-105, 0-115, 0-117, N-196, 0-170, 0-194. 
2480_025.  
2490-184. 
259N-1 77, N-202. 
251A few high civil servants were considered competent actors: Michael Dowling, Secretary of 
the Department of Agriculture (4, 0-004, 0-037, 0-165, N-222), his assistant, Bart Bradey 
(N-227), and the chief economist of the Department of Agriculture, Tom Arnolds (N-186). 
The Department of Agriculture and Food was mentioned in two article s (0-079, E-023). 
252N-011, N-012, N-015, N-016, N-017, N-020, N-022, N-023, N-024, N-026, N-027, N-028, 
N-029, N-030, N-031, N-032, N-033, 0-008, 0-009, 0-010, N-044, N-047, N-048, N-049, 
N-051, N-052, N-058, N-059, 0-016a, 0-018, 0-024, N-068, N-074, N-076, 0-033, N-083, 
N-084, N-086, N-091, 0-024, N-068, N-074, N-076, 0-033, N-083, N-084, N-086, N-091, 
0-042, 0-045, 0-047, 0-048, 0-049, N-099, 0-053, 0-056, N-104, N-I05, N-106, N-107, 
N-108, 0-063, 0-064, 0-065, 0-071, N-113, 0-073, 0-074, 0-075, 0-077, 0-079, 0-080, 
0-083, 0-084, N-118, N-122, N-122, N-125, N-127, N-129, N-130, 0-093, N-131, E-012, 
N-138, N-I40, N-I42, 0-100, N-I45, N-I47, 0-103, 0-104, 0-112, 0-113, 0-122, N-159, 
N-160, N-161, N-163, N-165, N-I67, N-I68, 0-129, N-173, 0-130, N-175, N-176, N-177, 
0-136, N-180, N-186, N-189, 0-143, 0-147, N-198, 0-154, N-200, 0-157, N-158, N-210, 
N-211, 0-164, N-214, N-216, 0-171, N-219, N-226, N-229, 0-179, N-231, N-234, N-237, 
N-238, N-242, N-244, N-245, N-246, N-253, 0-193, 0-197, 0-200, N-265, 0-202, N-273, 
0-203, N-276, E-022, N-277, N-280, N-28I, N-283, N-284, 0-208, 0-209, 0-210, 0-212, 
N-288, N-289, N-290, N-291, 0-215, N-292, 0-216, 0-218, 0-219, 0-222, N-298, 0-228, 
N-229, N-300, N-301. 
253N-004, N-011, N-012, N-015, N-017, N-029, N-030, N-031, N-032, N-033, 0-010, N-048, 
N-049, N-051, N-059, 0-016a, 0-017, N-062, 0-020, N-065, N-066, 0-024, N-068, N-073, 
N-076, 0-033, N-083, N-084, N-086, N-088, N-090, N-091, 0-045, 0-047, N-104, N-105, 
N-106, N-107, N-108, 0-063, 0-064, 0-065, N-113, 0-073, 0-074, 0-075, 0-078, 0-080, 
N-122, N-I25, N-127 N-128, N-129, 0-093, E-012, N-135, N-138, N-140, N-142, 0-100, 
N-I46, N-I47, 0-103, N-148, 0-104, N-152, 0-113, 0-122, N-159, N-I60, N-161, N-163, 
N-165, N-166, N-167, N-I68, N-176, N-186, N-189, 0-143, 0-144, N-I98, N-200, N-210, 
N-211, N-214, N-216, N-219, N-226, N-229, N-231, 0-180, N-234, N-237, N-238, N-242, 
N-253, 0-200, N-256, N-273, N-280, N-283, N-284, 0-208, 0-209, 0-210, N-288, N-289, 
N-290, N-291, 0-215, N-292, N-293. 
2540_077.  
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clearer leader for his organisation than Jef Mares for the Landbouwschap, and 
was the most prominent actor inside his organisation.255 The ICMSA was 
mentioned in 67 articles256. As in the case of the IFA, the President of the 
ICMSA, Tom O'Dwyer (52257, and interviewed once258) was the most prominent 
figure in the debate.259 
The two other farm organisations, the UFA and Macra na Feirme, were not 
mere curiosities in the debate, but they cannot he compared in significance with 
the IFA and ICMSA. The then recently established farm body for small farmers, 
UFA (18)260, was almost without exception connected with the utterances of its 
President, Sean Scanlon (12)261, and in addition to him, was represented only by 
255Deputy President John Donelly was mentioned in only three articles (N-017, N-091, N-246), 
and Deputy President Tom Parlon in one (N-250), whereas Dan Joe O'Donovan, vice-
president of the IFA's Munster region was mentioned in 5 articles (N-047, N-048, N-049, 
0-157, N-246). The only female IFA representative mentioned in the debate had a traditionally 
female role: Rosemarie Smith (3, 0-018, N-178, N-180) was chairman of the National Family 
Farm Committee. Four other IFA committee chairmen appeared as actors, representing the 
interests of IFA grain growers (Grain Committee chairman Henry Britton, N-046, 0-222), 
livestock rearing (Livestock Committee chairmen Ger Smith, N-244 and Richard Booth, 
0-219), dairy producers (National Dairy Committee chairman Michael Slattery, 0-228), and 
rural development (National Rural Development Committee, an interview 0-149). A couple 
of local representatives were also mentioned (Donal Howard, chairman of the Duhallow 
Regional IFA Executive (0-052), and Phil Lynch, a leading IFA man in Callan (0-083). 
From the IFA headquarters, General Secretary Michael Berkery (N-168) and the chief 
economist, Con Lucey (3, N-015, 0-053, E-020), were mentioned. Finally, Tom Clinton, 
former IFA President, was both interviewed once (0-048) and mentioned in one article 
(0-049). 
256 N-012, N-020, N-021, N-041, 0-012, 0-013, N-051, N-065, N-074, N-076, N-077, 0-033, 
N-079, N-081, N-086, 0-049, 0-062, 0-064, 0-073, 0-080, N-121, N-I27, N-128, N-130, 
0-093, 0-094, N-131, N-139, N-142, 0-100, N-I44, 0-103, 0-103, 0-104, N-156, 0-122, 
N-165, N-166, N-167, 0-129, N-175, N-176, 0-136, N-186, N-189, 0-147, 0-169, 0-179, 
N-23I, 0-182, N-234, 0-183, N-283, N-250, N-273, N-281, N-283, 0-206, N-285, N-288, 
N-29I, 0-215, N-292, 0-216, 0-228, N-300, 0-230. 
257 N-012, N-021, N-041, 0-012, 0-013, N-051, N-065, N-076, N-077, 0-033, N-079, N-081, 
N-086, N-I03, 0-073, 0-082, 0-083, N-118, N-121, 0-089, 0-093, 0-094, 0-100, N-142, 
N-144, N-I46, 0-103, N-I48, 0-104, N-156, N-166, N-167, N-176, N-I86, N-189, 0-169, 
N-23I, 0-182, N-234, 0-183, N-238, N-250, N-28I, N-283, 0-206, N-285, N-288, N-290, 
0-215,  0-228. 
258 0- 13 1. 
259Further leading ICMSA figures in the debate were Deputy President Con Scully (3, N-042, 
N-142, N-144) and General Secretary Donal Murphy (4, 0-085, N-121, N-127, N-128). The 
Livestock and Family Farm Committees were represented by their chairmen (Livestock 
Committee chairman Nicholas Ryan 3 times, N-029, N-030, N-056 and Family Farm Committee 
chairman Dan McCarthy four times, 0-047, N-113, 0-150, 0-230). The ICMSA economist 
Ciaran Dolan was mentioned in three articles. In addition, a couple of members of the 
administrative committee were mentioned (Donal Gynes and Maurice O'Riordan (N-144). 
260N-018, N-064,  N-074, N-076, 0-042, 0-043, N-099, N-107, 0-064, 0-080, 0-093, 
0-094, N-173, N-175, N-176, N-186, N-158. 
261 N-018, N-019,  N-076, 0-042, 0-043, 0-080, N-159, N-160, N-173, N-175, N-176. 
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Tim McCraith (1)262  and the National Chairman, Bertie Wall (1)263.  The 
organisation for young farmers, Macra na Feirme (16)264 was represented by its 
President, first Laurence Fallon (3)265 and later Matt O'Keeffe (8)266. 
The role of the farming organisations and their leaders as important national 
actors seemed not to be called into question in the Irish debate. There were 
several explicit references to their position as leaders in agricultural policy 
(18)267, and virtually in everything connected with it. It was also common to 
connect the interests of farmers and agri-business (3)268.  The ICOS (Irish 
Cooperative Organisation Society) (26)269 was thus often listed together with 
the above-mentioned farmers' organisations, being represented by its President, 
William Nagle (10)270, or by the Director General, John Tyrell (3)271. 
Political parties 
The two largest parties, Fianna Fåil (15)272,  then in the Cabinet, and Fine Gael 
(17)273, had the most to say in the debate. Both belong to the political centre, 
and their catch-all nature makes both appeal to the total electorate. As a 
consequence, they are currently difficult to distinguish ideologically (Lee 1989, 
545-546). Small farmers have traditionally been the Fianna Fåil heartland, 
while Fine Gael retained a distinct middle-class appeal for a long time, 
complemented by its relative electoral weight among the larger farmers (Mair 
1987, 39-42). 
262N_074.  
2630-085. 
264N-020, N-041, N-051, N-118, N-165, N-186, N-189, 0-147, N-224, 0-179, N-231, N-234, 
N-273, N-284, 0-207, 0-215. 
265N-041, N-077, N-173. 
2660_1/3, N-176, 0-162, N-216, N-223, N-231, 0-205, 0-215. 
267Farm leaders (N-040, N-063, 0-019, 0-032, N-096, N-097, N-185); the farming lobby 
(N-064); the Irish farm lobby (N-270); farm organisations (N-179, 0-202); famier organisations 
(0-027); farmers' organisations (N-220); farming organisations (0-031, 0-071); the Irish 
farming associations 0-217; the farm bodies (0-128); the farming community (0-081). 
268A11 Irish farm organisations and agri-business interests (N-184); Irish farming and agri-
business interests (N-184); the agri-industry (0-140). 
269N-020, N-041, 0-011, N-051, 0-027, N-086, 0-046, 0-071, N-118, 0-087, N-142, 0-113, 
N-165, N-189, 0-147, N-205, N-212, N-228, 0-179, N-231, N-232, N-233, N-234, N-251, 
N-273, N-29I. 
279N-017, 0-011, 0-044, N-142, 0-113, N-165, N-176, N-23I, N-251, N-291. 
2710-011, N-081, N-205. 
2720-002, 0-020, 0-023, 0-027, N-083, 0-097, N-145, 0-104, N-151, 0-130, N-181, 0-151, 
N-I92, 0-176, 0-231. 
273N-062, N-063, N-023, 0-025, N-070, N-080, 0-097, N-145, N-156, 0-126, N-164, 0-130, 
0 151, N-195, 0-194, N-256, 0-195. 
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Fianna Fåil was overwhelmingly represented by either one of its ministers 
(see above) or one of its MEPs (see below), only few other names being 
mentioned in the debate274. 
The Fine Gael party leader, John Bruton, participated in the debate (13)275, 
but the most important figure representing this party was the Agricultural 
Spokesman, Austin Deasy (27)276, himself a former Minister of Agriculture. 
Another frequently mentioned name was the Senator and former Munster MEP, 
Professor Tom Raftery (14)277. Quite a number of other Fine Gael politicians 
were mentioned in the debate278. 
With regard to the smaller parties, the Progressive Democrats (2)279 were 
represented by their Spokesman on Agriculture, Senator John Dardis (6)280, in 
addition to whom only one other PD politician was mentioned, Senator Martin 
Cullen (1)281.  The Social Democratic Labour Party (3)282 had no single 
outstanding figure in the reform debate, being represented by the party leader, 
Dick Spring (3)283, and his two deputies, Ruairi Quinn (1)284 and Peadar Clohessy 
(2)285. Liam Kavanagh (4)286 and Senator Pat Upton (3)287were also actors on 
the national scene, and Michael Ferris was mentioned once288. The Irish 
democratic left, the Workers' Party (1)289, was represented either by the party 
leader, MEP Proinsias De Rossa (4)290, or by the Spokesman for Agriculture, 
274Councillor 011ie Wilkinson (0-076); Senator Rory Keily (N-150); Senator Hugh Brune 
(N-150); Deputy TD (Teachta Dala = MP) Noel Tavern (0-130, N-204). 
275 0-012, N-080, 0-093, 0-094, 0-119, N-156, 0-126, N-174, 0-151, 0-152, N-192, N-193, 
0-160. 
276 N-033, N-044, 0-012, 0-017, N-062, N-063, 0-022, 0-023, 0-025, N-077, N-100, N-101, 
0-093, 0-104, 0-111, 0-113, 0-117, 0-120, N-156, N-174, N-236, 0-194, N-256, 0-195, 
0-204, 0-214, 0-223. 
277 0-014, N-068, 0-038, N-087, 0-053, 0-054, 0-057, 0-063, 0-072, N-150, N-189, N-193, 
N-224, 0-193. 
278Alan Dukes (N-155, 0-126, 0-154); Avril Doyle (N-087); Councillor Gary O'Halloran 
(0-076); Councillor Pat Coffey (0-076); Councillor Gerard Murphy (0-214); Senator Charles 
McDondald (N-150); Senator Mary Jackman (N-150); Deputy Bill Cotter (0-188); Paul 
Connaughton (0-223). 
279 0-130, 0-176. 
280 0-037, N-087, 0-094, 0-138, N-224, 0-184. 
281N-150.  
282N-156, N-I64, 0-130. 
283N-152, 0-117, N-156. 
284Ar_147.  
285 N-101, N-236. 
286 N-100, 0-094, N-236, N-274. 
287 N-087, N-150, 0-184. 
2880_223.  
289 0_130.  
290N-147, 0-168, N-236, 0-223. 
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Joe Sherlock (4)291. Two independent politicians, Tom Foxe292 and Brendan 
Lyan293, were both mentioned once in the debate. 
Research organisations and experts 
Research institutions and experts performed as competent actors in the debate, 
as in the Netherlands. In general, agricultural economists dominated the scientific 
discussion, and almost without an exception they were men. The farm advisory 
body Teagasc (the National Agricultural and Food Research and Advisory 
Agency) was mentioned most often (24)246, its findings being interpreted for 
the general public by its Chairman, the former IFA President Joe Rea (9)295. 
Several Teagasc experts appeared in the debate, not only from the headquarters 
in Dublin but also from outside the capita1296. 
In addition to the Teagasc, there were two other research institutions which 
contributed to the discussion: the ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) 
(2)297and the NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (4)298. The ESRI 
was represented by the economist John Fitzgerald and by Deirdre O'Connor 
(1)299. The Agricultural Science Association (ASA), and especially its President, 
Larry O'Loughlin, participated regularly (5)300, and the Agricultural Economics 
Society of Ireland was mentioned in one article301. 
Seamus Sheehy, Professor of Agricultural Economics at University College, 
Dublin, had a prominent status (9)302 among university experts,303 and a couple 
291N-100, 0-112, 0-117, N-156. 
292N-100. 
293N_150.  
2940-008, 0-009, 0-010, 0-015, 0-036, 0-130, E-015, 0-135, 0-138, N-179, N-180, N-181, 
N-182, N-183, N-186, N-198, N-200, N-208, 0-170, 0-218, 0-226, N-299, N-300, 0-229. 
2950-007, 0-008, 0-009, 0-010, 0-036, 0-064, 0-095, 0-166 N-223. 
296W. Fingleton, J. Heavey, A. Leavy and M. Roche (0-229); Director Pierce Ryan (N-183); 
Michael Calvin (E-004); Tony Leavy (N-205); Matt Barlow (E-018); Tom Thomas (N-254, 
N-255, 0-196); Dick Power (N-259). 
297E-009, E-012. 
298E-022, E-023, E-024, N-294. 
2990-130. 
3°°0-052, N-159, 0-138, 0-160, 0-161 (together with the new President, Fachnn O'Driscoll). 
301N-230. 
302N-044, 0-089, E-010, 0-164, 0-165, 0-171, 0-174, E-026, N-300. 
303A number of scientists at different universities were mentioned: Alan Matthews, Associate 
Professor of Economics at Trinity College (E-014), Professor Donal Dineen, Head of Business 
Studies at the University of Limerick (0-085), agricultural law expert Brian Carroll from the 
University College, Cork (E-007), Dr Gerry Boyle of St Patrick's College, Maynooth (E-017), 
and Anne Byrne of University College, Gallway, Social Sciences Research Centre (0-185). 
Diarmuid 0 Cearbhaill, a lecturer in economics at University College, Dublin, contributed an 
article (E 001). 
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of private consultants were mentioned in addition to university and institute 
researchers.304 Finally, writers sometimes referred in general to "economists" 
(1)305, "agricultural economists" (1)306  or "independent economists" (1)307 in a 
way which underlines the role of such people as competent actors in this debate, 
and in the field of agricultural policy as a whole. 
Other interest groups involved 
The role of agribusiness, especially of cooperatives, as competent actors in the 
field of agricultural policy also became clear in the Irish debate. These were 
referred to in general as "the co-ops" (1)308,  "dairy co-ops" (2)309 or "farmer-
owned co-ops" (1)310, or else specifically by name.311\312. ) 	Businesses connected 
with farming, from butchers (1)313 to contractors (1)314 and accountants (1) 15 
were ali considered when assessing the consequences of the reform for Irish 
agriculture. 
Ireland had its own profile of groups involved in the debate. The Green 
Movement, for example, was not a prominent actor (1)316, and organic farmers 
were mentioned in only one article317. On the other hand, the clergy were better 
304Dr Brendan Keamey, an agribusiness consultant (5, E-013, 0-171, 0-174, E-017, N-300), 
and the food analyst Joe Gill (0-177). 
3°5 0-221. 
306 0-222. 
307N-300. 
3080-042. 
309 0-138, N-197. 
310N-1 79.  
311An Bord Bainne (0-138, with Nowl Cawley, chief executive 0-101), CBF (the Irish cooperative 
meat marketing board) (2, 0-138, its chief, Paddy Moore in N-205), Waterford Foods 
(N-205, 0-231, also Stephen O'Connor), Golden Vale (4, N-205, N-212, also its chief 
executive, Jim O'Mahony, N-278, 0-231), Dairygold (N-205, also its chairman, Denis Cronin 
0-176), the Kerry Group (5, N-205, 0-177, with its managing director, Denis Brosnan 
0-022, 0-106, and Dick O'Sullivan, general manager 0-004) and Avonmore (3, N-205, with 
Gerry Hoey 0-022, and Pat O'Neill n-231) were included. Grain traders (0-138) and the Irish 
Grain and Feed Association (IGFA) (N-255, with its Feed Committee chairman Finbar Healy 
0-191) were involved in the discussion, and the beef industry (0-218, 0-221), beef processors 
(N-197) and the Irish Meat Processors' Association (IMPA) (N-086, with its chairman, Dan 
Browne N-244) expressed their interests. The Irish food industry (N-004) was represented by 
An Bord Glas (the Food Board) (0-138). 
3120_138.  
313Noe1 O'Connor, President of the Irish Butchers' Association 0-059. 
314interview with contractor Alan McCartney 0-190. 
315Philip Farrey 0-155. 
316mentioned in one article 0-027. 
317written by Paula McCann (Irish Organic Farmers & Growers Association) 0-061. 
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represented (3)318, and the labour organisation SIPTU (Services Industrial 
Professional Technical Union) (3)319 also participated in the debate. In addition 
to nation-wide organisations such as the Council for the European Movement 
(1)320 and the Irish Countrywomen' s Association (1)321, a small number of local 
actors were also taken into account (3)321. 
Farmers 
At the shop floor level, farm women (2)323, families and spouses (1)324, the 
Farm Family Women organisation(1)325, and other women and children in the 
countryside (1)326 were mentioned, but only occasionally. In addition, quite a 
number of farmers were interviewed or otherwise mentioned (9)327. In this 
sense, the Irish debate allowed more space for the human dimension and for 
considering the effects of the reform proposals than did the Dutch debate. 
Finally, an effort was made in some articles to show who were the people 
most affected by the reform. Once they were "government, consumers, farmers, 
retailers and politicians"328, another time "Irish farmers"329 or "Irish 
consumers"330, and elsewhere "rural Ireland"331 or "great urban cities"332. 
318Father Harry Bohan 0-004, 0-174; Bishop John Magee 0-193. 
319N-228, N-229 with Bill Attley, joint general president, N-264 with Jimmy Somers, assistant 
national executive officer. 
3200-154. 
321N_109.  
322Dan Barry, member of Kerry County Council (0-004); Munster Programme Director Pat 
Gleeson (N-208); Cork County chairman John Cal McCarthy (N-208). 
3230-018, 0-185. 
3240-050. 
325N-140. 
326N-1 78. 
3270-114, 0-146, 0-156, N-208, N-259, 0-231, 0-143, 0-145, 0-146. 
3280-175. 
329N-222. 
33°0-182. 
3310_193.  
332Q]93 
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Table 6.4. Actors on the Irish national scene. 
ACTOR FREQUENCY 
The President 1 
The government 30 
Prime Minister 62 333  
Minister of Agriculture 145 334 
Minister of State for Food 8 
Minister of Finance 4 
Minister of Industry and Commerce 4 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 2 
Minister of EC Affairs 2 
The Dåil (Pari.) 7 
Ministry of Agriculture 2 
IFA 152 
- Jan Gillis 113 
ICMSA 67 
-Tom O'Dwyer 52 
UFA 18 
Macra na Feirme 16 
ICOS 26 
Fianna Fåil 15 
Fine Gael 17 
- John Bruton (Pres.) 13 
- Austin Deasy 27 
- Tom Raftery 14 
Progressive Democrats 2 
- John Dardis 6 
Labour 3 
- Liam Kavanagh 4 
Workers' Party 1 
- Proinsias De Rossa (Pres.) 4 
- Joe Sherlock 4 
Teagasc 24 
ESRI 2 
NES C 4 
Prof. Seamus Sheehy 9 
Agro-industrial co-ops 4 
- An Bord Bainne 2 
- CBF 2 
- Waterford Foods 2 
- Golden Vale 4 
- Dairygold 2 
- Kerry Group 5 
Farmers interviewed 9 
LEVEL 
State organs 
Farm organisations 
Political parties 
Research institutes 
and experts 
Other interest groups 
involved 
Farmers 
333Haughey and Reynolds together. 
3340'Kennedy, Woods and Walsh together. 
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6.3.2. The EU scene 
In order to analyse this part of the debate, the same division will be followed as 
with the Dutch debate: 1) EU orggis, 2) members of the Commission, 3) MEPs 
and groups in the European Parliament, 4) politicians from other member and 
non-member countries, 5) national civil servants, 6) farm organisations, and 
finally, 7) CAP experts. 
EU organs 
EU institutions were referred to in the Irish debate as follows: the Commission 
(30)335, the Council of Farm Ministers (21)336, the European Council (2)337 and 
the European Parliament (18)338.  Among the less concrete references to the EU 
as an actor, "Brussels" was mentioned in 12 articles339 and "the EC" similarly in 
12 articles340. In addition, there was one reference both to "politicians in 
Brussels"341 and, somewhat pejoratively, to "Fortress Europe"342. 
For the Irish, the administrative machine of the EU was an actor, too. In 
some of the texts neutral words were used, such as "senior EC officials" (3)343, 
"the Commission officials" (1)344,  "senior officials in Brussels" (1)345, "EC 
officials" (3)346, or "the EC authorities" (1)347, but elsewhere there was a clearly 
negative connotation: "European Commission Bureaucrats" (1)348, "bureaucrats 
in Brussels" (1)349, "the EC machine" (1)35°, or "Eurocrats" (1)351. 
N-027, N-028, E-002, N-043, N-050, N-052, N-053, N-054, 335N-007, N-019, N-025, N-026, 
N-058, N-060, N-062, 0-029, E-005, 0-050, 0-084, N-143, 0-104, N-149, N-158, 0-125, 
N-172, N-177, 0-180, N-270, E-024, E-025. 
336N-020, N-036, N-050, 0-015, N-060, N-073, 0-050, 0-084, 0-121, N-261, N-262, 0-201, 
N-269, 0-202, N-276, 0-213, N-288, 0-215, N-296, 0-225, 0-226. 
3370-104, 0-128. 
3380-040, N-094, N-093, 0-051, 0-058, 0-060, N-114, N-184, N-220, N-221, N-243, N-252, 
N-266, N-267, N-268, N-270, 0-202, 0-206. 
339N-027, N-042, 0-014, 0-015, E-012, 0-105, 0-118, 0-125, 0-159, N-148, 0-208, N-269. 
34°0-001, 0-002, 0-031, N-142, N-169, N-171, N-188, N-197, E-019, E-023, 0-213, N-294. 
3410-218. 
3420_192.  
343N-050, N-057, N-206. 
3440-048. 
3450-189. 
346N-270, 0-219, N-190. 
347 0-129. 
3480-097. 
34°0-190. 
35°0-141. 
3510-225. 
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Commissioners 
As in the Dutch debate, the Commission ranked highest among the EU actors, 
but here only a few members within the Commission performed as actors in the 
discussion. Excluding Ray MacSharry, the most commonly mentioned was the 
Dutch Commissioner for External Trade, Frans Andriessen (20)352. Together 
with the Commission President, Jacques Delors (17)353, he was considered by 
far the most important member involved in the reform debate.354 
Although only a few Commissioners took part in the Irish debate, a number 
of people working for the Commission, i.e. for DG VI, were mentioned by 
name. The Director-General of the Agriculture Section, Guy Legras (7)355, was 
the most prominent among these EU officials, and officials from Commissioner 
Ray MacSharry's cabinet also appeared in the debate.356 
Members of the European Parliament 
With regard to the European Parliament, only the Greens (2)357 and the Socialist 
group (2)358 were mentioned in the debate. The members of the European 
Parliament were mentioned collectively in 3 articles359, and Irish MEPs played 
an important role in the debate. Fianna Fåil or government MEPs were referred 
to as a group (6)360. The leading Irish figure, and especially among the Fianna 
Fåil MEPs, was Paddy Lane, a former IFA President (36361, in addition to 
3520-005, N-031, N-052, N-058, 0-029, N-088, 0-064, 0-086, N-126, 0-094, N-131, 0-097, 
N-141, N-143, N-I55, N-158, 0-126, N-I69, N-171, 0-231. 
353 N-031, 0-029, N-085, N-086, N-088, 0-084, N-126, N-132, N-136, N-158, N-171, 0-183, 
N-240, N-277, N-281, N-297, 0-231. 
354Furthermore, four other commissioners were mentioned: Sir Leon Brittan (3, N-031, N-126, 
N-158), Henning Christophersen (2, N-031, N-158), Carlo Ripa di Meana (2, N-058, 0-029) 
and Peter Schmidthuber (N-158). 
355 N-071, N-072, N-073, N-076, 0-032, N-078, N-I26. 
356Co1m Larkin, "chef de cabinet" (2, N-120, 0-31), Deputy Head of Cabinet Paddy Hennessy 
(2, 0-225, 0-231), members of the cabinet Mary Minch, Bobby McDonagh, Herman Versteilen 
and Eileen Magnier (0-231), and members of staff Teresa Rehan and Jacinta Dolan (0-231) 
were mentioned. MacSharry's officials (N-010) were thus competent actors for the Irish, 
possibly because many of them were themselves Irish and thus more accessible to that 
country's journalists. 
357 N-189, 
358 N-189, 
N-270. 
N-270. 
359N-093, N-095, 0-211. 
360N-140, 0-104, 0-113, N-154, N-168, N-184. 
361 N-006, N-046, N-047, N-048, N-049, 0-027, 0-030, 0-039, N-083, N-084, N-091, 0-051, 
0-053, 0-057, 0-070, N-114, N-115, 0-077, N-116, N-138, N-145, N-168, 0-129, 0-133, 
0-140, 0-164, 0-171, 0-174, N-225, N-267, N-270, N-273, 0-203, N-275, N-276, 0-231. 
136 
writing one article himself362 and being interviewed once363). The Independent 
MEP and former IFA and ICOS Presidentin the 1960's and 1970's, T.J. Maher, 
was second•most frequently mentioned in the debate (14364., interviewed twice365), 
while the Fine Gael representative Joe McCartin was mentioned in 10 articles366, 
as was Fianna Fåil MEP Mark Killi1ea367 (also interviewed OriCe368)369. 
Politicians from other EU and non-EU countries 
Again as in the Dutch debate, ministers of agriculture were the most important 
actors among the foreign politicians.The British Minister John Gummer (25)37° 
was more important for the Trish than the French one, Louis Mermaz (9)371, or 
the German Kiechle (5)372, while the Italian Minister, Giovanni Goria, appeared 
in only 3 articles373, which indicates that it was easier for the Irish to swallow 
the Italian milk confusion than it was for the Dutch. The two Ministers who 
chaired the Farm Council meetings during the preparation of the refonn, Piet 
Bukman from the Netherlands and Arlindo Cunha from Portugal, had different 
levels of performance in the eyes of the Trish public, for where Bukman was 
mentioned in 7 artic1es374, Cunha's name was to he found in only 2375. In 
addition, onlythe Spanish (1)376 and the Danish (1)377 ministers were mentioned. 
3620-040. 
3630-064. 
3640-066, N-1I5, - 0-097, 0-110,'N-153, 0-116, .0-154, N-243, N-268, N-269, N-273, N-275, 
.N-276, 0-212. 
3650-071, N-110. 
-3660-060, N-115,-N-116, N-117, 0-103, 0-110, 0-116, N-268, N-275, N-276. 
3670-022,W-070, N-099,- N-114, N-I38, N-I45, 0-103, N-268, N-270,-0-231. 
3680-058. 
369There was an. impressive .list of-Fianna Fåil MEPs mentioned in .the debate. In addition to 
Lane and Killilea, -Neil Blaney. (2, -N-007, 0-153), -Paddy Lalor (4, N-048, N=091, N-138, 
N-184), 'Jim Fitzsimons (N-091, Gene Fitzgerald .(4,-NL091; 0-053, 0.,057, N-138) and Neal 
Andrews (N,138) -appeared • in the debate:-. In addition •to Joe McCartin, the Fine Gael was 
. represented by MEPs John Gushanan .(also the Christian Democrat -spokesman on Regional 
:Policyin theEP, 9, N-0016; N:117, 0-107, 0-178, N-268, N-275, N-276, 0-215, 0-231) 
. andPaddy-Cooney (N-177). The Progressive Democrat MEP Pat Cox was mentioned in two 
.articles (0-097; 0-231), Labour .MEP "Barry Desmond in one article (0:231), and New 
Agenclå• MEP Des, Geraghty in one .article ( N-267). 
370N-038, - N-039, AL045;N-061, N-065, N-069, N-071, 0-034, 0-035, N-089, N-090, N-092, 
-N-141,. N:168, N-170, 0-147, N-21I, 0:172, N-247, N-251, N-253, N-292, 0-218, N-269. 
371N-090, N-163, N-16C N-22C N-274,- N-297, N-298, 0-231. 
.3720-056 N-21I, N-226, N253,- N-273. 
373N-166,'N-296, N-297. 
374N-013, N-039,-N-141,.N-211,-N-215, N-218, 1'T-242. 
375N247, N-249. 
376N-274. 
377N-039. 
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Besides ministers of agriculture, a few other politicians were mentioned. 
Partly because of the chairmanship of the Netherlands, Dutch politicians gained 
attention. Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (4)378, the former Minister of Agriculture, 
Gerrit Braks (1)379 and even Sicco Mansholt (3)380, were active on the Trish 
discursive field for the CAP. Otherwise it seems that it was easier for politicians 
from the larger member states to he recognised as competent actors.381  
As in the Netherlands, the GATT trade talks gave an extra flavour to the 
CAP debate and brought in other authorised actors. Arthur Dunkel was the most 
important GATT figure (8)382, and the USA as a counterpart to the EC was 
represented most often by its chief negotiator, Carla Hills (7)383, or by the 
Minister of Agriculture, either Clayton Yeutter (5)384  or Ed Madigan (5)385. 
President Bush (2)386 and his Secretary of State, James Baker (1)387, were also 
mentioned occasionally, as was the US Congress (2)388. The other politicians 
from outside the EU ali came from English-speaking, industrialised countries: 
Canada (2)389, Australia (3)3" or the USA (1)391. 
National civil servants 
National civil servants were not prominent at ali. Only Tom Arnold, chief 
economist at the Department of Agriculture and Food, was mentioned (1)392. He 
had more to say about how the planned reform would affect Irish agriculture 
than about its performance on an EU scale. 
378 N-133, N-134, N-171, N-183. 
3790-056. 
380N-009, E-005, 0-126. 
381The rest of the list contains Margaret Thatcher (2, 0-072, N-132), John Major (N-132, 
N-171), Trade Minister Peter Lilley (N-002) and Chancellor Norman Lamont (N-169) of the 
UK, Francois Mitterand (N-125) and Minister Naille (0-056) in France, Helmut Kohl in 
Germany (N-169), and Giulio Andreotti in Italy (N-169). It is certainly a sign of the special 
situation of Ireland that the Northem Ireland Agricultural Minister, Jeremy Hanley (0-167), 
comes at the bottom of the list. 
382N-005, N-010, N-057, N-089, N-248, N-253, N-258, 0-202. 
383E-001, 0-048, N-I I I, N-158, N-159, N-171, 0-166. 
384E-001, N-004, N-005, N-064, N-207. 
385 N-206, N-207, 0-166, N-253, 0-231. 
386 N-111,N-159. 
387N-267. 
388N-277, 0-173. 
389Prime Minister Brian Mulroney: N-157, N-171. 
390 The Ambassador in Dublin, Terence Bary McCarthy: 0-148; Trade Minister Neal Blewett: 
N-204, N-206. 
391Idaho State Senator John Peavey, and Mark Ritchie, Executive Director of the Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis: 0-173. 
392N-067. 
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Farm organisations 
Farm organisations in other EU countries were authorised actors in the Irish 
discussion, too. As could have been expected, the Irish lent an ear most often to 
farm representatives in Britain. The NFU (National Farmers Union) was 
mentioned in 4 articles393 and the Ulster Farmers' Union, represented by its 
President, John Warden, was mentioned in one394. French farmers (1)395 and the 
"French grain lobby" (1)396 were powerful actors in the context of the CAP, 
together with the FNSEA (Federation National Des Syndicats D 'Exploitants 
Agricoles) (2)397, and Rural Co-Ordination (1)398.399 
The umbrella organisation for the EU farm bodies, COPA (4)400, was not 
very important in the Irish debate. The world farmers' organisation IFAP 
(International Federation of Agricultural Producers) was mentioned in two 
articles40I. Other pressure groups were not prominent in the discussion, except 
for the European consumer organisation BEUC (Bureau Europen des Unions 
de Consommateurs) (4)402. The BEUC was easily accessible for the Irish media 
through its spokesman, Jim Murray, who happened to be a former Director of 
Consumer Affairs in Ireland. 
CAP experts 
Among the experts who were performing as competent actors on the EU scene 
we find the same names as were already mentioned on the national scene: Prof. 
Seamus Sheehy (2, plus one article of his own and one interview)403, Associate 
Prof. Alan Matthews404, Con Lucey of the IFA405, Deirdre O'Connor of the 
393Together with the President, Sir Simon Gourley N-045, 0-012, N-034; with the leader, David 
Naish N-176. 
394N-068. 
395N-158. 
396N-270. 
3970-1 1 0, N-176. 
398N-297. 
399Hans Kjeldsen, President of the Danish Farmers' Union (3, 0-037, 0-074, 0-075) and the 
Danish Agricultural Council (N-176), an umbrella body for the farm organisations, represented 
Danish interests in the Irish debate. Farmers' organisation in four other member states, 
Portugal, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands, were mentioned in the same article (N-176). 
Jef Mares, chairman of the Dutch Board of Agriculture, Landbouwschap, was mentioned in 
another article. German farm bodies were referred to in two articles. 
400N-016, N-028, N-122, N-167. 
4°1 0-073, 0-074. 
4020-083a, 0-168, N-217, 0-219. 
403Participated with one article (E-002), was interviewed once (E-006) and was referred to in 
two articles (E-008, 0-167). 
404Wrote two articles (E-005, E-012) and was interviewed once E-021. 
405Interviewed once (E-022). 
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NE s c4O6, and the agribusiness and economic consultant Brendan Kearney407. In 
addition, a couple of foreign experts were mentioned: an agricultural policy 
expert from the World Bank, Csaba Csaki (1)408, and David Howorth, a Brussels-
based public affairs consultant (1)4°9, together with the Australian Bureau for 
Agricultural and Resource Research (1)410. 
Finally, there were a few fanners and other citizens active in this part of the 
debate. A dairy farmer, Oliver MacDonell, wrote columns about the reform 
proposals to the Farming Independent (5)411,  and others, including one MP, 
Roger Garland (1)412, wrote "Letters to the Editor" (4)413. Lay people wereclearly 
in a minority, however, when the CAP was being discussed at the EU level. 
6.3.3. Geography 
The neighbouring United Kingdom (57)414 was the most important EU member 
state for the Irish. It is significant, though, that Britain was discussed as a 
totality, without any mention about regional differences within the country. 
Northern Ireland was mentioned separately in three articles415. 
The second most commonly mentioned EU country was the Netherlands 
(51)416. Part of this interest was probably a result of its chairmanship of the EU 
for half a year. Since Portugal had the same status and was still mentioned less 
often, however, the Netherlands could also have ranked quite high without this 
important formai role in the negotiations. 
406Wrote an article (E-011). 
407Wrote two articles (E-019, E-025) and was interviewed once (E-016). 
4080_167.  
4°90-232. 
410E_021.  
4"0-035, 0-127, 0-139, 0-142, 0-170. 
4120_132.  
413Eamon McCullough (0-026); Mervyn Sunderland, farmer (0-140); Dominick J. Murray, Co. 
Sligo, Agricultural Minister advisor (0-187); Jow Barry, Co. Meath (0-201). 
414N-002, 
N-065, 
N-025, 
0-022, 
N-026, N-027, N-028, 
N-066, N-069, N-090, 
E-002, N-032, N-034, N-035, 
0-070, 0-084, N-I19, N-129, 
0-012, 
N-130, 
N-053, 
N-132, 
0-020, 
N-133, 
0-099, 0-122, N-163, N-I64, N-165, N-166, N-I68, N-169, 0-136, 0-154, 0-159, N-209, 
N-210, N-239, N-247, 0-193, N-256, 0-196, N-260, 0-198, N-265, 0-202, N-271, N-277, 
N-282, N-289, N-292, 0-218, 0-220, N-269, 0-225, N-298, 0-231. 
4150-024, 0-037, 0-167. 
416 N-002, 0-003, 0-005, N-013, N-026, N-027, N-028, N-053, N-057, N-061, N-065, N-066, 
N-071, N-090, 0-061, 0-064, 0-069, 0-070, 0-078, 0-083, N-120, 0-088, N-126, N-129, 
N-130, N-133, N-I34, N-139, 0-099, 0-122, 0-123, N-163, N-I64, N-165, N-166, N-168, 
0-130, 0-137, 0-159, N-209; N-210, N-239, N-256, 0-202, N-271, N-277, 0-220, N-269, 
N-298, 0-231. 
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Table 6.5 Actors on the Irish EU scene. 
LEVEL 
	
ACTOR 
	
FREQUENCY 
EU organs Commission 
European Parliament 
Council of Farm Ministers 
European Council 
Brussels 
The EC 
30 
18 
21 
2 
12 
12 
Commissioners 	Jacques Delors 
Frans Andriessen (External Trade) 
Leon Brittan (Trade) 
Henning Christophersen (Monetary 
Affairs) 
Carlo Ripa di Meana (Environment) 
Peter Schmidthuber (Budget) 
(Guy Legras, Director-General DG VI) 
Members of the European Socialist group 
Parliament 	 Greens 
Paddy Lane (FF) 
T.J. Maher (Ind.) 
Joe Mc Cartin (FG) 
Mark Killilea (FF) 
John Gushanan (FG) 
Politicians from EU and Ministers of Agriculture 
non-EU countries 	- John Gummer (UK) 
- Louis Mermaz (Fra.) 
- Piet Bukman (NL) 
- Ignaz Kiechle (Ger.) 
- Arlindo Cunha (Port.) 
Arthur Dunkel (GATT) 
Carla Hills (USA) 
17 
20 
3 
2 
2 
1 
7 
2 
2 
36 
14 
10 
10 
9 
25 
9 
7 
5 
2 
8 
7 
National civil servants 	Tom Arnold (Chief Economist, 
Ministry of Agriculture) 
	
1 
Farm organisations 	COPA 
	
4 
NFU (UK) 
	
4 
FNSEA (Fra.) 2 
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Germany (43)417 was the third most prominent country for the Irish. East 
Germany (3)418 and Bavaria (1)419 were dealt with apart from the rest of the 
country. Slightly surprisingly, Denmark (37)420 was mentioned more often than 
France (35  ) 421,  though the difference was not great. Evidently shared interests in 
the British food market made Denmark seem closer to the Irish, whereas France 
was not given a leading role in the CAP in the Irish debate. 
Again, somewhat unexpected but partly attributable to the chairmanship, 
Portugal ranks next (23)422, before Italy (21)423 or Spain (13)424.  Actually, 
Greece (17)425 again outnumbers both Spain and Belgium (9)426.  As in the 
Dutch debate, Luxembourg was not taken seriously as a member state, and was 
mentioned in only one article427. 
One can conclude that the Irish see the emphasis in the CAP as lying in the 
north: in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and France, but there is 
no clear distinction relative to the south as in the Dutch debate. "The Southern 
countries" as a group was mentioned in only one piece of text428, as was 
"Northern Europe" meaning the northern member states429. Similarly, "the rich 
and the poor in the EC" were referred to in one article430. 
0-015, N-057, 0-020, 0-029, N-069, N-090, N-092, 0-056, 417 E-002, N-033, 0-008, N-050, 
0-072, 0-078, N-131, N-I37, 0-099, 0-125, N-163, N-169, N-170, N-171, 0-130, 0-136, 
0-154, 0-159, N-109, N-224, N-226, N-240, 0-188, 0-189, N-253, 0-193, N-256, 0-196, 
N-265, 0-202, N-273, N-290, 0-220, 0-224, 0-231. 
418N-092, 0-078, 0-188. 
419N-209. 
420N-002, N-026, N-027, N-028, E-002, N-032, N-034, N-035, N-053, N-057, N-061, N-069, 
N-071, N-090;  0-046, 0-061, 0-069, 0-073, 0-084, N-130, 0-099, N-163, N-166, 0-136, 
N-209, N-210, N-248, N-249, N-256, 0-202, N-271, N-277, N-286, 0-220, N-296, 0-299, 
0-231. 
421 N-002, 0-008, N-061, 0-029, N-090, N-092, 0-056, 0-078, N-119, N-132, N-137, 0-099, 
0-122, N-I63, N-169, N-170, N-171, 0-130, 0-136, 0-137, N-I92, N-193, 0-159, N-209, 
0-166, N-226, N-240, 0-193, N-256, 0-196, N-290, 0-224, 0-225, N-298, 0-231. 
422 0-008, N-065, N-066, N-069, N-090, 0-056, 0-099, N-166, N-170, 0-131, N-209, N-248, 
N-253, 0-195, 0-197, N-262, N-263, N-271, N-277, N-282, N-284, N-286, N-289. 
423N-035, N-039, 0-008, N-061, N-069, N-090, 0-078, N-I37, 0-122, 0-124, 0-127, N-170, 
0-137, 0-159, N-260, N-265, 0-202, N-296, N-297, N-298, 0-231. 
424 0-008, N-065, N-069, N-090, 0-056, N-132, N-166, 0-127, N-170, 0-131, N-209, 0-195, 
N-286. 
425 0-008, N-065, N-066, N-069, N-090, 0-056, N-137, 0-099, N-166, 0-127, N-170, 0-131, 
N-176, 0-137 (actuall y Cypros), N-202, N-209, 0-195. 
426 0-008, N-090, N-168, 0-137, N-260, N-265, 0-202, N-271, N-290. 
427 N-090. 
428N_065.  
4290-123. 
439 0-181. 
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Table 6.6. EU countries in the Irish debate. 
COUNTRY 	 FREQUENCY 
United Kingdom 	 57 
The Netherlands 51 
Germany 	 43 
France 37 
Denmark 	 35 
Portugal 23 
Italy 	 21 
Greece 17 
Spain 	 13 
Belgium 9 
Luxembourg 	 1 
An important demarcation line for the Irish is that dividing the West and the 
East, and this runs through Germany. The former DDR belongs to "the East", 
and that is where everything that is evil comes from, as seen from the Irish 
perspective. The EFTA countries were discussed in a positive way (1)431, and 
"Western Europe" (1)432 had a sympathetic connotation, whereas Eastem Europe 
(16)433 was felt to be a threat.434 
The USA was the most prominent factor in the agricultural world outside 
Europe, and actually outnumbered all the individual EUcountries in mentions in 
the Irish debate, appearing in 85 articles435. As in the Dutch debate, this was 
partly due to the GATT negotiations, but these would hardly have been sufficient 
to explain the high frequency, which probably has something to do with Ireland' s 
431A11 except for Iceland are mentioned by name (N-172). 
432N-223. 
433N-071, 0-086, N-123, 0-122, 0-133, N-176, N-I95, N-199, N-215, N-220, N-221, 0-181, 
N-242, N-243, 0-208, 0-210. 
434"Eastem Europe" meant the USSR (5, 0-040, or "the Soviet Union", N-204, "Russia", 
0-166, "the former Soviet Union", 0-202, or the "Soviet Republics", N-199), including 
Poland (0-078, N-122, N-243), Hungary (0-167, N-243), Czechoslovakia (N-243) and/or the 
Ukraine (N-199). 
435N-001, E-001, N-002, 0-001, N-025, 0-006, N-029, 0-008, E-003, N-049, N-050, N-057, 
N-063, 0-020, 0-021, 0-022, N-068, 0-027, 0-028, 0-029, 0-034, 0-040, 0-065, N-111, 
0-082, 0-083, 0-086, E-010, N-131, N-134, 0-100, 0-102, 0-109, N-153, 0-119, 0-120, 
N-155, 0-122, N-157, N-155, 0-122, N-157, N-158, N-159, 0-124, 0-125, 0-126, N-172, 
0-130, E-014, N-178, 0-144, N-194, N-I95, 0-153, N-204, 0-159, N-206, 0-166, 0-167, 
0-172, 0-173, N-220, E-017, 0-178, N-235, E-019, N-237, N-240, 0-192, N-251, N-253, 
0-193, 0-196, 0-197, N-266, N-267, N-269, N-270, 0-202, N-277, 0-213, 0-217, 0-220, 
0-231. 
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close political and economic connections over the Atlantic. Besides, other 
industrialised English-speaking countries also ranked high in the Irish debate.436 
The world trade talks brought the Cairns group (3)437 and the group of seven 
(G7) (3)438  into the agricultural policy field as actors. World trade actors such as 
Japan (3)439, Argentina (3)440, Brazil (1)441 and China (1)442 were also mentioned, 
but the rest of the world was less significant.443  
Again as in the Dutch debate, Europe was often used as an equivalent to the 
European Union (27)444, but Ireland itself was evidently perceived as something 
apart from "Europe". Europe - and thus often the EU - was connected with the 
mainland of Europe. If Ireland was to he included, it was explicitly mentioned445. 
Geographically, the distinction is a clear one, of course: the mainland is the 
mainland and an island is an island. But, strangely enough, another island, 
Britain, was not normally excluded from "Europe"446. Furthermore, the CAP 
discussion is seldom about geography. Instead, this mode of expression refers to 
a significant dimension in the Irish political identity, which maintains and 
stresses the distance between Ireland and the rest of the EU. 
6.4. Conclusions 
On the Dutch national scene, the Minister of Agriculture alone represented the 
govemment, both as an active actor giving interviews and speeches and as the 
government actor. The other ministers were either not interested, or as in the 
case of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, not welcomed by the other actors. The 
Landbouwschap was the second most important actor in the Dutch debate, but 
436New Zealand (8, 0-040, 0-065, 0-082, 0-086, 0-123, N-172, 0-167, E-019), Australia 
(7, 0-065, 0-086, N-172, N-204, 0-159, N-206, E-019) and Canada (6, N-169, N-172, 
0-136, N-206, 0-166, 0-218). 
437 N-001, N-131, N-155. 
438N-I26, N-130, N-171. 
439N-172, 0-166, 0-218. 
440N-1 72, E-019, 0-224. 
4410-202. 
4420-0/4. 
443  The Third World countries performed as a group (3, N-001, 0-065, 0-132). The Middle East 
(2, N-050, 0-159) and North Africa (2, 0-124, N-243) appeared as potential market areas. 
Only a few countries were mentioned: India (0-014), Iraq (0-122) and Ethiopia (0-124) once 
each, and Iran twice ( 0-125, 0-202). 
4440-014, 0-016a, 0-032, N-100, 0-054, 0-058, 0-081, N-118, N-125, 0-100, 0-117, 0-118, 
N-181, N-182, 0-141, N-I98, N-158, 0-172, N-237, 0-189, 0-193, N-260, 0-201, 0-205, 
0-210, 0-213, 0-215, 0-218. 
445"Ireland included" (0-016a); "European and Irish farmers" (0-032); "farmers in Ireland or in 
Europe" N-118; "in Europe and in the Republic" (0-100); "Irish and European farming" 
(N-181); "rural Ireland and rural Europe" (N-182). 
4460ne such example was found: "in the European countries and in Britain" (0-227). 
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interestingly, its representation was not embodied so clearly in the person ofJef 
Mares as was the situation with its Irish countemart. Consequently, there were 
many debaters in the Dutch farm lobby. This gives the idea of a slightly low 
profile for the farm lobby, or else it could be interpreted as a matter of style in 
Dutch politics. One reason could be that the Landbouwschap was not purely an 
interest organisation, but also had statutory functions. Moreover, only a few 
politicians, both in the govemment and in the parliament, participated or were 
referred to in the debate. This may be a sign of a highly developed division of 
labour, but equally well of a certain indifference with regard to agriculture. 
There were a lot of experts active in the debate by comparison with the Irish 
situation, but few of them were from circles outside agriculture. Finally, the 
traditional agri-business was fairly well represented by the active debaters. 
On the EU scene, the role of the Commission was important, but there were 
major differences between commissioners. Economic and fiscal interests were 
understood as being prominent in the CAP. The large Member States were 
regarded as important actors in the debate, and the farmers' umbrella organisation, 
COPA, was often mentioned, although this should not be taken as a direct sign 
of its significance on the EU scene. Furthermore, a couple of national civil 
servants were active in the discussion, giving the image of agricultural policy as 
a specialist field. 
On the Irish national scene, in addition to the leading role of the Minister of 
Agriculture, as in the Netherlands, the Prime Minister and other ministers were 
also active. The govemment was more often an actor than in the Netherlands, 
and the Minister of Agriculture also performed as a part of the govemment, and 
not alone as in the Netherlands. Moreover, the Taoiseach was an actor in the 
Irish debate, whereas the Dutch Prime Minister was almost absent, and a large 
number of other politicians emerged as agricultural policy actors. These 
differences relative to the Netherlands may be partially explained by the 
differences in the division of the two countries into electoral districts. Politicians 
in Ireland are connected with specific regions, whereas the Netherlands forms 
one constituency in national elections. Furthermore, the farm lobby seemed to 
have a strong leadership, and in general the farmers' organisations clearly 
performed in public in the manner of a traditional pressure group, whereas the 
public performance of the Landbouwschap in the Netherlands was somewhat 
vague. Finally, traditional agri-business and its interests were represented in the 
debate, but environmental interests were not. Farmers performed as actors slightly 
more often than in the Dutch debate, and were also regarded as actors in their 
own right to a greater extent. 
MEPs were active on the Irish EU scene, and were also regarded as actors by 
others. The Ministry of Agriculture was represented by the Minister, and the 
role of civil servants was an invisible one. The large northem member states 
performed as important actors in the debate, whereas the COPA was not 
particularly important. 
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If we compare the actor structures of the two countries, the farmers' 
organisations in Ireland had a more traditional pressure group profile in the 
debate than the Dutch Landbouwschap, and their leaders, Alan Gillis of the IFA 
and Tom O'Dwyer of the ICMSA, represented their members in a sovereign 
way. The Landbouwschap maintained a lower profile, and had more spokesmen 
in addition to the leader, Jef Mares. In my interview (30.11.1995), the then IFA 
President, Alan Gillis (later a Fine Gael MEP), stated that he was in Brussels at 
least as often as the Minister of Agriculture, and found that the farming lobby's 
influence, both direct and via the COPA, was more important than anything 
achieved by the Minister in the Council of EU Farm Ministers. Tom O'Dwyer's 
influence was more restricted to Ireland, since the ICMSA is not a member of 
the COPA, and he was not particularly active outside the British Isles (interview 
with T. O'Dwyer 9.7.1995). Moreover, the number of Trish politicians for whom 
agricultural policy was relevant was larger than in the Netherlands, where it had 
more the image of sector politics, with only a few specialists. In addition, the 
government context in which agricultural policy was dealt with was different, in 
that Ireland had a Minister of Agriculture and Food and a Minister of Horticulture, 
while the Netherlands had a Minister for Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries. 
The farming lobby was active on both the national and the EU scene in both 
countries, and the need to promote national interests in connection with the EU 
reinforced the symbiotic relations between national officials and groups (on the 
same phenomenon, see McLaughlin, Jordan and Maloney 1993). It emerged 
from my interviews in both countries that relations between the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the farming organisations were regarded as important on both 
sides, although the partners did not necessarily agree on ali issues. 
If one looks at who were regarded as the most important actors by the others, 
it was the Minister of Agriculture in both countries, with the farm lobby as the 
second most important. The scene was dominated by male actors in both national 
debates, and if there were women involved, they represented special female 
interests or the family in general. Moreover, economists dominated among the 
experts. There were only occasionally groups involved that did not represent 
either the farmers or agri-business. The consumers' point of view was poorly 
represented in the debate, both by the debaters and by actors recognised by 
others. 
The frequent references to "Brussels" gave the impression that it was not 
clear who was the actor in the case of the EU itself, just as it was unclear in the 
debate what the different EU organs actually do. This can be seen as a sign of a 
more general unawareness of EU politics in the member states. The political 
groupings in the European Parliament, for example, were not regarded as 
important in the debate in the same way as their counterparts in the National 
Parliaments. In addition, when "Brussels" was the actor in the CAP debate, it 
was depicted as an entity, with a will of its own. "Brussels" was the actor more 
146 
often than "Den Haag" or "Dublin", implying that it is easier to find a concrete 
actor on the national scene. 
The political geography of the actor structure showed that the Dutch pictured 
themselves at the centre of the EU, surrounded by the power axis of Germany 
and France. They perceived a clear division between the northem and southem 
member states, implying some distrust of "the south". Moreover, the Dutch had 
a neutral or slightly positive attitude towards Eastem Europe, which did not 
include Russia, however. The Irish, on the other hand, were inclined to stress 
their distance from "Europe". For them the division inside the EU was not 
important, for the main line of demarcation ran along the old iron curtain, the 
Eastem European countries being felt to pose a threat to Irish agriculture. The 
USA was also an important actor in the Irish debate. 
"Europe" was frequently reduced to the EU in both national debates, implicitly 
underestimating those European countries that were not members. This seemingly 
innocent practice also modified the geographical term for the continent "Europe" 
into a political term "EU". In general, the knowledge of other member states 
was rather poor, allowing interpretations which were strictly speaking incorrect, 
or just lumping together countries which actually had little in common. When 
the Dutch listed the EU countries, they most often omitted Luxembourg and 
Greece, whereas Luxembourg and Belgium were most often forgotten in the 
Irish debate. Finally, when the CAP was discussed, countries outside the EU or 
in other parts of the world were seldom included in the context, even though the 
CAP has a significant influence on the global situation regarding agriculture and 
food. 
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7. Thematic structure 
7.1. Introduction 
The focus in this chapter will be on the thematic structure of the MacSharry 
reform debates in Ireland and the Netherlands. For this purpose, the issues are 
grouped into themes in the Foucaultian sense as described above (section 3.3.2). 
We will first discuss separately the main Dutch themes and the main Irish 
themes, and then identify the themes common to both national debates. The 
chapter will conclude with an interpretation of the thematic outline of the debate 
from the point of view of politicisation and politicking. 
The different versions of the Commission reform proposals prepared by the 
Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry (CEC 1991 a,b,c; CEC 1992), 
form the background to this debate. At the core of the reform were the proposals 
for the arable sector147. As discussed in section 4.5.2, the basic aims were to 
reduce levels of price support in the cereals sector, bringing them closer to 
world market levels, and to compensate farmers for their loss of revenue through 
a system of acreage payments. At the beginning, the Commission proposed that 
the compensation should be modulated so that small farmers would be 
compensated in full but only partial compensation would be paid beyond a 
certain farm size. In addition, compensation would be linked to a set-aside 
scheme448. Other products were barely touched on by the proposals, but the pian 
included a number of "accompanying measures": schemes for encouraging 
environment-friendly farming, a new subsidy scheme for the afforestation of 
agricultural land and a proposal for renewing the Community-financed early 
retirement scheme for farmers. 
7.2. Specific Dutch themes 
The main themes in the Dutch debate were the EU budget, economic rationality 
and the relationship between agriculture, the environment and nature. In the 
Dutch case, economics referred mainly to the EU budget or to economic 
rationality in general, and not so often to the national economy. For the Dutch, 
the MacSharry proposals were, above ali, a matter of reforming the CAP in 
order to cut agricultural policy costs in the EU449. The Dutch discussion 
approached the reform proposals largely in macro-economic terms, in relation 
447 Outlined in more detail in CEC 1991c, 10-15. 
W8 The fmal agreement (CEC 1992) contained most of these features, but the concept of modulation 
was watered down during the negotiations. 
449Documents 0-014, N-015, N-019, 0-041, 0-046, 0-056, N-068, N-090, N-094, N-129, 
N-180, N-182, N-185, N-188, 0-107, N-256, N-257. 
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to the EU budget. The Community had moved from deficiency to surplus in the 
case of most of its agricultural products, and the policy measures tended to 
stimulate output at a rate beyond the market's absorption capacity. This had led 
to rapidly increasing expenditure on agriculture despite the measures introduced 
from 1984 onwards: milk quotas, s'tabilizers (the introduction of maximum 
guaranteed quantities), co-responsibility levies, and structural measures to 
promote afforestation and diversify agriculture etc. 
As a consequence, a desired effect on the budget was the major criterion on 
which to judge the reform. Even though most Dutch opinions were opposed to 
Commissioner MacSharry's proposals almost throughout the preparation and 
negotiations, agreement usually prevailed over the need in principle to cut EU 
agricultural costs45°. In this sense, a new proposal was necessary451 and cutting 
the EU budget was an unquestionable objective452. Actually, the need to reform 
the CAP was the only subject on which the Dutch debaters could agree with 
Commissioner MacSharry. 
As the months went by and the plans crystallised, it became clear that, rather 
than reducing expenditure, the reform was likely to increase EU budget spending. 
Price support in the cereals sector was to be significantly reduced, but the 
proposalspromised compensations through a system of acreage payments. Cereals 
sector, prices would be brought closer to world market prices, which would 
certainly reduce the need for export refunds, but huge sums would have to be 
paid in compensation from the EU budget. 
At this stage the Dutch focussed their budget rationality on the guideline 
principle. A special European Council meeting in Brussels in 1988 agreed on 
measures for a significant reduction in expenditure on the CAP and drew up an 
"agricultural budgetary guideline" that enabled agricultural expenditure to 
increase at a rate not exceeding 74% of the rate of growth of the Community 
GNP (CEC 1988, 16). Since ali hope of cutting the EU budget was apparently 
lost, there was a shift in the Dutch debate towards defending the guideline453. 
The negative view of the Dutch was not surprising. As execution of the pian was 
assumed to increase CAP. expenditure, Dutch costs would also increase. Also, as 
the cereals sector is not important in the Netherlands, only a small amo-unt of the 
compensation was likely to end up in Dutch agriculture. 
Parallel with the EU budget theme, and partly connected with it, a group of 
other issues formed a second Dutch theme: that of economic rationality. 
Commissioner MacSharry proposed the introduction of direct income subsidies 
as a new policy measure in the CAP, and the Dutch debate was obliged to 
450N-040, N-058, N-080, N-081, N-082, N-238, 0-133. 
4510-074. 
452N-227. 
453N-258, N-263, N-264, N-265, N-266, N-267, N-268, N-270, N-271, N-275, E-026, N-277. 
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consider whether market orientation, which treats agriculture "like any other 
sector of the economy"454, would be the proper way to approach agriculture, and 
whether there were specific characteristics in the nature of agricultural production 
which called for state intervention. Income subsidies were confronted with 
production subsidies, and pricing policy was contrasted with production control. 
The issue was often ironically put in the form of a rhetorical question: whether 
agriculture is an economic activity or a form of entertainment, "sociale bezigheid", 
to which the hard rules of economics are not applicable455. The Dutch Minister 
of Agriculture, Piet Bukman, warned: "Je mag de sector niet degraderen tot een 
soort bezigheidsclub" (You must not reduce the sector to a sort of pleasure 
activity club)456. Another issue under this theme concerned economic efficiency 
and competitiveness, and contrasted small farms with large enterprises457. A 
common undertone was the argument that it would be irrational to punish the 
larger (Dutch) farms for their efficiency in order to keep the countryside viable 
(elsewhere) in Europe. The Dutch were thus mostly applying their "own" rather 
limited definition of efficiency, although some debaters questioned this as 
neglecting external costs (associated with the environment, biodiversity and the 
developing countries)458. 
The need to discuss the CAP only in terms of the budget or economic 
rationality made it difficult for the Dutch to take the reform proposals seriously. 
According to many actors, the proposals contained elements which were 
considered contradictory to "normal" conditions: "Dit staat dwars op alles wat 
normaal is", as Bukman once pointed out459. Agricultural policy was being 
turned upside down: "pian om de landbouwpolitiek op zijn kop te zetten"460. 
Both the Landbouwschap, and Bukman as Minister of Agriculture were convinced 
that Commissioner MaeSharry's proposals would have no chance of gaining 
acceptance in the Council of Ministers. The Dutch "no nonsense" attitude, 
which emphasised economic arguments, was part of a negotiation strategy aimed 
454This is, of course, an example of the way in which rhetoric is used: many other "pure" sectors 
of the economy are equally well protected or subsidised, not necessarily in such a direct and 
obvious way as agriculture, but through standardisation, tariffs or import restrictions - e.g. 
the textile industry, shipbUilding and the car and electronics industries in the case of the EU. 
455N-003, N-008, 0-035, N-034, E-004, 0-047, 0-063, N-109, E-014, N-121, N-122, N-123, 
E-017, N-145, E-022, N-157, 0-102, 0-103, N-181, 0-110, 0-117, N-230, 0-121, 0-124, 
0-126, N-248, E-026, E-031. 
456"Alles kan". 100 dagen Bukman als minister van Landbouw, Boerderij, 2.1.1991. (0-016). 
457  0-0 11, 0-012, N-008, 0-025, 0-032, N-014, 0-036, 0-037, 0-042, N-033, N-061, N-076a, 
N-078, E-002, E-012, N-171, 0-129, 0-147. 
458  0-026, 0-042, N-057, N-168, 0-109 and J. Nijssen in De Volkslcrant 23.2.1991 "Zure regen 
maakt nu ook schaap tot bedreigde diersoort". 
459Piet Bukman in "Breed front tegen pian MacSharry", Oogst, 18.1.1991. (0-027). 
460 "Landbouw-commissaris doet nieuw reorganisatie-voorstellen aan Europese Commissie 
MacShany wil zuivel en granen hard aanpakken", De Volkslcrant, 12.1.1991. (N-009). 
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at defending the prevailing pricing policy, which was beneficial to the 
Netherlands. The position of this attitude in the Dutch debate was so strong that 
it may also he interpreted as referring back to more fundamental values461. 
The third theme was the relationship between agriculture, the environment 
and nature. A separation of agriculture from "nature" was seriously suggested 
in the Netherlands as a solution to problems in both agricultural policy and the 
environment462, an idea that was completely absent from the Irish debate. It 
would be no exaggeration to say that the environmental issue had found its way 
onto the Dutch agricultural policy agenda by this point, although this does not as 
such say anything about how profound its effect may have been on traditional 
politics. An analysis of Dutch political party programmes shows that the 
environmental issue was attached to the old agenda as such, and that it was dealt 
with in a fragmented and rather superficial way (Vihinen 1994). A proper 
politicisation of the environmental issue would have require a horizon shift in 
thinking about agriculture. 
However, according to Joop Frouws and Jan van Tatenhove (1993), the 
environmental issues has already had an impact on Dutch agricultural policy 
decision-taking. The development of agro-environmental policy-making led into 
a reorientation in Dutch agricultural policy at the end of the 1980's. The issue of 
environment finally broke the isolation and consensus of the agricultural elite 
and brought the,Ministries of Agriculture and the Environment closer to each 
other. At the same time, however, it threatens to alienate the Ministry of 
Agriculture from its constituency. 
The debate analysed here suggests that obviously the Dutch do not oppose 
stricter environmental norms or more ecological agriculture as such. Pressure 
from the market is, however, preferred. The Dutch trust that farmers react more 
correctly to market changes than to the propositions and orders.'of state authorities 
or environmental activists. The farming lobby seems to prefer self-regulation by 
farmers' organisations, and as Frouws and van Tatenhove maintain, the 
"environmentalist invasion" has not involved any change in agriculture's 
economic interests or in its technocratic character. High priority is still given to 
competitiveness and export capacity. (Ibid., 229.) 
The environment issue was more frequent in the Dutch463 than in the Irish 
debate464. The "Agri-Environmental Action Programme" included in the 
Accompanying Measures (CEC 1991c, 2) should, in fact, have provoked 
4610n micro and macro-economic values in Dutch agricultural policy, see Nooij's articles on the 
typology of agricultural policies (Nooij 1969; 1993). 
462Documents N-282, N-283, 0-151; inspired especially by "Grond voor keuzen" 1992. 
463Dutch documents 0-010, 0-026, E-003, 0-042, 0-047, 0-052, N-057, 0-054, 0-058, N-105, 
0-078, 0-079, 0-094, E-025, N-168, 0-104, N-221, 0-126, N-259,-0-140, E-029, 0-147. 
464Irish documents N-058, 0-055, 0-102, 0-200, 0-201. 
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discussion in both countries alike. According to the Commission, the old policy 
had encouraged intensive farming systems and given rise to environmental 
concerns. The "Agri-Environmental Action Programme" was "to give recognition 
to the dual role of farmers as producers and as stewards of the countryside, and 
to encourage farming practices which are less intensive and more in tune with 
environmental constraints" and "should also make a positive contribution to 
rebalancing markets" (ibid.). The debate shows that the Dutch ,were clearly 
more prepared to seize upon this issue than the Trish. The Irish debate was 
characterized by a belief that environmental problems did not concern them, 
since their agriculture was not "intensive" — according to their own defmitions465. 
The thematic choices discussed above form the backbone of. the Dutch 
MacSharry debate, and other observers have arrived at similar conclusions 
regarding Dutch agricultural policy. Dirk Strijker (1993), for example, taking up 
the same elements, notes that "the position of the Netherlands in the debate on 
EC policy is determined by the belief that agriculture is primarily an economic 
activity ... More generally, the Netherlands is in favour of a strong budgetary 
discipline within the EC." (ibid., 143). He suggests an explanation that individual 
farmers have not been able to dictate the policy agenda because the exporting 
sub-sectors and agricultural industries have dominated the discussion, and sees 
the environmental issue as still in the state of emerging, although he expects it 
to have "the greatest impact on Dutch agriculture" (ibid., 146). Frouws and van 
Tatenhove (1993, 227) also refer to the "productivistic orientation" of the Dutch 
agribusiness. 
7.3. Specific Irish themes 
The Irish adopted a different tone from the economic emphasis and generalising 
tendency of the Dutch debate, which enabled the Dutch to talk on behalf of the 
whole Community. The Trish debate was more clearly oriented towards Ireland, 
and first and foremost expressed concern about the consequences for Irish 
agriculture, the countryside and the national economy. Ireland was seen as lying 
apart from the rest of the Community — as an island. But the Irish went even 
further in internalising the EU problem. They saw the reform proposals either as 
an attack directed especially at Ireland, or else they felt that they in particular 
were being blamed for the agricultural overproduction affecting the EU. 
Furthermore, the reform was transformed from an EU policy issue into an 
internal Irish affair, with human dimensions gaining more attention than in the 
Dutch debate. 
465The environmental issue was discussed in the Irish debate only in documents N-058, 0-055, 
0-102, 0-200. 
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The Irish deduced right from the beginning that the idea of reforming the 
CAP had to be connected with the need to introduce more justice into the 
common policy. When news about the content of the proposals first leaked out, 
the Irish welcomed the reform as a device to ensure a more equitable division of 
EU money and as a promise to redirect the Brussels cash-flow from the large-
scale operators to smaller ones. Their "own" Commissioner, MacSharry, was to 
be the Robin Hood who took money from the rich and gave it to the poor. When 
more details became available, this idea lost much of its credibility. The Irish 
went on considering the proposals in terms of justice, fairness and cohesion, 
however, claiming that their vital national interests were at stake466. One 
consequence of this was that compensation467 was a more important issue than 
the budgetary implications468. 
One could say that the Irish were suffering from a "small country syndrome", 
that fact that, because of their lack of physical power (in terms of military 
capacity, size of population or economic influence), small countries are inclined 
to insist on their "rights" and integrity in international politics. Reference was 
made to the letter of the law to the extent that "Realpolitik" would no longer 
allow it.469  The Irish stuck firm to the letter of the EU "constitution", the Treaty 
of Rome, and refused to recognise any other dimensions which might determine 
the decisions -taken in the EU. They referred to the fundamental guarantees 
given to .Ireland on EU entry, "adequate parallelism" in EU jargon. This meant 
that Irish farmers could expect to progress to higher Community prices as 
industries and the business sector lost their protection against competition from 
other member states. For them "these terms of entry offer strong moral grounds 
for. any Irish Government to demand protection for Irish farmers"470. 
Commissioner MacSharry himself once had to remind his countrymen of this 
fact: "It is important for commentators in Ireland to realise that it will not be an 
easy task to obtain a substantial increase iri cohesion related expenditure. It will 
not be enough to repeat, mantra-like, the articles of the treaty on cohesion as if 
they were a code for access to a European cash 
Partly in connection with the justice theme, the second theme represented 
Irish agriculture as an exception •among the EU countries. Frequent references 
were made to how important agriculture was for the national economy and how 
N-025, N-036, N-054, N-073, 0-230; 466N-003, N-004, N-005, N-007, 0-003,0-006, N-014, 
N-033, 0-007, 0-009, 0-012, N-055, E-006, 0-012, N-202. 
467N-072, 0-032, N-077, 0-072, N-I46, N-I49, N-163, 0-133, N-210, N-211, N-245, N-282. 
468N-001, N-038, 0-040, 0-154, 0-168, 0-198. 
469Ben Tonra (1997) refers to the same phenomenon when comparing the Irish, Danish and 
Dutch strategies in the EU. 
470,,Ec fam promise", Cork Examiner, 26.6.1991; a leading article, 0-090. 
471"Opt out clause danger foreseen by MacSharry", Irish Times 30.11.1991. 
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the Irish case should be treated as an exception in the CAP472 In this debate 
agriculture was synonymous with the whole national economy. Ireland, as an 
exceptionally agricultural country, was also able to broaden the issue to cover 
rurality as a whole, whereas issues concerning the countryside or rural areas 
were absent from the Dutch debate473. In the Irish case, agriculture could not be 
separated from its rural context474. 
The social implications for rural Ireland formed a distinct theme. The Irish 
were especially concerned whether the reform might worsen social problems 
and increase unemployment in the countryside. It is indicative that one dramatic 
vision involved the breaking up of rural families475. The reform proposals were 
seen as a threat to (small) family farms476, and "marginalities" such as 
disadvantaged areas and farming women were also mentioned as potential 
victims477. The human dimensions were emphasised as Irish agriculture faced 
the implications of the reform message: the outcry was that thousands of farmers 
would have no other option than to leave the 1and478, which has often implied 
migration away from Ireland as well. High levels of net emigration had prevailed 
there for over a century, with the exception of a brief turn around in the 1970's, 
and emigration had been a difficult social problem at times479. 
Overproduction, the dependence of Ireland on the CAP and the intervention 
system became. personal problems for the Irish480. The Irish Minister of Food, 
Joe Walsh, once admitted that a third of the produce bought by the EU and 
placed in intervention in 1991 was from Ireland481. The level of dependence on 
intervention was regarded as frightening. The phenomenon of overproduction 
was by no means caused by the Irish alone, but the fact that much of their 
produce went to intervention and not onto the market was used by MacSharry 
and others as an argument in favour of the reform. The farming lobby defended 
472  0-008, 0-046, 0-049, 0-092, 0-118, N-177, 0-156, N-202. 
473  With two exceptions, in which "the countryside" was used with a pejorative flavour, claiming 
that the MaeSharry proposals were of no use for anything else but "keeping the countryside 
alive" (Dutch documents N-051, N-061). 
474N-009, 0-004, N-023, N-040, N-109, N-I 10, 0-085, 0-100, 0-107, 0-135, 0-144, 0-149, 
0-150, 0-152, 0-161, 0-162, 0-180, 0-190, 0-191, 0-193, N-285. 
475 0-013, 0-050, 0-106, E-015, 0-180, 0-224. 
476 N-018, N-103, 0-206. 
477 0-143, 0-185. 
478 0- 1 14. 
4790n the scale, type and impact of Irish emigration, see Breen et al. (1990, 148-152) and Lee 
(1989, 373-386). Lee argues that no other society has "found itself obliged to rationalise so 
remorselessly the subversion of the national and family ideals inherent in the emigration 
"solution" to the problem of social structure" (ibid., 375). 
480 N-063, 0-030, 0-051, 0-086, N-119, 0-087, N-12, 0-101, N-I48, 0-129, N-191, N-197, 
N-205, 0-213, 0-218, 0-226. 
481N-124. 
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the Irish position fiercely: "I won't stand by and let anyone put Irish farmers in 
the dock for things they're simply not guilty of."482 Those who opposed major 
reforms in Ireland, asserted instead that the Euro-intervention "mountains" were 
caused by leaks in import controls483 and were not a sign of structural 
overproduction. On the contrary, it was argued that excess production in the EU 
was necessary in order to feed Russia and other Eastern European areas484. 
The Irish intertwined the reform proposals with their domestic affairs to an 
extent where outsiders were hardly needed or recognised as competent participants 
in the debate. This was partly due to the fact that Commissioner MacSharry was 
an Irishman. The main theme was the person of Ray MacSharry rather than the 
contents of the proposals, for they had, after ali, been made in the first place by 
an Irishman. Consequently, the public discussion considered his achievements 
from the point of view of MacSharry as an Irish politician, a Fianna Fåil 
member and a potential prime minister after Charles Haughey485. Negative 
evaluations of MacSharry's performance led to demands for terminating his 
appointment as a commissioner486, suggestions that he should be assigned to 
another post in the Commission487, or other criticisms488. But the path of 
communication also worked in reverse: criticised by Irishmen, MacSharry himself 
followed the Irish discussion closely and participated in it by expressing criticism 
of the people and their comments and alternatives. He gave a number of interviews 
for domestic newspapers in which he tried to convince his fellow countrymen of 
the advantageousness of his reform plan for Ireland in particular489. 
The domestic affair theme was enriched further by the fact that, although 
discussions on the reform pian easily turned into a bitter wrangling at home, the 
crucial decisions were being taken in Brussels. Whatever Fianna Fåil politicians 
said about the reform proposals, it was interpreted as an effort at showing 
loyalty to Ray MacSharry. The political opposition led by the Fine Gael used 
the MacSharry pian to attack the Fianna Fåil government490, and it was also 
repeatedly connected with the new three-year national development programme 
(PESD, Programme for Economic and Social Development)491. When the Irish 
found themselves divided with regard to the proposals, the lack of a national 
482IFA leader Jan Gillis in "CAP reform for ESRI study call", Farm Exam, 18.4.1991. (0-063). 
4830-063, 0-078, 0-087, N-243. 
484N-215 0-170. 
4850-029, N-088, N-181, N-194, N-I96, 0-225, N-23I. 
4860_076.  
487N-062. 
488N-046, 0-017, 0-021, 0-028, 0-059. 
489N-096, N-097, N-108, N-116, N-118, N-158, N-232, N-233, N-24I, 0-202, 0-208, N-287. 
490N-047, N-048, N-049, 0-023, 0-025, N-076, N-079, 0-035, N-083, N-084, N-099, 0-077, 
N-131, N-136, N-145, N-151, N-I68, N-175, N-189, 0-147. 
491N-012, N-020, N-021, N-042, N-185, N-186. 
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strategy was considered a severe drawback. Probably because of the country's 
historical experiences, the division was looked on as a threat: "It has always 
been too easy to divide the people of this country"492. Pleas for a united national 
front were also frequent493. 
7.4. Themes held in common 
Discourse analysis is interested not only in elements contained in separate 
arenas in a debate but also in shared elements. We will therefore turn our 
attention now to the themes which could he found in both countries. Even 
though certain themes were noted in both debates, they were not necessarily 
approached in similar ways. The negotiation process was followed carefully in 
both countries, for example, but the Dutch and Irish stressed different 
characteristics. The content of the reform pian and potential influences were 
also documented in both countries, but the emphases differed significantly 
Furthermore, the fact that the Commission had launched reform proposals inspired 
ideas about the desirability of the CAP and about the most acceptable direction 
of development for agriculture in the EU. The reform thus provoked discussion 
about the fundamentals of the Common Agricultural Policy, by again on different 
Iines in the two countries. The discussion was more harmonious in the case of 
connecting the CAP reform with the GATT world trade talks, however, and 
both debates included comments about the general nature of EU policy and its 
implications for the country as a whole. 
As already mentioned, the progress of the reform proposals in the EU 
decision-making institutions was followed closely in both countries. Apart from 
mere descriptions of the course of events494, the Dutch were more inclined than 
the Irish to emphasise difficulties in the negotiations and disagreement on the 
reform inside the EU495. Disagreement was mentioned at times in Ireland, but 
not underlined so as to form an independent topic. The Irish news and 
492"EC to back pian for disadvantaged areas", Irish Times, 3.12.1991. 
493N-043, 0-016, 0-019, 0-037, 0-054, 0-066, 0-079, 0-096, 0-138, N-184, N-200, N-158, 
0-164, 0-169. 
494Dutch documents N-004, N-006, N-012, N-016, N-017, N-020, N-023, N-028, N-030, N-031, 
N-036, N-037, N-038, N-045, N-052, N-072, N-073, N-074, N-076, N-079, N-079a, N-081, 
N-082, N-085, N-086, N-087, N-088, N-090, N-099, N-125, N-126, N-127, N-128, N-143, 
N-147, N-148, N-150, N-166, N-174, N-178, N-179, N-186, N-188, N-189, N-191, N-197, 
N-199, N-206, N-207, N-214, N-217, N-223, N-236, N-239, N-242, N-243, N-244, N-246, 
N-249, N-285, N-286, N-287, N-290. 
495Dutch documents N-017, N-018, N-020, N-022, N-030, N-031, N-032, N-086, N-087, N-088, 
N-090, N-091, N-095, N-096, N-097, N-098, N-126, N-136, N-178, N-179, N-186, N-188, 
N-197, N-198, N-200, N-201, N-202, N-203, N-205, N-214. 
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interpretations regarding the negotiation process were usually optimistic496, and 
it was only in January-March 1992, that even they had to confess that the EU 
ministers of agriculture had reached deadlock in the negotiations, causing repeated 
setbacks497. The Dutch498 also devoted more time and space than the Irish to 
speculation on how much support or opposition there was for the proposals499. 
Other themes, not surprisingly, were the content of the different versions of 
the proposals and the anticipated effects on national agriculture (and the 
countryside in Ireland; see section 7.3 above). The main interest of the Dutch 
was focussed first on the content500, but gradually more profound analyses also 
emerged of the background and expected effects of the proposed changes in the 
CAP501. These were followed by a couple of more scientific economic analyses502. 
Later, the theme was enriched by several surveys of possible consequences503. 
After repeated demands for independent surveys504, studies produced by different 
institutions were published and discussed in Ireland505, and the predicted 
consequences were also discussed in general terms, but not as frequently as in 
the Netherlands506. 
There were also differences in which products were regarded as most seriously 
affected by the reform proposals or otherwise essential to them. The Dutch were 
most concerned about mi1k507, and feelings were further raised by the Italian 
milk quota incident508  at a moment when general agreement on the reform had 
496Irish documents N-004, N-008, N-026, N-027, N-028, N-031, N-035, N-039, N-052, N-053, 
N-054, N-058, N-060, N-061, N-065, N-069, N-093, N-094, N-095, N-133, N-134, N-136, 
N-143, N-146, 0-103, N-I63, N-164, N-209, N-211, N-220, N-239, N-240, N-242, N-250, 
N-252, N-262, N-263, N-266, N-268, N-269, N-271, N-273, N-275, N-276, N-283, N-284, 
0-212, N-288, N-289, N-290, N-291, N-293, N-298. 
497N-251, N-253, N-261, N-265. 
498Dutch documents 0-019, 0-021, 0-025, 0-028, 0-033, N-028, N-029, N-033, N-092, N-146, 
N-147, N-150, N-151, N-152, N-155, N-173, N-199, 0-110, N-212, N-213, N-216, N-217, 
N-218, N-219, 0-114, N-230, N-235, N-242, N-261. 
499Irish documents N-061, N-120, N-126, 0-089, N-165, N-166, N-170, N-209, N-226. 
500N-007, N-009, N-014, N-067, 0-067, N-071, N-072, N-074, 0-070, N-075, N-076, N-077, 
0-089. 
501E-005, 0-056, 0-069, 0-071, N-080, N-080a, N-084, N-103, E-010, E-015, N-112, 0-088. 
5020-015, E-028. 
503Discussed in Dutch documents N-054, 0-076, N-104, N-112, N-113, N-114, N-115, N-116, 
N-117, N-118, N-119, 0-081, N-154, N-164, N-180, N-182, N-183 (conceming Belgium), 
N-185, N-240, N-247. 
5"0-036, 0-063. 
505N-081, E-009, E-011, N-228, E-023, E-024. 
506Irish documents N-071, 0-167, N-23I, N-235, 0-220, N-299, N-300. 
507N-009, N-069, N-071, N-084, 0-076, N-103, E-010, N-104, N-186, N-243, N-244, N-245, 
N-261, N-262, N-267, N-272, N-273, N-276. 
508There was a wrangle over Italian milk quotas which had delayed the adoption of the reform 
package. The Italians claimed the original quotas had been set too low due to a statistical 
error, but some member states, with the Netherlands the loudest among them, argued that an 
increase would amount to rewarding the Italians for breaking the rules. 
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almost been reached509. The main new policy instruments proposed by 
Commissioner MacSharry were directed towards crop husbandry, especially 
grain, and attention was paid to this, too, even though arable farming is a 
relatively unimportant activity in the Netherlands5I0. The reform proposals were 
also discussed in connection with intensive cattle breeding, even though the 
anticipated effects were mainly indirect ones, occurring via the lower prices of 
the grain used as fodder511. On the other hand, it was the consequences for crop 
husbandry that were brought up most often in the Irish debate. The Irish were 
particularly worried about the value of their "green gold", i.e. their grassland512, 
but the consequences for grain513  were noted, too. Given that the main products 
of Trish agriculture are dairy products and beef, the effects on mi1k514 and 
beef5I5 were frequently discussed. 
The preparation of a policy reform for EU agriculture naturally encouraged 
meditation and visions about what this agriculture should be like and what 
would be aproper policy for dealing with it. Thus the idea of a reform as such 
and various visions of EU agriculture in the future constituted a central theme in 
the Dutch texts. This approach is noteworthy in two ways. First, the visions or 
alternatives often radically questioned the old policy and went deep into the 
very fundamentals of the CAP, and secondly, the Dutch did not restrict their 
interests or ideas to their own agriculture, but used the opportunity to speak "for 
the whole of the EU". The Dutch visions implied qualitative changes in addition 
to new policy suggestions, whereas the Irish contributions were more often 
content with technical or quantitative changes to the old policy. This theme 
revealed another characteristic of the Dutch way of discussing the CAP. A sharp 
disagreement prevails in the Netherlands between those responsible for day-to-
day agricultural policy-making, and external experts on agricultural policy. 
There were two examples of the work of extemal experts: the manifesto published 
by the large working group for "Sustainable co-existence of agriculture, nature 
and the environment" (Duurzaam samengaan van landbouw, natuur en milieu)516 , 
and Professor Jan de Veer's report to the EU (the "De Veer Plan")517. The 
experts tried to break down the inertia in political thinking about agriculture, 
nature and the environment and seek a new kind of state intervention. 
N-291, 0-148. 509N-274, N-285, N-286, N-289, 
510E-010, N-104, N-120, N-121, N-142, 0-092, E-025, N-153, N-164, N-215, 0-113, N-229, 
N-134, N-249, N-279. 
511E-013, N-112, N-153, 0-143. 
512E-002, 0-007, 0-016, E-006, N-139. 
513 E-004, N-046, 0-120, N-255, 0-196, 0-222. 
514N-015, 0-011, N-056, 0-016, E-022, N-269 (Italian). 
5150-140, N-191, E-018, N-243, N-244, 0-210. 
5160-002, 0-003. 
517N-001, N-181, 0-107. 
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In addition to these broad visions of agriculture518, the Dutch debate frequently 
touched upon the choice between market orientation and state intervention as a 
basis for the CAP5I9. Supply management was also discussed520. Numerous 
policy measures were suggested as solutions to current problems: enlargement 
of farm units52I; diversification of farm sizes, products and activities522, and 
evaluation of the possibilities for ecological or extensive farming523. Solitary 
voices remained to suggest that production costs should be cut by sharing 
goods, or that Dutch arable farming should produce the fodder used in cattle 
breeding524. Agrification525 and two-price schemes were mentioned only once 
each526. 
The most fundamental alternatives in the Irish debate were market orientation 
and supply management527. Reduced government involvement was not raised as 
a topic, however. It is indicative of the atmosphere in the Irish reform debate 
that a return to the contemporary price policy was suggested as an alternative to 
Commissioner MacSharry's proposals528. Organic or extensive farming were 
considered, but not necessarily in a positive light529. The Trish seemed to prefer 
small steps rather than revolutionary visions. Corporate farming530, agritourism53I, 
and agrification532 were noted as serious alternatives. As in the Netherlands, 
diversification towards more value-added products was thought to have a potential 
in the future533, and enlargement of farm size was mentioned as a traditional 
remedy for the low income problem in agriculture, but some more original 
voices proposed a Basic Income Scheme for ali citizens534, a ban on the sowing 
of winter crops535, or a tax on nitrogen536. 
518E-008, E-023, 0-047, N-284, 0-153. 
519N-027, E-003, E-017, 0-102, 0-106, 0-112, 0-113, 0-115, 0-077, 0-117, 0-138, 0-146, 
E-026, E-027, E-028, 0-147, 0-154, N-215. 
5200-020, E-006, E-007, 0-093, N-144, N-145, E-022. 
521E-001 E-009, E-009a. 
522E-002: 0-042, 0-108, E-008, E-009a, E-024, N-260. 
5230-026, E-009a, 0-054, E-025, 0-097, N-181, 0-109. 
524E-009a. 
525N-141 . 
5260-092. 
5270-026, E-012, 0-119, E-014, N-177, 0-187. 
528N-105, 0-087. 
529 0-061, 0-068, N-154, 0-142, 0-146. 
°O-O83, 0-088. 
'O-O69, N-137. 
5320-116. 
533 0-068, 0-137, 0-155. 
534 0-132. 
5350-134. 
5360-201. 
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Policy measures suggested in the reform proposals were not widely discussed 
in either of the countries, with the exception of the aid per hectare to compensate 
for the reduction in the prices of arable crops537. Detailed measures as solutions 
never formed a major theme. The set-aside scheme was not a very popular topic 
in the debate, and was mentioned only a couple of times in each country in this 
text corpus538. In addition, the Irish proposals included forestry539 and early 
retirement schemes540. 
As expected, the round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
multilateral trade negotiations launched in 1986 was a prominent theme. Once 
MacSharry had announced a new pian to reform the CAP (CEC 1991a,b), 
newspaper articles claimed that these were budget-driven, intemal reforms 
separate from the GATT negotiations. Even though the EU would rather have 
kept the two matters apart, speculations about their interconnection continuously 
followed the reform debate541. Officially, the EU was claiming that the reform 
proposals were necessary because of internal Community businesses and nothing 
else. Politicians were keen on emphasizing that the GATT negotiations (and the 
Americans as the main partner in them) must not be allowed to determine the 
course which the CAP would take, and free trade as a general principle was also 
discussed in the Netherlands542. The annual negotiations on farm prices for the 
forthcoming year were also regularly connected with the reform proposals543. 
Finally, one more common, although slightly more fragmented theme can be 
found, consisting of remarks about the nature of the CAP as EU policy and 
politics. There was speculation in both countries about the rotation of the EU 
Presidency; about its efficiency under the management of different countries 
and how the change would affect the balance of power in meetings544. The 
Council and its committees and working parties are presided over by a 
537Dutch documents N-204, N-249, E-027, N-279, 0-150. 
538Dutch documents 0-135, 0-151; Irish documents 0-139, N-254. 
539Irish documents 0-116, N-188, 0-209. 
540Irish documents N-190, 0-227. 
541Dutch documents N-008, 0-029, 0-030, N-015, N-024, N-032, N-035, N-036, N-038, N-045, 
N-048, N-053, N-053a, 0-053, N-055, 0-055, N-070, 0-068, 0-073, N-077, 0-074, N-091, 
0-079, 0-090, N-152, 0-096, N-155, N-165, N-167, N-169, N-174, N-184, N-190, N-195, 
N-204, N-213, 0-133, 0-135, N-252, N-253, E-030; 
Irish documents N-001, E-00I, 0-001, N-004, N-010, N-011, 0-005, N-020, N-029, N-037, 
0-011, 0-012, N-057, N-089, N-111, 0-037, E-008, 0-074, 0-075, N-115, N-I34, N-155, 
N-157, N-159, N-I60, 0-126, N-167, N-169, N-171, E-016, N-204, N-207, N-222, 0-178, 
0-183, E-019, N-237, N-240, N-251, N-267, N-270, 0-213. 
5420-018, N-024, 0-072, 0-073, 0-078, 0-134. 
543Dutch documents N-046, N-048, N-049, 0-049, N-175, N-176, N-208, N-209, 0-111, N-210, 
N-211, N-241; Irish documents N-075, N-078, 0-033, N-085, N-086, N-087, N-090, N-091, 
N-092, 0-041, N-102, N-114, 0-081, 0-084, N-260, N-267, N-270, 0-212. 
544Dutch documents N-005, N-070, 0-065, 0-073, N-170, 0-152; Irish documents N-120, 
N-277, N-283. 
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representative of the presidency who holds office for six months, the post 
rotating among the member states in alphabetical order. During the span of the 
MacSharry reform negotiations there were three presidencies: Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, and the final decision was taken just before Portugal 
handed the command over to the United Kingdom. The Irish considered that the 
Portuguese presidency offered a friendlier atmosphere for long-term compensation 
for price cuts than would have prevailed under either the British or the Dutch, 
whose more commercially oriented agriculture favoured only temporary 
compensation for farmers545. The Dutch regarded the Luxembourg-presidency 
as an advantage for Commissioner MacShany546, but when their "own" Minister, 
Piet Bukman, took over the chair, reactions were not entirely positive. The 
situation was a delicate one from their point of view, because the presidency 
requires impartiality and should always contribute to gaining a result, but it was 
also considered an influential post in the EU547. Bukman was shocked how 
openly Portugal supported the reform, while the British presidency was considered 
to approach agriculture "nuchter en zakelijk" (in a businesslike manner), i.e. in 
accordance with the Dutch style548. 
Another common feature was the particular interest in the comings and 
goings of the two countries' "own" commissioners549, Ray MacSharry and the 
Dutch External Trade Commissioner Frans Andriessen. Their "own" 
commissioner was often mistaken for a representative of the country. If he 
failed to perform according to these expectations, he was easily blamed for 
scoring an own goal. The roles of a country's "own" commissioner and of a 
minister in the negotiations were often (over)emphasized. There were also 
expressions of discontent with the CAP, the EU and with the way in which 
politics were conducted in the EU550. The Dutch were worried about their 
diminishing influence in the EU551, whereas the Irish criticism was more general: 
that EU policy was insecure, contradictory or ill-managed. The relationship to 
EU policy was also often felt to be problematic, so that one Dutch observer even 
saw the CAP as a threat to the EU552 and the Irish were almost painfully aware 
of their dependence on decisions taken in Brussels553. 
545Irish documents N-277, N-283. 
546Dutch document N-005. 
547Dutch documents N-070, 0-065. 
548Dutch documents N-178 and 0-152. 
549Dutch documents 0-023, 0-024, 0-032, N-019, N-024, N-028, N-036, N-037, 0-053; the 
Irish case was discussed in section 7.3 above. 
550Dutch documents N-010, N-034, N-037, N-065, N-102, 0-082, 0-105, 0-109, N-220, 0-118, 
0-137, 0-149; Irish documents N-022, 0-052, 0-083, 0-141, N-187, N-201, N-246, 0-082. 
5510-085, 0-123. 
552 0-05 1. 
553 0-015, 0-128, 0-131. 
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7.5. Conclusion 
It became obvious in the course of the above presentation of the thematic 
outlines of the MacSharry discourse in the two countries that the approaches 
adopted to the proposals were partly different. For the Dutch, the reform was a 
matter of following economic rationality, the problem being presented in the 
terms of the budget, whereas the Irish dealt with the problem in terms of justice 
and tried to falsify the diagnosis that overproduction was a structural phenomenon 
in the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Rough contours of the MacSharry reform discourse start to emerge on the 
basis of this analysis. Two features in the debates are crucial. In addition to 
some of the themes discussed deviating in the two national debates, they were 
also approached differently. It can be concluded that there are actually two 
discursive fields which are partly overlapping. The results are summarised in 
Figure 1 below. 
In order to interpret the findings more generally, one has to shift from the 
thematic discourse analysis level to the level of politics as action. First, as 
DUTCH 	 COMMON 	 IRISH 
EU budget 	 - Irish agriculture as 
GATT 	 an exception 
economic rationality 
	
	 - justice and cohesion 
- negotiations in the EU: 
*disagreement 	*optimism 
- relationship 
between agriculture, 
the environment 
and nature 
- content and effect of the r 
* milk 
* cereals 
*intensive 	*grass 
cattle breeding 	*beef 
eform 
- social implications for 
rural Ireland 
domestic affair 
dependence of Ireland 
on the CAP and 
intervention 
the CAP as EU politics: 
* speculation 
* own commissioner 
*diminishing 	*general 
influence in EU 	criticism 
visions of the CAP: 
*fundamental 	*qualitative 
and qualitative 	changes 
changes 
Figure 1. Discursive fields based on the thematic reading. 
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concems the ways of politicking, the Dutch used as their discursive strategy an 
interpretation of agricultural policy as a solely economic matter, emphasising 
efficiency (although the content of the term is not clear) and the budget. In this 
way they tried to maintain the existing principles for dividing support in EU 
agriculture, even though this division was biased in favour of those who produce 
most — which is not necessarily logical in an oversupply situation. They chose to 
speak of "efficient" and "inefficient" farms, while the Irish preferred to discuss 
"larger" and "smaller" farms. This is a question of conceptualising the discourse 
differently. 
The maun politicking strategy used by the Irish was the construction of "us" 
and "them". "Us" referred to the EU member states taken together, while "they" 
were the Eastem Europe countries. Ali the evil — in this case illegal imports 
which caused an oversupply on the EU market — came from them.554 Polarised 
models of this kind are often used in political discussion to sustain existing 
attitudes or to generate new negative attitudes555. Another element in the Irish 
politicking strategy was its introverted character, in that they managed in the 
course of the debate to change an EU-wide proposal into an Irish topic. 
Few of the issues discussed brought anything radically new to EU politics. 
The need to hold down agricultural policy expenditure had been persistently on 
the EU agenda, and the issue of justice had been kept alive while striving for 
cohesion. A couple of issues are worth mentioning, however, since they did not 
arise from the original text of the reform proposals but were more in the nature 
of by-products of the debate. These are the themes which concemed the EU as a 
political institution and its relationship with the US. Officially, efforts were 
made to discourage connecting the MacSharry reform with the GATT 
negotiations, but it seemed to be unavoidable. It was an unlucky confrontation, 
because the idea of the reform being something forced on the EU from outside 
naturally made it less attractive and less likely to be successfully implemented. 
The expressions of suspicion about the EU as a political institution were certainly 
unintended outcomes of launching the CAP reform. 
I would like to argue, however, that questions of power, democracy and 
sovereignty are discussed and studied too little in connection with the Common 
Agricultural Policy, as it is more common to elaborate upon them in the general 
framework of the EU, or to study the relationship between the EU and a 
particular member state. On the other hand, the social dimension of a farm as a 
production and reproduction unit, for example, was hardly touched upon at ali, 
nor were the different production techniques thoroughly politicised, since the 
environmental issue was mainly centred on arable farming or nitrogen emissions, 
whereas animal welfare, for example, was not an issue at all. 
554For the Dutch this demarcation line ran inside the EU, between the northern and southem 
member states. 
555See e.g. van Dijk (1993, 263). 
163 
Finally, the politicisation of the environmental question deserves special 
attention. One has to assess the importance of a new environmental discourse 
challenging the traditional productivist discourse in agriculture in this debate. 
As was shown above, the environmental question was an issue in the 
Netherlands, whereas in Ireland it was seen as less relevant. The Irish seemed to 
be convinced that it was not their problem, and argued that Ireland had the 
"most environmentally friendly agriculture in EC."556 Even in the Netherlands, 
however, there are still reasons to doubt how fundamental the impact of the 
environmental issue has been. The traditional productivist discourse may be 
crumbling, but it is a fragmented and uneven process, and environmental aspects 
have so far been attached to an old agenda in which economic interests still have 
priority. One problem is thus that environmental concerns have not yet been 
placed in line with other aims. 
The environmental issue in general seems to be strong in the argumentation, 
and terms such as "sustainability" or "environmentally friendly production" 
have been adopted quickly into the agricultural policy discourse. They have 
become popular even though hardly anyone can explain precisely what they 
mean in practice, or else they are given numerous different meanings depending 
on the context. These terms are politically powerful in the discourse, however, 
which points to another problem with the new environmental question that is 
challenging the old discourse, namely, that its power lies very much in the fact 
that the terms which are used can be interpreted in various ways. This is actually 
nothing new in political discourse, where consistency is often difficult to find, 
but it does complicate efforts at creating a new policy and massing enough 
unanimity behind it, especially in the EU context. 
Finally, one has to be cautious when judging the importance of the MacSharry 
reform with respect to the environmental issue. After ali, there was not enough 
political will for a radical change. Many of the measures which might have 
shifted production practices in a more environmentally friendly direction remained 
incomplete. It is allowed, for example, to grow non-food plants in a set-aside 
field without any restrictions on the use of fertilisers and pesticides. Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee that the farmer will not try to produce more with the rest of 
his arca when a part of it has to be set aside. In the cattle sector, upper limits 
were placed on the number of livestock units per hectare, but they do not apply 
to pigs and poultry. Moreover, member states are required to establish 
environmentally friendly agriculture through programmes that specify areas, 
objectives, measures and forms of assistance. This leads to different 
interpretations, and it is unlikely to result in EU-wide criteria for environmentally 
friendly production. More steps are needed before this goal is likely to be 
reached. 
556"Brussels pincer movement on prices and output" by Prof. Seamus Sheehy, Farming 
Independent, 22.1.1991. (E-002). 
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8. Argument structure 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the reform debate from the point of view of argumentation 
structures. The rhetorical approach was outlined in section 3.3.3, and the role of 
argument in defming realities and constructing policy choices was then discussed. 
Rhetorical analysis as presented by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca 
will be used in the following to analyse the Dutch and Irish reform debates with 
regard to adaptation of the speaker to the audience, the premises or starting 
points of argumentation and the rhetorical techniques employed. 
The intention is not to list ali cases in which dissociative argumentation was 
used in the debate, for example, but to explicate how the argumentation tools 
were used for politicising, depoliticising or politicking the CAP. In addition to 
the aspects presented above, of interest are also the use and invention of terms, 
formulations, distinctions and classifications. 
In order to analyse the rhetoric of the debate in depth, however, the material 
has to be reorganised. It is not possible, or even sensible, to analyse ali the 
material available, but rather it is best to devote attention only to those texts 
which are rich in argumentation and which are as direct products of the CAP 
actors as possible. As a consequence, news articles will not be included at this 
level of analysis. Since this work does not focus on press strategies, news items 
are not good sources of argumentation structures, as they would place too much 
emphasis on the attitude of the newspaper in question, or on the style of a 
certain reporter or editor. 
In the political reading of the reform debate, statements of reasons can be 
expected to prove more interesting than stances or positions. Similarly, 
symptomatic interpretations of power relations and interests are rather 
uninteresting as such. A demonstration that the farmers' organisations lobbied 
on behalf of the interests of their members would hardly deserve hundreds of 
pages of explication, but rather the rhetorical analysis should focus on the way 
in which such interests are presented as "givens" and thus unproblematic. 
Explicating argumentation structures strips these interest policies of their quasi-
natural finality, asking how the interests are presented and refiecting and assessing 
the rhetorical means used and the other by-products of striving for this aim. This 
is a way of distancing oneself from interpreting the politics of agricultural 
policy primarily in instrumental terms, as was discussed in Chapter 2 in 
connection with the political economics and political science approaches. 
The argumentation analysis will thus set out to restructure the text corpus 
into arguments about definitions of the problem, the environment and the rural 
issue. These topics overlap with the themes discussed in Chapter 7, but they are 
now reorganised under fewer headings in order to highlight the rhetoric of the 
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debate. As an example of non-politicisation, arguments concerned with production 
methods will he analysed as well. 
8.2. Definitions of the problem 
As noted in section 4.5.2, the Commission quoted surplus production as the 
main reason for the reform (CEC 1991a, 1). Earlier measures had not been able 
to remove this problem permanently, it was argued, so that "the Community's 
agricultural policy cannot avoid a succession of increasingly serious crises 
unless its mechanisms are fundamentally reviewed so as to adapt them to a 
situation different from that of the sixties" (ibid., 9). 
8.2.1. The Dutch debate 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the Dutch took the general definition of the problem 
as set out by the Commission, the cost of overproduction, as the starting point 
for the debate, discussing it under the themes of the EU budget and economic 
rationality. Consequently, overproduction was placed in an economic setting. 
The Dutch rhetoricians agreed that it was impossible to avoid the unavoidable, 
the need to cut overproduction, but they did argue that the inevitable could be 
dealt with in various ways. Actually, most of them disagreed with the Commission 
on what would he the best way of reaching the goal. 
Sicco Mansholt, who was among the most infiuential debaters in the 
Netherlands, claimed that the proposed price reductions would not cut production 
(0-010, interview with S.M. 30.8.1992) and employed dissociative argumentation 
to maintain that "Brussels" had interpreted the reality wrongly by seeing a 
connection between producer prices and the amounts produced. He referred to 
former experiences with the use of a price policy and to statistics showing that 
neither production nor consumption react to changes in the prices of agricultural 
products. According to his reasoning, the nature of agricultural production is 
such that only the taking of fields out of production permanently can reduce the 
amount produced and put an end to costly overproduction. 
Mansholt similarly did not support the idea of direct income subsidies (ibid.) 
at the beginning, and recounted how his party companion, Dr. A. Vondeling and 
other agricultural experts had wanted to replace price support with income 
support as early as 1955. Mansholt said he could not find any justifiable way of 
dividing income subsidies among farmers at that time, and nor could he today. 
He argued that it was impossible to liken farmers, who as land owners were 
often millionaires, with unmarried mothers living on social assistance. Here he 
was drawing on the premise of the universal value ofjustice, with the conviction 
that his audience would share the same idea of justice and identify with his 
disapproval of direct income subsidies in the form proposed by the Commission. 
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The suggested direct income subsidy was an important topic in the debate. 
The farming lobby in particular rejected the idea in both countries, because it 
would be much more visible than price support and both the consumers and the 
treasury would more easily want to reduce it. Economic theory was not often 
quoted in this connection, because this theory regards price support as the 
measure that causes the most market disturbance. A completely free market 
would have been the best solution according to the theory of agricultural 
economics, and direct income support the `second best'. This argument was put 
forward in Holland in the early days of the debate (0-015), but the agricultural 
economists also showed a lot of understanding for the farmers' opposition to 
Commissioner MacSharry's proposals. 
Mansholt (0-010) also took the opportunity to teach the younger politicians 
the art of politicking in GATT negotiations, blaming the European Commission 
for allowing the Americans to dictate the mies of the game. The USA wanted to 
subordinate agricultural policy to trade policy, whereas according to Mansholt, 
"healthy" agricultural policy should give the direction to trade policy. He 
dismissed out of hand the idea of freer trade in agriculture, as had been the 
European stance during the previous GATT rounds: "Wij hebben dat toen 
geweigerd. De Europese Commissie had nu ook gewoon nee moeten zeggen." 
(We denied it then. The European Commission should have just said no this 
time as well.) According to him, free trade in agriculture would lead to a crisis, 
as view which entailed taking the writings in economics textbooks as facts, and 
thus withdrew this notion from the argumentation. He also reprimanded the EU 
negotiators even more strongly for accepting the US demand to abolish the 
variable import levies (0-010). "Dat is fout. Over de hoogte van de variabele 
heffingen kun je onderhandelen, over het principe niet." (That is a mistake. You 
can negotiate about the amounts of the variable levies, but not about the principle.) 
In setting trade against agriculture, Mansholt (0-010) was implying in his 
argumentation that the eoncrete value embodied in agriculture is higher than 
that of trade. In this premise he was questioning one of the "givens" in agricultural 
policy, namely that the interests of the farmers, the food industry and trade 
somehow naturally coincide. He argued that the farm leaders and public 
administrators have an eye for the interests of the large cooperatives rather than 
for the interests of the farmers. The lower the producer price, the more there is 
to export and gain turnover from, and the better the competitiveness of these 
companies is in the world market. He asked himself whether it was really in the 
interests of the farmers to produce goods at such a low price, and answered that 
it was not. This remark is consciously provocative, since Mansholt was well 
aware of the close relationship that the farmers and their lobby had with the 
food industry and trade in general in the Netherlands (as discussed in section 
5.2.2), and of the great narrative of success attributable to Dutch agriculture. In 
this connection, he also raised the question of the impact of subsidised exports 
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from the EU on the developing world. This remark goes beyond the conventional 
frame of reference in which the CAP was discussed. 
Mansholt presented the above arguments to two different audiences. When 
arguing against price policy as a means of cutting production and against direct 
income subsidies in the form in which they were presented in the reform 
proposals, he was trying to convince the universal audience, so that ali rational 
human beings should be able to follow the argumentation, whereas his arguments 
conceming the conflicting interests of trade and agriculture were addressed to 
the particular audience of Dutch farmers. 
Another Dutch debater, Prof. Jerry de Hoogh (0-020, interview with J. de H. 
31.10.1995), similarly did not question the need for reform caused by the 
overproduction problem, but he also stressed the peculiarities of supply and 
demand in the case of agricultural products. Lower prices hardly increase 
consumption at all, nor do they reduce the supply to any appreciable extent. 
This argument dissociates agricultural markets from the conventional 
understanding of neoclassical economics about the functioning of markets (the 
same argument that he also put forward in E-022, written together with 
S. Mansholt, H.A. Liicker, and C.P. Veerman). His explanation for the problems 
in agriculture is overcapacity in the form of land (interview 31.10.1995). 
Consequently, de Hoogh preferred production control as a means of alleviating 
overproduction. 
de Hoogh (0-020, E-006) rejected the far-reaching ideas of the early proposals 
to change the logic of support in the CAP in order to favour small farms and 
extensive production, arguing that the prices in the common market should 
correspond to the situation of those who produce efficiently and cheaply — an 
understanding widely held in the Netherlands. However, he defended direct 
income subsidies as a means of encouraging environmentally friendly investments, 
and to of protecting rural areas which are in danger of depopulation. 
de Hoogh's starting point of the special nature of the market in agricultural 
products also led him to reject the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. 
He condemned the use of export subsidies and the dumping of one's own 
surplus on the world market. It is equally important, he argued, to see that free 
trade on a world scale is a sheer illusion, and that the liberalisation of trade is 
also someone's deliberate policy and not a natural law which would result in 
growth in the world economy and thus bring welfare to ali alike. Here he 
distanced himself from the premises ofhis own discipline (agricultural economics) 
and from his own country as an agricultural exporter. 
Instead, he created himself a specific space in the agricultural policy arena 
by stating that he was an independent scientist (0-020) whose task was not to 
speak for his country but rather to defend those who had a weak voice in 
intemational politics. He was basing these arguments on the universal value of 
justice, and more precisely on the Christian values of the unity and responsibility 
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of the Creation.557 In my interview, he also blamed the scientific view of 
economics for being too reductionist, especially with respect .to values, for there 
are no facts without values and morality attached to them. Consequently, his 
arguments are not directed at particular audiences composed of his academie 
colleagues or even at Dutch agriculture, but at a wider, universal audience of 
(responsible) human beings. 
The Minister of Agriculture, Piet Bukman was also in favour of cutting 
overproduction in order to remain within the EU budget guideline, but he could 
not accept the idea of direct income subsidies as a- policy measure, since it 
would have been aimed at the producer instead of the product (0-016) and 
would, in his view, have represented a form of social policy which should not he 
allowed to become the heart of agricultural policy. Essentially, Bukman was 
defending the "old" price and market policy system against the policy detached 
from prices and production, proposed by Commissioner MacSharry. Bukman 
was in favour of using the old means of price policy, ‘and would have accepted 
even larger reductions in prices if needed. In political terms, he was against 
changing the mies of the game, because the new mies would not-be beneficial to 
the kind of agriculture he had in mind. This argumentation was supported by the 
farmers' organisations, which claimed that small farms that were in trouble 
should come within the sphere of social policy, while agricultural policy should 
he designed for efficient farms (e.g. E-014). 
Bukman defended the existing price policy by saying that giving 80% of the 
support to 20% of the purposeful farmers (doelmatige boeren) may perhaps not 
conform to the concept of a social policy, but it does comply with the concept 
that agriculture pro duces in an appropriate manner for the market. According to 
this argument, price support was not support in the same sense as direct income 
payments were. Again use was being made. of the .dissociative technique of 
argumentation: Bukman was claiming that Commissioner MacSharry was trying 
to introduce into the CAP elements which were in contradiction with its "real" 
logic. 
Bukman grounded his argumentation in the idea of a farmer primarily as.an 
entrepreneur, and agriculture as an enterprise. ,Hence the farmer is above ali 
active in economic terms. He argues that the only correct way of affecting the 
farmer's income is via the price of the product, because it is the only way of 
orienting agriculture further towards the market. This argument is based. on the 
premise that the market is something genuine, something that has the power of 
resolving the situation in a neutral manner. From the viewpoint of argumentative 
structure, we are dealing here with .an associative argumentation in the form of 
557Christian convictions are not rare among Dutch agricultural academics. Prof. de Hoogh is a 
Calvinist. 
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an analogy: 'the market' is a commonplace, topos, a locational metaphor so 
frequently used in economics that one hardly notices its rhetorical origin. 
Bukman and others who followed the same line of reasoning did not mention 
in this connection the various existing measures for manipulating the markets 
for agricultural products, i.e. the EU price regime, nor the potential for 
shortcomings in the ability of the market to channel information or benefits and 
disadvantages. In addition, not ali member states and their agricultural systems 
were in the same position with respect to benefiting from the internal EU market 
as the Netherlands as became evident in the Irish debate. The way in which Piet 
Bukman used the market argument was both a matter of influencing the manner 
in which the benefits of the CAP were divided up and a matter of defending the 
principle of price policy as the main CAP instrument. 
Bukman's reasoning was widely used in the debate both in the Netherlands 
and in Ireland, the farmers' organisation spokesmen being especially apt to use 
it frequently. This belief in the functioning of the market raised another crucial 
argument in the debate: that it was unjust and foolish to punish "efficient" 
producers and to reward "those who have done it badly' (degenen die het slecht 
hebben gedaan) (0-016) by giving up support through the price regime. 
Arguments of this kind conveyed a strange idea of efficiency, however, and this 
was sharply attacked by Commissioner MacSharry (0-056), who noted that 
competitiveness cannot be measured by the amount of money drawn from the 
EU farm budget ("... concurrentievermogen mag niet worden afgemeten aan de 
mate waarin iemand erin slaagt geld uit het landbouwbudget te halen"). 
Efficiency is a powerful and frequently used argument in agricultural policy. 
It leans on formal rationality, which measures the output in relation to the inputs 
and resources used (Weber 1922, 58-59). In itself, efficiency is a morally empty 
principle which is based on the idea of "more is better", and it always requires 
material quantification. Also, malicious deeds can be enacted equally efficiently. 
Efficiency covers only a thin layer of the meanings and values that people attach 
to agriculture, but it is favoured as an argument. 
When efficiency, or productivity when concemed with farms, is used as an 
argument, the conditions under which it is achieved are seldom discussed. If 
some inputs, e.g. energy, are not priced according to their environmental and 
social costs, our understanding of the efficiency of agriculture also becomes 
biased. The focussing of the discussion on productivity prevented recognition of 
both the negative and positive extemalities that could be reflected only in a full 
cost account of a production system. The extemalities caused by agricultural 
policy were kept apart from the market/efficiency discussion in the reform 
debate and were touched on separately. The way in which the Dutch used 
efficiency as an argument implied that their idea of efficiency was what took 
place in their country, which they were willing to use as a measure for the rest 
of the EU's agricultural sector as well. In this way the Dutch implicitly had 
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recourse to the associative argument strategy, suggesting that European agriculture 
is essentially like Dutch agriculture, or on its way to become so. 
Piet Bukman directed this argument at a particular audience of farmers, with 
the aim of strengthening the idea of a farm as an enterprise and persuading the 
farmers to behave accordingly. He referred to pork producers and market 
gardeners as examples of flexible market behaviour, and stated that this should 
also be the direction in other sectors of pro duction. 
The contradiction between thinking in terms of markets and in terms of 
intervention was also underlined by Prof. Gert van Dijk (E-024), who said that 
an intervention policy that concentrated on exporting bulk products could not 
take into account the complicated nature of food markets. The more farmers 
became dependent on intervention, the less their activities could react to the 
modern developments in the food trade led by the huge supermarket chains. 
These were relevant arguments in the Netherlands, where a significant proportion 
of the agricultural exports and the resulting income was derived from products 
which did not belong to the supported core of the common policy. In this sense 
they were clearly in a different position from the Irish, whose agriculture was 
primarily based on dairy products and beef, which are heavily supported by the 
CAP price and intervention mechanisms. 
Huiman held on more grimly than any other EU minister of agriculture to the 
opinion that compensation in the form of direct income payments was not 
welcome and that it ought in any case to be only temporary. This opinion was 
widely shared in the Netherlands at the beginning, but by summer 1991 many 
debaters had changed their mind. For example, Jan van Zijl, a PvdA member of 
parliament, could accept direct income subsidies on condition that the farmers 
achieved a certain performance level: in this way the compensation would not 
carry the image of social aid but be purely an economic measure (E-018). 
According to van Zijl, social aid could be regarded as another acceptable form 
of help, but it could be given only to the poorest regions. This was the means by 
which such an extraneous element could be included in the traditional agricultural 
policy reasoning. 
8.2.2. The Irish debate 
It was noted in the discussion on themes in Chapter 7 that the Irish first welcomed 
the reform as a means of giving more support to their "small and extensive" 
farms and then noticed that the Irish farms were not, after ali, particularly small 
or their operation always so extensive by EU standards, so that they changed 
their strategy to questioning the existence of structural overproduction. It was 
also a question of who had caused the overproduction and who, in the name of 
justice, should have been punished for of it. 
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While the Dutch interpreted the reform proposals as contrasting efficient 
farms with inefficient ones (e.g. 0-014), the Trish were more inclined at the 
beginning to see the same proposals in the terms of large and small farms (e.g. 
0-001,0-003, 0-112), or of intensive continental factory farms against extensive 
Irish "family" farms. Fairly soon, however, an article by Professor Seamus 
Sheehy appeared (E-002) which showed that Ireland will not gain from the 
reform under the conditions proposed but lose out: "... there is no joy whatsoever 
in this package for small and medium sized farmers who are not in cereal 
production, as is the case for most Trish farmers" (ibid.). 
At this point a discussion started over who was guilty of overproducing. A 
position widely held by the farming lobby and individuals close to it was that it 
was a result of "the East dumping its products on the West" (0-035), refiecting 
a situation in which "the EC's system of import control is the primary, underlying 
cause of most of these difficulties" (0-063, 0-077, 0-087, 0-122, 0-156, 0-
170, 0-178, 0-179). The IFA President, Alan Gillis (0-078), blamed the "fiood" 
of live cattle imports into the Community across the East German border from 
Poland as being directly responsible for forcing significant quantities of Trish 
beef into intervention "at heavy cost to the EC budget". This was again an 
argument based on a dissociative technique, showing that the truth had been 
misinterpreted by the Commission. 
Other voices, especially the UFA, the small farmers' association, argued that 
it was only the commercial sector that was responsible for overproduction 
(0-040, 0-120). They also complained that it was wrong to punish the small 
producers with supply controls, since the amounts they produced had no effect 
on an EU scale. This argument was clearly directed nationally. 
The same argument was also used, however, to protect the whole of Trish 
agricultural production against agriculture in the rest of the EU. The ICOS 
President, Billie Nagle (0-044), who represented the cooperative interests of the 
food processing industry, claimed that while Ireland was producing less than 
half of its "natural milk capacity", other member states were exceeding theirs 
with the aid of intensive feeding of cattle with cereals and cereal substitutes. 
Furthermore, he argued that the refonn proposal should have to take full account 
of "the fact that agricultural production in Ireland was frozen at a much lower 
percentage than in any other member states". Another version of this definition 
of the problem was the one put forward by the Fianna Fåil MEP Mark Killilea 
(0-058), for instance, who stated that "the small producers are not responsible 
for the problem; it is the factory farmers across Europe who have to be brought 
to a hait". The Minister of Agriculture, Michael O'Kennedy, also explained that 
the problems originated "in mainland Europe and further afield" (0-117), but 
admitted as well that Ireland should have reduced its dependence on intervention 
and expon funds long before that. 
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Intervention was a thomy subject for the Irish, but gradually louder and 
louder voices claimed that "the milking of the sacred cow of intervention can.not 
continue" (0-086), and that the Irish themselves should take responsibility for 
market disposal (0-101, 0-199). It also led some debaters to question the whole 
logic of agricultural policy: "In the CAP dictionary, terms such as intervention, 
aids to private storage (APS), export refunds and import relief give the impression 
of a market but the reality is they are terms for transferring billions of taxpayers' 
money as subsidies" (0-187). Commissioner MacSharry used this argument 
against his fellow countrymen, claiming that something was wrong if the returns 
available from intervention were higher than from the market. Furthermore, he 
provoked the Irish by asking (0-202): "Why do we always hear about 
intervention? Can we not go out and exploit the markets that are there?" 
During the MacSharry reform debate, stocks from Ireland accounted for one 
third of ali EU intervention stores of butter and a half of ali Irish beef production 
went either to intervention or to markets outside the EU which were only viable 
through EU export subsidies (0-086). The tone of the debate changed during the 
summer of 1991, however, from denial of the structural surplus problem into 
arguments for the special treatment of Irish agriculture (0-118, 0-123). 
The Irish strategy was based on a strong dissociative argumentation technique 
which underlined the unique nature of Irish agriculture by comparison with the 
rest of the EU (0-176, 0-179, E-022). The facts presented to back this claim 
were that the Irish economy as a whole was more dependent on agriculture and 
agricultural exports than that of any other member state, and that Irish production 
(especially of livestock) was more extensive than agriculture elsewhere in the 
EU. Furthermore, the demand for exceptional treatment was based on the effect 
that reducing grain prices would have on the comparative value of grassland, 
and in this way on the profitability of Irish agriculture (E-014, 0-140). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter on themes, the claim for exceptions in 
the reform became intertwined with the idea of Ireland's right to special protection 
in the EU, on the basis of social and economic cohesion558. This argument may 
seem to be a rather harmless tactic of trying to stand out from the rest of the EU 
countries in order to gain something extra, but it is an indication of a much 
larger phenomenon which reminds us of the fact that the EU was never established 
based on a tabula rasa. "Brussels never seemed to be able to convince itself that 
Ireland had a case for additional help, on the grounds that we entered as a 
severely under-capitalised country — something which was due to historical 
factors we were never able to control" (0-181). 
558 The argument was based on Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, which cites for priority those 
states where agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a whole. 
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The claims for justice in the form of additional help arose from earlier stages 
in European history — in this case from the time when Ireland was under British 
rule. This is an argument which it is easy to foresee the former socialist countries 
using when entering the EU, and is a healthy reminder of the complicated 
history of our continent, which is tightly interwoven into the fabric of every 
effort at integrating these economies. There is a lot of potential for such arguments 
in the Central and Eastern European countries, especially when it is a matter of 
reversing the progressive division of Europe into rich and poor groupings. 
Commissioner MacSharry, for his part, advocated strongly the idea of a more 
just division of CAP support, although in the end much of this dimension was 
diluted in the reform. The idea was based on the locus of quantity: what is good 
for the greatest number is preferable. 
There was signiflcant antipathy in both countries towards direct income aid 
as compensation for the price cuts. As one Dutch debater expressed it (0-015), 
direct income aid is in conflict with entrepreneurship and gives the image of 
poverty relief (bedeling). "Handouts would be even more false than intervention 
has been and they would be paying people to do less than they are capable of 
doing", as an Irish debater put it (0-156). It threatened to "destroy not just the 
economic, but the social and spiritual values of our people" (0-119), and it was 
"insulting to farmers who are being penalised for their efficiency" (0-201). The 
argument was that it was morally wrong to pay for something other than 
producing, since the farmer's dignity was based on his ability to produce food as 
an entrepreneur. This attitude has hardly altered very much, although direct 
payments are now everyday practice in the CAP. It implies difficulties and extra 
effort every time that new measures such as the French CTE-system559 are 
introduced into the farming community. 
The arguments used in the Trish debate were mainly directed from the farming 
community to the Commissioner or to the Minister for Agriculture and Food, 
and vice versa. One point worth noting by comparison with the Dutch debate 
was that the ideas expressed concentrated on Ireland's point of view and less on 
European agriculture as a whole. The Trish debaters took it as given that Ireland 
would be doomed to isolation due to its location on the margin of the Union. 
This attitude is one obstacle that will have to be overcome if the EU is to aim 
seriously at common policies and common politics. 
559CTE stands for Contrat Territorial d'Exploitation, a type of voluntary farming contract 
designed to bring a series of aid schemes together into a single package under the triple 
objective of maintaining and improving the economic, social and environmental contribution 
of farming to rural areas. It was introduced in 1999 as a means of promoting and funding 
agricultural multifunctionality (Contribution of France 1999, 8-10). 
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8.3. Rural issue 
The Commission states in its Reflections paper (CEC 1991a, 9-10) that rural 
development is one of the objectives of the reform: "Sufficient numbers of 
farmers must be kept on the land. There is no other way to preserve the natural 
environment, traditional landscape and a modern agriculture based on the family 
farm as favoured by the society generally. This requires an active rural 
development policy and this policy will not be created without farmers." 
8.3.1. Dutch debate 
From the Dutch point of view, the Commission carried the CAP to excess by 
seeing agriculture not as an economic sector, but as an integrated part of the 
countryside (E-004). Rural policy was an adverse element in the CAP, and will 
eventually cause it to come apart at the seams (daarmee uit zijn voegen barst, 
E-004). The Dutch were inclined to see here the interests of the southern 
member states, or of the electorate of Jacques Delors (E-005). In this respect, 
the tactics of the Dutch were to fight against including a dimension in the CAP 
which would not contribute to their idea of agriculture. 
The task for the Dutch concerning the rural issue was to show that rural 
problems should be taken care of by means other than agricultural policy (E-011). 
This began with sneering comments about Ray MacSharry as the hero of the 
small farmer. The Dutch could not take his suggestions seriously, because it was 
not rational to punish modern, remunerative farms (0-036, 0-039). Later, as 
these proposals did not disappear from the agenda, they were studied more 
seriously. One of the most prominent Dutch debaters, Sicco Mansholt (E-007), 
for example, was in favour of supporting areas that were in danger of 
depopulation, but he had doubts about whether the proposed means were the 
right ones for achieving this target. 
The rural issue was not debated much in the Netherlands, but the undertone 
was that one should take care of rural development by other means (E-020). 
Agriculture should not be turned into an open air museum in the name of rural 
development, it was argued (0-103). The analogy used here is designed to make 
the association of agriculture with rural development seem old-fashioned and 
reactionist. 
There were some debaters, however, who welcomed the proposed change in 
policy. This position was based on a more general criticism of the growth in 
farm size, the rationale of which was also questioned (0-042). This argument 
puts forward the idea that farming means more to the farmer than growth, so 
that some might even prefer being a boer (peasant farmer) rather than an 
ondernemer (entrepreneur). Likewise, some farmers expressed their support for 
the idea of maintaining rural vitality with CAP measures (0-104). Some months 
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before the final decision, most Dutchmen had accepted the idea of reducing 
cereal prices and compensating farmers with direct income aid. At this stage it 
was possible even for a liberal politician such as Piet Blauw (VVD member of 
the parliament) to defend direct income aid with a rural argument: "Het 
cultuurlandschap wordt gewaardeerd door de burger" (the citizens respect the 
cultural landscape) (0-126) in his attempt to persuade his particular audience of 
farmers to accept a shift from price policy to rural measures. 
The president of the farmers' organisation, Jef Mares (interviewed 1.11.1995), 
stated that integration of rural policy into the CAP was now unavoidable, not 
least because it was being promoted by France. Gerrit Meester, a senior civil 
servant at the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (interviewed 
6.11.1995), was doubtful about the rural dimension of the CAP, and maintained 
that the CAP was not originally designed to take care of rural problems, which 
should actually have their own policy, preferably a national one, since in his 
view it was hardly an EU responsibility. Professor Jerry de Hoogh put forward 
the same argument (interview 31.10.1995), as did the CDA MEP, Jan Sonneveld 
(interviewed 30.11.1995), who pointed out that this was also the idea of 
subsidiarity. According to him, the CAP had to he a market policy, and the 
additional aid for rural areas should come almost totally from the national 
budget. 
Sicco Mansholt (interviewed 30.8.1992) saw the growing importance of 
rural issues in the CAP, and was himself in favour of reducing producer prices 
to the world market level, combined with direct, hectare-based income aid as a 
reward for maintaining the rural landscape and social structure. In his view, the 
most important thing would have been to simplify the common policy. 
8.3.2. The Irish debate 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the rural issue figured more prominently in the Irish 
debate. In fact, it is possible to distinguish two main ways in which it was used 
by the Irish in their argumentation. The first one was to give more weight to 
agriculture by identifying it with rural values. Agrarian traditions were anchored 
in the nation's history and identity, and rural life was seen as qualitatively better 
than urban life (0-004). Moreover, the "traditional attachment to the land" (0-
098) was seen as an important factor affecting the behaviour of farmers. The 
countryside and agriculture were presented as one concrete value, a premise on 
which it was possible to establish arguments to defend the status quo. The 
understanding of the countryside as agriculture also included the idea of family 
farms as the.basis for rural communities (0-100, 0-135). As Lowe et al. (1999, 
21) have shown, the Irish interpretation of the rural issue uses rhetoric which 
stresses that people come first in the countryside: — the land must first and 
foremost be occupied and used for production purposes. Inefficient use of land 
176 
was an indefensible idea, it was argued (0-150): "... we must ensure our basic 
asset, land, was utilised to give that best possible result in terms of economic 
activity and employment ...". 
This was done by arguing that the suggested redistribution of funds in order 
to keep the optimum number of farmers on the land was a way of "maintaining 
the fabric of rural society" (0-003), and that "farming is the only way by which 
rural economies can be preserved" (0-004). It was also a way of defending aid 
for intensive farmers, because they "are the backbone of jobs in the farm 
services sector through buying manure, animal doses and technical advice" 
(0-021). The rural argument was also used against the Commission, by claiming 
that "it was hypocritical of the EC Commission to express an interest in rural 
development while, at the same time, cutting a lifeline to tens of thousands of 
farmers who could have no source of income other than from milk production" 
(0-033). When the decision was taken on the reform, the Irish were able to 
welcome the greater recognition afforded to the dual role of the farmers in 
producing food and managing the countryside (E-025), since the emphasis laid 
on these things by the EU was to a large extent in tune with the mainstream 
thinking in Ireland. 
A modem way of expressing agriculture-based rural development was 
promoted by Michael O'Kennedy (0-069), for example: "There will be some 
reduction in the number of farmers who are dependent exclusively on agriculture. 
However, to supplement their income we have launched the Rural Development 
Programme to make income from other sources a major component for that 
sector. A main element of that is the agritourism programme." He could see the 
possibility of a trade-off betvveen agricultural support and rural development: 
"Vastly increased funds are needed for rural development programmes if the 
damage caused by limiting agricultural production is to rectified ..." (0-162). 
The other way of using the rural argument was by distancing oneself from 
agriculture and interpreting the rural issue without starting out from agriculture 
as the nucleus of the countryside. This was done by showing the significance of 
other occupations for the vitality of rural areas, occupations which were 
"providing lasting jobs in the local economy and doing so without EC handouts" 
(0-060, for a similar kind of reasoning, see also 0-190). Some debaters were 
prepared to argue that the "future survival is the creation of indigenous 
employment opportunities not based on agriculture" (0-085), or in diversifying 
incomes in multiple ways (0-185). It was also argued that farm households 
themselves are not totally dependent on income from farming, but often have 
several sources (E-019). This is another way of presenting a more colourful 
picture of the countryside than the conventional image of farming gives. It was 
no longer especially radical in Ireland to suggest that "the only means by which 
we can hope to hait or reverse rural decline is by having more off-farm income 
and to a lesser extent altemative farm enterprises" (0-193). 
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In the interviews, ICMSA President Tom O'Dwyer (and his advisor Maurice 
Fitzpatrick, interviewed 9.7.1995) represented the "countryside as agriculture" 
view, complaining that the reform did not, after ali, pay enough attention to 
rural problems —and that it should have addressed the viability of family farms. 
He did not believe that would be possible to solve the problems with a separate 
rural policy, although the CAP alone was not capable of developing the 
countryside, either. Mr. MacSharry (interview 6.7.1995) was convinced that 
agricultural production could not be divorced from rural areas, and that their 
problems had to be tackled within the CAP. John Cushnahan, a Fine Gael MEP 
(interviewed 8.7.1995), was not inclined to see a separate rural policy as possible 
at the EU level, because it would probably take money away from the CAP, but 
he argued that the CAP had also been a regional policy at one time. He saw that 
EU investments in rural policy had been very modest up to that time. For Alan 
Gillis, the President of the IFA, later a Fine Gael MEP (interviewed 30.11.1995), 
rural issues were included in the CAP. According to him, the difference between 
US agricultural policy and the CAP lay precisely in the emphasis that Europeans 
placed on the rural people, whereas the US "just organises the market, and 
forgets the people". 
Michael Dowling, Secretary of State at the Department of Agriculture 
(interviewed 7.7.1995), saw rural decline as a political problem. In his view the 
EU already had a kind of rural policy that encouraged other sources of income 
to some extent, but agriculture was still the most important element in the rural 
economy. Professor Alan Matthews (interviewed 10.7.1995) saw that the EU 
was involved in a movement to bring about a real rural policy, both in its new 
formulations of the CAP and in the policies of the Structural Funds. He argued 
that people were prepared to provide agricultural support because they thought 
that it actually had something to do with the rural regions, and asked: "Why not 
make it explicit?" 
8.4. The environment 
The Commission, in its Reflections paper (CEC 1991a, 2), had set out a 
framework for taking the environmental aspect into account in the proposed 
reform, by stating that "a system which links support to agriculture to amounts 
produced stimulates production growth and thus encourages intensification of 
production techniques. This development, if unchecked, leads to negative results. 
Where intensive production takes place nature is abused, water is polluted and 
the land impoverished. Where land is no longer cultivated because production is 
less dependent on surface area, abandonment and wilderness occur." 
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8.4.1. Dutch debate 
The environmental consideration in the reform proposals was taken seriously by 
the Dutch, largely because the environmental problems entailed in agriculture 
had already been recognised as a national problem in the Netherlands. The 
agricultural pollution that had been experienced had detracted from the image of 
agricultural products among consumers, and thus threatened the market for 
Dutch produce. Before the Commission's proposals leaked to the public, there 
was a national suggestion that land should be freed from agriculture and turned 
back to nature, and also that premiums should be given to farmers who reverted 
to sustainable farming (De Werkgroep De Zeeuw I Albrecht, e.g. 0-001, 0-002, 
0-003). 
The most common reaction to the environmental problem in the debate was 
that it should be organised via the market: that the environmental component 
should be emphatically included in the model of a farm as an economic enterprise 
(e.g. E-008). Two essential features of Dutch agricultural policy thinking are 
embodied here: first, no matter what you confront, take it pragmatically; and 
second, deal with it through the market. As Jan Sonneveld, a CDA member of 
the European Parliament, put it (interview with J.S. 30.11.1995): "I hate too 
much, say, discussions on principles. Let's go practical. There is enough to do." 
The farmer organisations were well aware of the environmental problem, 
which in the Dutch case boiled down to the question of how to manage the 
manure supply (interview with Jef Mares, President of the Landbouwschap, and 
Henk Letschert, its head of international affairs, 1.11.1995). From the farming 
organisation's point of view, a technical solution for processing the manure was 
preferable (ibid.), although financial incentives were also welcome (E-009a). 
The more uncompromising opponents within the farming community (E-011, 
0-079) labelled both the environmental and the rural elements in the reform 
proposals as inappropriate (oneigenlijke kwesties) and maintained that actions 
other than agricultural policy measures should have been taken. In their view, 
arguments of this kind did not fit into the concept of agricultural policy. 
The MacSharry reform nevertheless proposed the extensification of production 
— reducing the amounts of fertilisers and pesticides. For the people of the 
Netherlands, this was like "cursing in church" (vloeken in de kerk) (Piet Blauw, 
VVD member of parliament, E-009a), but there were also debaters (0-080) who 
saw the farmer's interests as coinciding with extensification, and even with 
price cuts: given lower cereal prices, it is rational to use less inputs, which is 
good both for the environment and for the farmer's pocket. The proposed 
compensation would cover the drop in income. In fact, not very much 
compensation would be needed, because the saving in inputs would be beneficial 
to the farmer. The only thing that was needed was to convince the farmers. 
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The premise in the Dutch debate was, as before, an efficiently producing 
enterprise, which should grow rather than shrink in economic terms. When land 
is a scarce resource, as in the Netherlands, low-input agriculture and reasonable 
incomes for farmers were difficult to combine: this was the line of the reasoning 
(E-009a). The cereal growers in particular, being the most direct targets of the 
MacSharry proposals, criticised the combination of environmental measures 
and price reductions (ibid.), and farmers in general were afraid that environmental 
measures would affect them harder than producers elsewhere in the EU, because 
Dutch productivity was to a large extent simply a result of using more fertilisers 
and pesticides. The counter-argument was, however, that the farming community 
had to realise that the Dutch level of production entailed a cost disadvantage 
relative to other regions on account of its environmental problems (ibid.). 
The debate on environmental problems in agriculture is a case in point 
regarding the difficulty of integrating externalities into an agricultural policy 
that has been established around a pricing and market policy. The "polluter 
pays" principle is difficult to implement in agriculture, as producer prices are 
given. On the other hand, there had not been enough public money available to 
compensate for the loss of income if producers adopted more extensive techniques 
(E-019). It seemed to be difficult to treat environmental goods and services as 
agricultural commodities, since it was actually production methods that were at 
stake in this issue. These will be analysed as a non-politicised issue below. 
The environmental lobby argued that it was to the short-term advantage of 
agriculture to pollute the environment (0-078). Their advice was that both 
production and consumption should take place under conditions dictated by the 
environment. This order of values showed in practice that the interests of trade 
were being taken into account when agreeing on global mies for the environment, 
but that the environment was not a decisive element in trade negotiations such 
as the Uruguay Round. The Greens (0-109) argued that an unpolluted 
environment simply included qualitative advantages of a lcind which could 
never be translated into money, so that this could be used as an argument in a 
debate loaded with economic pre-understanding. 
Hardly anyone in the Dutch debate tried to deny the environmental problem 
in agriculture. The arguments were mostly directed at a farming audience, trying 
to persuade them to change their behaviour accordingly. The most commonly 
used tactic was to show that there had been a change in consumer expectations 
which had modified the product market in favour of "clean products" (e.g. 
0-054): "Dat duidt erop, dat schone producten kennelijk de sleutel zijn tot de 
markt van morgen." 
There were also those among the farmers who welcomed Commissioner 
MacSharry's proposals on the environmental issue as a sign of a new vision for 
agriculture (0-104). They took nature and environment as the starting point for 
agricultural policy and suggested that organic agriculture should be promoted 
180 
throughout the EU. This approach neglected one of the unquestioned givens of 
EU agriculture, namely that it should be able to compete with other regions on 
the world market. An interesting feature of the arguments put forvvard on the 
environmental issue was whether it could be included in conventional thinking 
with regard to the role and nature of agriculture, and whether it questioned the 
logic of the CAP agenda. Especially in the case of the Netherlands, this required 
a delicate approach, in most of the cases one which framed the question as a 
market/demand issue. 
8.4.2. The Irish debate 
If the Dutch saw rural problems as not concerning them very much, then it was 
the environmental issue that was somewhat remote for the Irish debate. The 
most frequent attitude was that the problems lay elsewhere, in the countries 
practising "intensive" production, whereas Irish agriculture was seen as the 
"most environmentally friendly agriculture in the EC" (E-002, 0-193, E-022a). 
Some debaters argued that it was necessary to take environmental problems 
seriously, because "the Green factor is definitely becoming an issue" in EU 
politics (0-027), and that it was an important argument for Ray MacSharry in 
his efforts at convincing "his fellow bureaucrats" (0-102). The reasoning was 
the following: intensive production methods had caused environmental problems 
(E-005), but the grass-based mode of production favoured in Ireland was extensive 
in character (0-044). 
The debate was based on the assumption that farmers were generally seen as 
"the guardians of the countryside" (an idea also promoted by Commissioner 
MacSharry when referring to EU agriculture, 0-067). There was some worry 
that the reform proposals would give rise "to a `them and us' syndrome with 
regard to countryside — with `farmers' supposedly as the threat and 
environmentalists' as the protectors" (0-055), something brought in from outside 
and intrinsically alien to Ireland. The idea of Irish agriculture drew on the 
traditional small-scale, pastoral nature of farming, and was promoted as a 
marketing image with the notion of "Green Ireland" (Lowe et al. 1999, 21). 
A case in point as far as the Irish environmental argumentation was concerned 
was the comment by Alan Gillis, President of the IFA, (0-200) that farmers 
have a more vital interest than anybody else in the protection of the environment, 
and that the reductions in farm support proposed by the Commission would 
slash farm incomes and prevent farmers from taking care of the land. According 
to him, the food industry was bound up with the ideal of a clean, wholesome 
environment. The proposed regulatory measures were portrayed in this 
dissociative argumentation as threatening the rural environment — contrary to 
the original intention. 
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Not everyone was so convinced about the environmentally friendly character 
of Irish agriculture, however. Ewe payments in particular were mentioned as 
liable to cause over-grazing and environmental damage, especially in mountainous 
areas (0-132, interview with Ray MacSharry 6.7.1995, interview with Alan 
Matthews 10.7.1995). Those who were in general critical of the CAP, also saw 
it as responsible for environmental pollution, in the form of runoff of fertilisers, 
fungicides, insecticides, slurry and dairy and silage effluent (0-154). 
In general, the Irish arguments on the environmental issue were fairly 
superficial, the broad ideology being that the countryside was best protected by 
safeguarding the position of the family farmers (Lowe et al. 1999, 20-21). 
Among the Irish, this argument could be directed as to convince the universal 
audience, for no other voices were strong enough to challenge this "fact" in the 
debate. 
8.5. A latent issue: Farm production methods 
The reform proposals introduced the issues of rural development and the 
environment into the official debate, adding new dimensions to the argument 
about agriculture, but they occasionally touched upon another question in addition 
to this, farm production methods. This issue had not yet been properly politicised 
in the debate, but it gained a lot of public attention later, mainly as a consequence 
of food security crises. As seen above in the overview of former CAP reforms 
(Chapter 4), new issues may be carried along in between the Iines, in a latent 
form, for quite some time before they become properly politicised on the CAP 
agenda. Consequently, we should take a brief look here at how the issue of farm 
production methods was non-politicised in the debate, and what moves were 
made towards widening the political agenda. 
8.5.1. The Dutch debate 
In the case of environmental problems caused by agricultural production, the 
way of not making an issue out of production methods was to limit the question 
to a technical one which could be solved by refining the existing production 
methods and not by changing them for something else. This was the logic of the 
Dutch when they spoke in favour of processing surplus manure industrially 
(interview with Jef Mares). 
The anti-environmental image was a real problem for the Dutch agriculture, 
though (E-003), and as it was especially damaging to the important markets in 
Germany, it was takenseriously. It was pointed out that consumers were becoming 
more critical as to the negative externalities caused by agricultural production 
methods (E-019), and that the crumbling image of agriculture was reflected in 
the numbers of students entering the agricultural university, so that demands 
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were made for more "green" education in agriculture (0-026). Young people 
did not seem to believe in the chosen path of agricultural technology, which 
helped to solve one problem but often simultaneously created new ones (ibid.). 
A growing need was perceived for knowledge about promoting human, animal 
and environmental-friendly agriculture, but the university was not in a position 
to meet this demand. 
Some interesting openings towards the politics of production techniques 
were made in the Netherlands, most naturally by interpreting these as changes in 
consumer thinking. This again can be regarded as a pragmatic reaction to a 
potentially controversial issue. In an article on new thinking in the agricultural 
world, H. de Boon (lid van de algemene directie van Cebeco-Handelsraad; 
E-008) argued that social priorities were undergoing change, and that new ideas 
were emerging on the place and role of man. He was inclined to see an oriental 
influence in these ideas about man, morality and the environment, which in turn 
affected both consumer behaviour and the politics of agriculture. He expected 
health concerns, food security and the ecologically responsible use of raw 
materials and production methods to gain more emphasis in agriculture as well, 
and addressed his argument to the farmers and the food industry, with a message 
that no matter what one ' s personal opinion of this may be, the future market will 
be of that kind. 
Professor Gert van Dijk, President of the Council for Co-operatives (NCR), 
who represented the marketing point of view in the debate, had concluded that it 
was in the interests of Dutch agriculture and horticulture to shift the debate on 
agricultural policy to a larger framework which included both trade, competition 
and environmental policy (E-024). This was one of the few explicit suggestions 
for repoliticising agricultural policy. 
Another open claim for changing the basis of agricultural policy came from 
Prof. Cees Veerman (E-031), who argued that what was at stake was more than 
a question of criticism based on environmental concerns, and that a debate on 
the functional place of agriculture had become unavoidable. The landscape was 
also a matter of values connected with nature and culture, while agriculture was 
a bioethical issue. The profit that could be achieved on the market was not the 
right measure of the economic value of production. He argued that rationalisation 
in terms of scale would yield results only at the expense of great sacrifices in 
terms of the environment, the landscape and rural vitality in Europe. The EU 
was, in his opinion, faced with crucial decisions, and a profound reorganisation 
in agriculture could be foreseen in the future, when new issues would be 
included in the policy. 
The Dutch preferred politicising the issue of production methods by 
channelling the "real scarcity" (werkelijke schaarste) of unpriced goods 
(environment and health) via the markets (E-022). Because of surplus production, 
international solidarity and environmental constraints, extensification and 
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integrated production were the right direction in which to proceed, but this 
implied that people would also have to be ready to pay more for higher-quality 
produce (ibid.). 
The most severe criticism of conventional production methods was, not 
surpfisingly, expressed by the debaters who were politically close to the Green 
movement (0-057, 0-109). They also paid more attention to animal welfare, 
and also to the environment and the interests of farmers in developing countries. 
Most proposals concerning the politicisation of production methods were 
thus made in connection with the environment, not questioning the animal 
welfare aspect, for example. In addition, these suggestions came mostly from 
academie circles, or from the marketing perspective. The arguments were 
addressed, first and foremost, at a particular audience of farmers, in order to 
persuade them to change their behaviour. The reactions to the suggested changes 
in production methods were often doubtful, however. For example, Prof. 
R. Rabbinge published research claiming that extensive production, which used 
less inputs, would be more competitive as such and would not require any 
support at ali (E-025). His computer model suggested that it would be sensible 
to move almost ali dairy production to the southern member states and to cease 
grain cultivation in the Netherlands as well. What would be left would be seed 
production, allowing considerably more land to be devoted to nature and 
recreation. The farming community blamed him for being too theoretical in his 
vision of the future. 
Although the heavyweight politicians were cautious on the subject of 
production methods, there were some remarks about the Minister of Agriculture, 
Piet Huiman, being worried at the criticism of intensive cattle breeding, so that 
he seemed to be ready to take measures to save the reputation of the sector 
(0-102). He started to arg-ue prudently in favour of "total quality insurance" 
which would cover the whole production chain, including the production method 
(0-147). His words were directed at the farmers, trying to convince them that 
"the adjusting and innovation capability of the agricultural sector has shown" 
("gezien het aanpassings- en innovatievermogen dat de agrarische sector in ons 
land heeft gelegd") that this is possible. 
8.5.2. The Irish debate 
Production methods were hardly touched upon in the Trish debate, mainly because 
they were approached via their environmental effects (0-202), and most debaters 
were of the opinion that the extensive agriculture practised in Ireland was 
particularly environmentally friendly (E-005, 0-115). Those who identified 
themselves more closely with intensive farming argued that extensive forms did 
not constitute a serious alternative, because they could not "feed the world" 
(0-142), but they were also aware that intensive farming had caused damage to 
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the public image of agriculture. This environmental issue was seen to be less 
relevant in Ireland than it might have been on the continent. 
Problems cormected with production technology were understood to have 
arisen elsewhere, in the Netherlands, for example (0-088). Organic farming has 
a potential for politicising conventional production methods, but this was not 
touched upon very much during the reform debate. It was mentioned only 
occasionally, as a market niche promoted by the Minister for Finance (0-068), 
for example, or even as something that would deny the farmers "opportunities to 
use their drive and entrepreneurial skills" (0-149). 
8.6. Conclusions 
The Dutch and Irish reform debates had slightly different profiles. The Dutch 
debate was firmly based on market and trade interests. Agriculture was primarily 
interpreted as a sector of the economy, even though it differed from other 
sectors to a greater or lesser extent. This engagement in the market did not close 
the framework as tightly as one might presume, however, for different aspects 
were included in market-based agriculture, and agricultural policy thinking can 
be described as fairly open. The academic debaters in particular, being remarkably 
numerous and well-informed, ventured to question the prevailing structure of 
Dutch agriculture and followed a division of labour in the debate which implied 
that they most often challenged the farming community, while the farmers' 
organisations , defended it. Politicians appeared in both roles, depending on the 
person and the situation. 
The Dutch debate seldom based its premises on agrarian values, whereas 
these were frequently used in the Irish debate, which also broadened agriculture 
to cover the politics of rural areas as well. For the Irish, agriculture was 
essentially a part of society, and more a matter of people in their rhetoric than in 
the Dutch debate: the tural people, family farms, "our children", or simply 
Irishness. It should not be forgotten that efficiency and market values were also 
strong arguments in Ireland, but they were combined with agrarian values, 
which were not used in the Dutch.argumentation. 
Where the subject in the Dutch debate whose future was primarily at stake 
was most often the farm as an enterprise, in Ireland it was the farming family, 
and the most powerful role in the Irish debate was that played by the farm 
organisation. Agricultural academics were less numerous, and although some of 
them were prominent individuals in the debate, their role in general was more 
one of feeding -in information for later use by farm leaders and politicians. The 
Irish politicians were fairly well-informed, and were also apparently in fairly 
frequent contact with the farming lobby, although this does not imply that they 
were always playing the same tune. Ex-commissioner Sicco Mansholt and 
Commissioner Ray Mac Sharry were prominent figures in the debate in their 
respective countries. 
185 
The way in which "morality" was used as an argument provides us with our 
final example of agricultural policy rhetorics. According to the discussion in 
section 3.3.3, the idea of what is moral and what is amoral is connected to 
premises conceming preferences: values, value hierarchies and their loci that 
are important and precious for the audience. In the Dutch debate, the participant 
who claimed that a permanent set-aside was "amoral" (0-135a), was basing his 
argument on efficiency as a value. Morality is frequently used to defend 
overproduction in agriculture. In an Trish example from this debate it was 
argued that "... the Community was lucky to have a supply of cereals in stock at 
a time when famine loomed in many parts of Africa" (0-212). This argument 
takes hunger as a question of the quantity of food, while it can just as well be 
seen as a distribution issue, or more generally, as a question of the biased 
structures of intemational trade. 
The analysis showed that just as there were several altemative ways of 
interpreting the situation of EU agriculture, so there were no uniform answers to 
the problems. The debate in both countries kept the CAP in its old framework, 
but only with an effort. Environmental problems, rural issues and intemational 
trade disputes, once taken onto the CAP agenda, unavoidably questioned the 
logic of its price policy and its productivist idea of efficiency. Even though the 
final reform was a watered-down version of the original proposals, it undeniably 
brought elements onto the CAP agenda, which were based on a new understanding 
of the role of agriculture in the EU. 
186 
9. Conclusion: Recognising choice 
9.1. Main findings 
The aim here was to outline the principles of CAP politics through an empirical 
analysis of a recent reform debate, and to envisage potential future qualitative 
changes in EU agriculture. The focus has been on the moments of recognising 
choice as moments of political action which include contingency and unintended 
results. 
An extensive account has been given in the foregoing chapters of the national 
debates that surrounded the MacSharry reform proposals in terms of an analysis 
structured by actors, themes and argumentation, focussing attention on situations 
and issues which included elements of choice. Broadly defined, the investigation 
explored the basic question of what kind of politics agricultural policy was at 
the time in question: what were the issues, who were the actors, who or what 
was the object of the policy, and what were the Iines of thought that agricultural 
policy discussions could be based on. Our inquiry into these dimensions also 
revealed what was not an issue, who were not actors, who or what were not 
regarded as relevant objects of the policy, and which conceivable Iines of 
reasoning were not used in the argumentation. One essential aspect of this 
approach is its dependence on context. These characteristics of agricultural 
policy can be assessed only in a certain space and at a certain moment of time, 
but conversely, they also reveal change in time and space. 
The work started with a review of ways of interpreting political aspects when 
studying agricultural policy. Different approaches entail different conceptions 
of politics, which in turn are capable of problematicizing the object of study in 
different ways. Mainstream research has explained agricultural policy in terms 
of pursuing interests, as a means of achieving given goals, and the approaches 
discussed here have contributed to our understanding of the articulation and 
promotion of interests in agriculture, and of the corporatist linkages that exist 
inside agricultural policy. They have concentrated, however, on certain arenas 
for action and certain groupings which have been understood to have direct 
interests in public policies with regard to agriculture. In this sense, these 
approaches have been inclined to formalise the policy setting and have given it 
perhaps too static an image. The instrumentalist view on politics the approaches 
discussed represent is highly policy-oriented: politics is about dealing with a 
given problem and finding a functioning solution to it. These approaches are not 
strong in recognising the moments of choice in situations where the problem can 
be constructed in different ways and where there is no single "right" answer. 
The benefit of understanding politics in instrumentalist terms is that it allows 
for clarification and simplification. The question I would like to raise in this 
study is that of how well the current discussion on agricultural policy can be 
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explained in the terms of interest politics. It seems that a lot of our present 
political action is channelled through other kinds of actors, such as non-
governmental organisations or individuals interpreting their personal choices as 
political acts. A lot of political action based on ethics or morality, for example, 
does not easily translate into interest politics. Likewise, many contemporary 
political actors shun traditional interest group politics and flnd or create other 
channels to express their ideas. It could be argued that we would be better off 
taking a closer look at what people say in practice about agriculture and including 
the complexity, inconsistency and incalculability of concrete political action in 
the inquiry. 
Methodologically, the investigation has been directed by the concept of 
politics as an action in a situation characterised by a plurality of actors, 
recognising controversy and operating with arguments. These characteristics 
were explicated in a large body of empirical material relating to the public 
debate on the CAP in Ireland and the Netherlands. The case study was placed in 
its context from two directions. First, the formation of the CAP was discussed in 
Chapter 4 as a part of European integration and its enlargement and deepening. 
The CAP had been established around the concept of common markets, and had 
started out as a policy for agricultural products, gradually coming to embrace 
measures focussed on production factors as well. Successive reforms and reform 
proposals served as critical junctures which brought to the surface new themes 
and arguments on agricultural policy, ending up — to a varying extent — with 
qualitatively new policy measures. One essential point to note is that the new 
themes were always politicised and the new arguments established gradually, 
appearing first as marginal notes in Commission documents and only later 
gaining status on the formal agenda. In this respect, the Commission was much 
more radical than the Council of Farm Ministers, where it may take years before 
even a watered-down version of the Commission's ideas can be agreed upon. 
Times, external pressures and exceptional moments — such as major enlargements 
or intensive periods of integration — have nevertheless changed, and these 
continue to shift the emphasis of the CAP. 
The primary concem with price support is reflected in the strong position of 
market and price regimes. The total expenditure on the price support is covered 
by payments made from the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, whereas the 
structural measures, financed from the Guidance Section, have always required 
a national contribution. Moreover, measures financed from the Guidance Section 
are less binding than the price regimes of the Guarantee Section, even when 
they are both legislated as regulations, which have recently become more common 
in structural policy, as well. Originally directives were used for Guidance Section 
measures. In addition, the budget share of the EAGGF is well protected, as it is 
labelled as compulsory expenditure, on which the European Parliament has had 
little say. 
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When the content of the CAP started to broaden beyond price and market 
regimes, the first structural measures were horizontal, i.e. they were the same 
for ali. It was the special measures for less-favoured areas that launched the idea 
of regional policy measures in the CAP. When Greece, Portugal and Spain 
became members of the EU, the promotion of economic and social cohesion 
was stated as a prerequisite for integration and, consequently for economic 
growth in the union. The new dimension of cohesion also placed the CAP in a 
new framework. Its official status made new arguments sound relevant to the 
debate on the CAP as well, and as shown in the Irish debate, such arguments 
were also used in politicking. The changes in the CAP are constantly related to 
EU integration in general, and should always be taken into account when trying 
to explain the politics of this process. 
The second contextualisation was carried out with respect to the case countries 
and to the GATT —negotiations that were going on at the time. The basic 
elements of the national settings consisted of political features and agriculture 
in the two countries. In addition, the countries differed in their history with 
respect to the EU and their location in it. The constitutional differences between 
a kingdom and a republic are of negligible importance, but divergences in party 
structure, in the culture of dealing with political issues or in the way in which 
local and regional topics are dealt with are more significant as far as their 
consequences for the discussion of agricultural policy are concerned. For a 
secularised observer it is a healthy reminder that arguments embedded in 
Christianity — or religion in general — may be relevant to the debate on agricultural 
policy. Both countries are engaged in exporting their agricultural produce, but 
on differing terms with respect to the CAP. The main problem for the Irish was 
their dependence on external markets and export subsidies from the CAP, 
whereas for the Dutch, who produced for the internal market, it was crucial to 
prevent the CAP rules from being changed in a way that would punish intensive 
production and reward aspects other than efficiency understood in a narrow 
sense. The discussion on the case countries was also aimed at giving a concrete 
idea of the complexity of the situation in which the common policy for agriculture 
should function and was supposed to have its intended effect. 
The final element of the case study context dealt with the world trade 
negotiations known as the Uruguay Round. Officially the CAP reform had 
nothing to do with these GATT negotiations, but a connection certainly existed. 
One may interpret it either that the MacSharry reform was necessary in order to 
reach a deal on the new rules for world trade, or that GATT was used for 
politicking inside the CAP; that it enabled a reform to take place which would 
have been necessary anyway. Be it as it may, the Uruguay Round placed trade in 
agricultural products on the same line as trade in other commodities, and attracted 
attention to agricultural issues from quarters other than the ministers of 
agriculture. Besides, the Uruguay Round introduced both new concepts into 
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agricultural policy, namely various measures that had the effect of distorting 
trade, and a new political game to be played with "green boxes" (non trade-
distorting policies) and "blue boxes" (payments linked to production-limiting 
programmes) and with the varying interpretations given to them. 
The empirical analysis concemed first the actors in the reform debate. Detailed 
information was gathered on who participated in it and who were mentioned as 
subjects or objects of the Common Agricultural Policy. The outstanding common 
denominator among the actors was that they were men. The absence of the 
deeds and words of women has been taken for granted in matters of agricultural 
policy. The second most common feature in both countries was the emphasis on 
farmers or their representatives. Ministers of agriculture were crucial actors in 
both countries, but the rest of the government was very much more active in 
Ireland than in the Netherlands. Similarly, the Taoiseach was an important 
debater in Ireland, whereas the Dutch Premier was not regarded as a competent 
participant. The group of party politicians participating was larger in Ireland 
than in the Netherlands, whereas an impressive amount of academics contributed 
to the debate in the Netherlands. The Irish farmers' organisations were very 
loud in the debate, and assumed a rather traditional pressure group role, whereas 
the Dutch Landbouwschap was less dominant and spoke with the voices of more 
individuals than the Irish IFA or ICMSA. The interests of the processing industry 
and trade were well articulated in the Netherlands, where the farmers appeared 
more often as objects of the policy than as active subjects. 
The Dutch debate did not include rural people, whereas they were clearly 
more often mentioned in the Irish debate, but as objects only. Farming families 
and farmers' wives existed in the Irish debate, whereas in the Dutch debate the 
farmer was implicitly a male entrepreneur. Farm animals were not included as 
objects of the policy, unless one counts carcasses. Ali in ali, the actor structure 
hints at a preference for discussing agricultural policy in the traditional terms of 
income policy, which is predominantly the farmers' business. There were only 
few references to taxpayers, consumers — let alone consumer groupings arising 
from differing tastes or from the politicising of production methods — , 
environmental organisations or animal welfare activists. It is interesting that 
women were so obviously absent, both as agricultural producers and as consumers, 
since it is they who most often buy the food consumed at home and are interested 
in diet and health. Differing tastes and the increased attention to agricultural 
production were discussed as themes, especially in the Netherlands, but the new 
actors attached to these themes were neither participating as subjects as yet, nor 
properly recognised as actors of full standing. 
As for the EU level, "Brussels" as a political actor had hardly any other face 
than that of Ray MacSharry. Other actors, or even any division of labour (and 
power) among the EU institutions and bodies, remained unclear or uninteresting. 
The status of "Brussels", however, was uncontested in the debate, although the 
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roles of the Commission and the European Parliament and their relationship to 
the Council of Farm Ministers were not explicated. If the EU wants to transform 
itself into a functioning democratic unit, it should pay more attention to giving 
flesh and blood to its political actors and those who take the decisions. 
The geopolitics of the two national debates drew demarcation Iines inside 
Europe. For the Dutch, the EU had a central European core in which the 
Netherlands is itself located, but the margins of EU geography were vague, so 
that smaller or more peripheral member states such as Luxembourg or Greece 
could easily be forgotten. Thus the division that explained European politics 
was that between the north and the south. For the Irish, however, Europe was 
divided into the West and the East, leaving Ireland itself with an "island-
identity" that left it separate from "the continent" and the rest of the EU. The 
Irish placed themselves on the periphery. 
The thematic analysis was concemed with the issues that were rendered 
political in the debate and appeared in thematic constructions. Both national 
debates were provoked by the same reform proposals from the Commission, but 
they led to differing deflnitions of the problem in the respective national contexts. 
The Dutch translated the problem into a purely economic matter, a problem for 
the EU budget and a question of efficiency. In addition, the Dutch interpreted 
the reform proposals in connection with the relationship between agriculture, 
the environment and nature. By contrast, the Irish debaters challenged the 
Commission's explanation for the surplus problem, arguing that the real problem 
was in fact illegal imports from Eastem Europe. Another central theme was the 
exceptional position of Irish agriculture and its right to receive special treatment, 
while the effect of the 'reform on Irish society as a whole, the countryside and 
the national economy was also an important theme. The issue of the environment 
was not rendered political in Ireland, but rather it was regarded by the Irish as a 
problem that could be conceived of only elsewhere in the EU. In addition to 
these different definitions of the problem, the Irish and Dutch also had similar 
themes in the debate, but they led to partly different emphases. Broadly speaking, 
the Dutch expressed their explicit ideas about the reform proposals less from the 
point of view of the Netherlands, whereas the Irish arguments concentrated on 
the Irish case, and seldom took sides with regard to EU agriculture as a whole. 
The Dutch were comfortable enough speaking on behalf of the whole of the EU. 
As for the argument structure analysis, the national debates had slightly 
different profiles. Arguments based on the premise of the primacy of the market 
and trade flgured prominently in the Dutch debates. "The market" was the 
master metaphor of the Dutch argumentation, although the economic rationality 
emphasis did not cause the Dutch agricultural policy to become totally closed. 
Rather, the Dutch stance was that it would be the best situation if ali decisions 
were based on (narrowly interpreted) efficiency, but as this was not the case in 
reality, as other aspects were included in agricultural policy, then they took the 
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new dimensions pragmatically. The main Dutch arguments were formulated in 
order to defend the existing logic of the CAP, which was based on price and 
market regimes. They were in favour of dealing with other issues by means of 
separate policies — an argument which ignores the influence of a price and 
market policy on the environment or on rural development. The Dutch thus 
opposed changing the rules of the game. As premises, the values of the 
environment and of nature were more obvious for the Dutch than rural or 
agrarian values. Rural areas had a very weak identity inside the Netherlands, 
whereas the arguments of the food industry and of trade in general were well 
articulated, and strengthened by the premise of agriculture as an economic 
activity only. 
The Irish arguments were largely based on the premise of justice. Their 
arguments concerned both the reason for production surpluses and the right of 
Ireland to receive special treatment, and exploited a wider range of premises 
than the Dutch arguments. Markets, entrepreneurship, economic efficiency and 
importance for the national economy were cornerstones in the argumentation, 
but they were often mixed with agrarian and rural values stressing a "green" 
Irish identity, a healthy rural family life, and the right of farmers to earn a 
decent living. The Irish argumentation had a more traditional agrarian surface, 
underneath which the line of thinking hardly differed from the Dutch one. This 
is not to say that the Irish rural arguments were sheer cosmetics for promoting 
agricultural interests, for the Irish reasoning on rural and regional problems and 
the options open for solving these was undeniably well developed and was seen 
in a broader context. The key Irish actors interviewed were nevertheless in 
favour of promoting rural development via the CAP. The Irish argumentation on 
environmental problems was fairly thin, as they had been lulled into the idea 
that this was not an Irish issue since their agricultural production was understood 
to be so extensive as to have very little impact on nature or wildlife. 
Considered from the point of view of European integration, the idea of a 
Common Agricultural Policy in Europe does not seem to have proceeded much 
further than the establishment of a common market for agricultural products. 
When I posed a question to the key informants about what is common in the 
Common Agricultural Policy, most of them found the question odd, and merely 
referred to the common markets. Indeed, this has to a large extent been the case, 
as the politics of EU agriculture has turned into a series of disputes about price 
and support levels and about favouring northern products over southern ones. 
The national debates showed that knowledge of other EU countries is rather 
poor, and even completely false arguments could be expressed in public about 
agriculture in other member states. Furthermore, the Irish were inclined to see 
their country as deemed to isolation due to its location on the margin of the 
Union, and Irislunen are most probably not alone in this feeling. No matter how 
the union enlarges in the future, some member states will always be situated on 
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the margin. This attitude of being left outside "the core" needs to be overcome if 
the EU is to aim seriously at common policies and politics. 
This analysis shows the debates in member states to be deeply embedded in 
national contexts, with different premises and perspectives that direct the 
argumentation and definitions of the problem. A common idea of European 
agriculture is only just emerging, as some elements for this kind of thinking are 
now traceable in the concept of multifunctional agriculture and in the European 
Model that the EU has promoted in the new round of WTO negotiations (see 
EuroChoices Spring 2001). One may argue that it will be only in connection 
with politicising agriculture on a broader basis than markets and price policy 
that a politically powerful idea of European agriculture can emerge. An 
agricultural policy that uses basically (micro)economic reasoning is a fairly 
narrow foundation for common politics, but there are signs that the horizon of 
the policy debate may be broadening. This idea will be pursued further in 
connection with the change in the CAP paradigm. 
Before taking a historical and predictive overview of politics in the CAP, I 
would like to draw attention to one of the fundamentals of politics in the view of 
Hannah Arendt: the plurality of actors. The conventional way of interpreting the 
politics of agricultural policy has been based on the contrast between producer 
and consumer interests. As discussed in Chapter 2, it has been shown that 
producer interests have been better organised than consumer interests. This 
observation is no doubt correct, but on the basis of the debate analyses it is 
possible to draw attention to other oppositions that are embedded in agricultural 
policy and only partly politicised. Contradictions taken as given easily exclude 
other possible ways of outlining opposition. The reform proposals lent greater 
visibility to the different situations prevailing for small and large farms, extensive 
and intensive farming, different products, and specialised farms versus combined 
farming, and thus politicised the agricultural sector from the inside. 
The contradiction between smaller and larger producers in Ireland was 
politicised by the establishment of the UFA, an organisation of small farms, 
while in the Dutch debate, the contradictions between the farmers and the 
processing industry (for example 0-137) and farmers and the food trade (see 0-
089, 0-124), and the farmers and their interest organisation (0-077) were raised 
as issues. The maun question here was that of who ultimately benefited from low 
producer prices and intensive production, and the hereditary answer was that 
neither the farmers nor the consumers benefited but the traders. It was argued 
that very often the farmers actually supported similar kinds of solution to the 
consumers or taxpayers, e.g. as less intensive production and more attention to 
animal welfare, but the farmers' organisations were loyal to the needs of the 
processing industry, often owned by the producers themselves. Furthermore, the 
recognition of these contradictions offered opportunities for politicking with 
different interests. This was only served to show that there was also much more 
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variety in interests, arguments and the framing of questions on the agricultural 
producer side than the discussion on agricultural policy normally recognises. In 
addition, the plurality and increasing number of relevant actors also implies that 
the perspectives of agricultural policy actors are becoming more and more 
incommensurable. This will increase the complexity of the policy. 
9.2. A paradigm change? 
If one takes a look at the politics of the CAP starting out from the MacSharry 
reform debate, one may anticipate that a paradigm change was gradually taking 
place. The CAP was created around a common market, administered with the 
help of price and market policies that were originally designed to suit the main 
(northern) products: milk, grain and beef. Simultaneously, the first policy 
measures with respect to the market were introduced, mainly directed towards 
improving processing and marketing structures. This choice was based on the 
income policy paradigm for agricultural policy, which meant in practice 
maintaining the level of incomes for farmers by guaranteeing the prices of the 
main products. Producers were interpreted as being the main actors, those for 
whom the policy should be designed. In an earlier study of Finnish agricultural 
policy in the structural change era (Vihinen 1990) I underlined the connection 
between the agricultural income policy paradigm and the construction of the 
welfare state and Keynesian economic policy, which emphasised the importance 
of demand for economic growth. There are exactly the same elements in the 
context of the early version of the CAP. The income policy emphasis led the 
prices to be set in such a way that it encouraged the growth of production in 
larger, more efficient farms. This development was stimulated by technical 
advances in production. 
Surplus production had already become a problem for the CAP in the early 
1970's, and the policy was also enlarged at that time to comprise the production 
factors: labour, land and capital. As the cost of the policy increased, it also 
became more important to accept consumers and taxpayers as potential actors. 
Similarly, farm workers and landowners were recognised, but none of these 
groups could displace the producers from their dominant position as the main 
actors for whom the policy was designed. In this phase, price and market 
regimes were complemented with socio-structural measures for investment aid, 
payments to outgoers and socio-economic guidance and training. The directive 
on less-favoured areas was the first measure which recognised the need for a 
regionally specified policy. Surplus production and the growing costs of the 
policy forced the EU to agree on production control, such as the milk quotas in 
1984, and on agricultural budgetary guidelines in 1988. 
The income policy paradigm of the CAP started to crumble in the early 
1990's. The establishment of direct income payments alongside price support 
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policies in the MacSharry reform initiated a shift that continued in Agenda 
2000. Both rural and environmental measures gained more status in these reforms, 
although the formulations given were by no means radical. In practice, the 
minimum standards for the agri-environmental measures of the MacSharry reform 
were set at low levels in the member states, and in some cases full support was 
paid to farmers for virtually no change in farming practices. Similarly, once 
taken onto the CAP agenda, rural development came to be interpreted in highly 
agricultural terms. Attempts to define rural policy more independently, as in the 
Cork Declaration of 1996, caused a political reaction from the farming 
community. One may conclude that, irrespective of successive reductions in 
producer prices, the price and market regime is still the core of the CAP, but it is 
being seriously challenged from a number of directions. 
First, supported prices have come under heavy pressure under the global 
trade policy: support has to be decoupled from production, to avoid trade 
distortion. This pressure is encouraged by the prevailing liberal ideology, which 
sees the key to economic growth in increasing economic liberalisation. In the 
long run, it becomes difficult to protect agriculture from these requirements if it 
is defined as just one sector of the economy. Secondly, as the welfare state 
project has given way to the construction of a competitive information technology 
society, the claiming of a reasonable income for a certain group has lost its 
power as an argument. In order to be regarded as acceptable, support for 
agriculture has to be based on different arguments, and conditioned by applying 
it to concrete tasks, e.g. regarding the environment, rural areas, food safety and 
quality, animal welfare or the ethics of production. 
Thirdly, a major challenge to the closed income policy paradigm has arisen 
from the consumers, and especially from differentiating consumer groups. On 
the one hand, EU legislation on agriculture has lagged behind public opinion, 
which has become more and more critical of the consequences of intensive 
modem farming for the environment, as became evident in the Dutch reform 
debate above, where the image of farming was so poor that it threatened the 
whole seetor. On the other hand, consumers' demands for food have differentiated. 
The basic need for cheap food has been satisfied to the extent that other qualities 
are increasingly gaining weight in consumers' choices. Products are differentiated 
according to their origins, regions or production methods. Consumer choices are 
also a part of the identity of a people, and consequently, the quality constructed 
in the product during production, processing and marketing is crucial. The 
interest shown nowadays in the quality of food — understood in a broad sense — 
has rendered farming practices political, at the same time as the choices connected 
with consumption itself can potentially be seen as political acts. 
Fourthly, and partly connected with what has just been said about citizens as 
consumers, various new political movements (as distinct from parties or interest 
groups) have questioned the way of speaking about agriculture and raised the 
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issues of nature and animal welfare, for example. Thinking of this kind politicises 
agriculture as a major interface between human beings and nature, and as 
representing our relation to biological processes in general. Issues concemed 
with sustainability, manipulation, ethics, morality and global development 
problems are translated into agricultural policy arguments. 
Fifthly, agricultural policy has also become to a larger extent a matter of 
using land, landscape, territory and space. Production methods modify the 
landscape differently, and as the demand for recreation increases, the landscape 
and nature values of the countryside increase. Another related issue is the 
unpriced scarcity of space, which is becoming recognised as people concentrate 
more and more into the major cities, which often lack the uniqueness still to be 
found in some parts of the countryside. What agriculture as a mode of production 
does to the space, and what citizens actually want from the space are gradually 
being translated into policies such as the French CTE, and more generally the 
idea of multifinictional agriculture. The concept of multifunctionality implies 
that, beyond its primary function of supplying food and fibre, agricultural activity 
can shape the landscape, provide environmental benefits such as land 
conservation, allow the sustainable management of renewable natural resources 
and the preservation of biodiversity, and contribute to the socio-economic viability 
of rural areas (OECD 2001, 9). 
These changes in the framework for the politics of the Common Agricultural 
Policy are presented in Figure 2, which should be read from top to bottom, 
including three phases, the last of which refers to the near future rather than to a 
current, well-established situation. There is no guarantee that the new elements 
in the CAP — rural development, environmental concems, animal welfare etc. — 
will become part and parcel of the policy in the long run. The only thing that can 
be said with greater certainty is that the EU price levels for agricultural products 
will be moved closer to the world market level. Whether this will take place 
along with a major qualitative change in the politics of the CAP still remains to 
be seen. So far, farm leaders and ministers in particular have been largely 
opposed to such change, mainly out of a fear that the new emphasis would be 
promoted at the expense of support for agriculture. While this fear is partly 
reasonable, the change can equally well be seen as a challenge to agriculture, 
which has faced many changes in the course of time. Alternatively, the change 
can be taken pragmatically, as it has by some of the Dutch debaters: no matter 
what we think about these trends, if the demand goes that way, we will follow. 
The qualitative change in the politics of the Common Agricultural Policy 
may be envisaged in the first place as having something to do with the policy 
being formulated more from the point of view of consumption issues. The 
consumer gives meanings to both food commodities and other benefits and 
services produced by agriculture (multifunctionality), and these meanings become 
the starting point for policy formulation. It is a question of what EU citizens are 
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ready to pay for. This is how, in the second place, the setting in which agricultural 
policy functions is changing towards a contract between society and agriculture. 
The income policy paradigm would thus lose its position as the framework 
for the policy, and as a consequence, the goal of safeguarding a reasonable 
income level for the producers would have to be adjusted to incorporate other 
goals and means. If production techniques do not become politicised properly 
and transformed into policy measures, it is also possible that agriculture will 
become a producer of low-priced raw materials for a powerful processing industry, 
with very little concern for, or restrictions on, the ethics of production. In that 
case, the "multifunctional" services of agriculture could be produced by other 
means. 
The global question at the moment concerning the conditions under which 
food is produced is that of biotechnology, especially genetically modified 
organisms (GM0s) and intellectual property rights such as patents, which can 
be used to restrict the use of naturally existing genetic material, both genes, 
organisms and species. One set of concerns has to do with the risks and 
uncertainties, and also the potential benefits, that are directly associated with 
the biological consequences of using pro ducts generated by such technologies. 
Another set relates to people's doubts, fears and hopes concerning the social 
and economic context in which these biotechnologies are being introduced and 
used, and the consequences they may have for social and economic development. 
These issues will have profound social consequences, in particular with regard 
to people' s rights to feed themselves the prospects for developing countries as a 
whole. One open issue is that the benefits appear to be low or non-existing for 
poor farmers and poor consumers, at the same time as the major corporations 
investing in these technologies are defending themselves by emphasizing the 
potential of GMOs to feed the increasing population of the world. The debate on 
agricultural policy in general and the CAP in particular is thus coming to 
concern increasingly broader issues, ones connected with ethics and morality. 
The change that is taking place is reflected not only in policy objects and 
measures, but in actors as well. The differentiation of consumer groups was 
discussed earlier. In addition, the traditional corporatist structure referred to in 
agricultural policy-making is losing ground along with the political modernisation, 
or "new governance" that is gaining ground in the EU. These concepts refer to 
the changing roles of the state, the markets and civil society, and to a development 
"from an initiating govemment to a withdrawal-of-the state" -logic paralleled by 
a shift "from regulation to communication strategies" (see van Tatenhove et al. 
2000, 6). The new governance implies a weakening of the nation-state and a 
change in its role which both weakens it as a part of the corporatist agricultural 
policy triangle and increases the significance of other actors. As a whole, it 
means that actors will be transformed and new kinds of actors will appear in the 
agricultural policy arena and have to be taken into consideration. Non- 
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governmental organisations (NG0s), for example, have gained in importance at 
the same time as traditional political parties (on the national scene) and nation-
states (on the international scene) have lost their status. In addition, the new 
governance refers to a change from "closed" policy-making to participative 
policy-making, from centralised to decentralised, and from command and control 
to contextual "steering". These changes in policy arrangements are likely to 
bring more actors into the agricultural policy domain, and to change the nature 
of policy measures. Another thing is that as new governance is understood to 
diminish the importanee of traditional political actors (such as political parties) 
and to channel more decisions via the market mechanism, it implies that instead 
of a political voice, citizens should he able to have impact on political issues by 
their market choice. 
At the moment a new political debate is going on in the EU about a major 
shake-up in farm policy. The Farni Commissioner, Franz Fischler, has recently 
argued (Agra Europe, May 11, 2001) that the current allocation of CAP money 
"no longer corresponds with public concerns about the priority needs of the 
rural sector" (ibid.). He is advocating a wider definition of rural aid and more 
focus on cross-compliance56° as a condition for aid, arguing that intensive 
production methods are simply becoming less and less acceptable (ibid.). The 
most remarkable novelty in his speech, however, was his long-term vision, 
arguing that "EU agricultural policy will in future be defined in decreasingly 
sectoral but increasingly territorial terms... Govenunent assistance will he granted 
only in return for clearly defined services on the part of farmers." 
Fischler's argument when defining the CAP more in territorial terms has 
broader implications. It is evidently connected with the deepening and enlarging 
process of EU integration. When the Central and Eastern European countries 
become members of the EU, the CAP in its present form will simply not he 
possible — either to finance, or to implement and control. Giving the CAP a 
more territorial and even a regional content will make it easier to finance, since 
measures of this kind are normally co-financed, in distinction to price and 
market regimes, which are financed totally from the EU budget. Moreover, 
Fischler's statement can he seen in connection with the widely held idea that 
European integration will lead to economic growth only under conditions of 
social and economic cohesion, that it carmot abide great regional disparities. 
The CAP will he in a crucial role for achieving cohesion. 
In the gradual process of European integration, the Common Agricultural 
Policy has become surrounded by other common policies. Simultaneously, the 
structure and powers of the EU institutions have been strengthened. If the EU as 
560Cross-compliance is used to refer to stricter environmental conditions being placed on farmers' 
payments. 
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a project is to proceed, it is likely that the future of the CAP will have to he 
envisaged more in relation to other policy sectors and that it will have to he 
given more of a shape that will contribute to deepening integration and increasing 
cohesion. This development would lead to similar results to those- deduced here 
from the internal trends in agriculture: it will become less of an income policy 
for farmers and more of a contract between agriculture. and society. 
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EG-ministers in Beetsterzwaag'. 
N-133 Trouw/1.10.91 'Boeren zetten ministers vast'. 
N-134 NRC Handelsblad/30.9.91 `Boeren belegeren ministers EG: "Wir wollen 
auch essen". 
N-135 Agrarisch Dagblad/1.10.91 `Boeren blokkeren landbouwtop'. 
N-136 Boerderij/1.10.91 `Seherpe tegenstelling dreigt Landbouwministers verdeeld 
over EG-hervormingen'. 
N-137 Boerderij/1.10.91 `Geen profeet in eigen land'. 
N-138 De Volkskrant/30.9.91 `Parijzenaars juichen boeren toe'. 
N-139 Algemeen Dagblad/30.9.91 `Boeren massaal tegen hervormingsplan'. 
N-140 Oogst/4.10.91 `Bulcman en MacSharry om tafel met actievoerders Veel 
publiciteit voor boerenprotest'. 
N-141 Agrarisch Dagblad/3.10.91 `EG-ministers eens over onderzoek agrificatie'. 
N-142 De Volkskrant/8.10.91 Sombere toekomst voorspled voor akkerbouwers in 
Noorden'. 
N443 Agrarisch Dagblad/12.10.91 `MacSharry voelt zich onbegrepen'. 
N-144 Agrarisch Dagblad/16.10.91 `Copa roept op tot acties'. 
N-145 Agrarisch Dagblad/17.10.91 `Deskundigen tegen pian-MacSharry'. 
N-146 Trouw/22.10.91 `Frankrijk gaat omin EG-landbouwdebat'. 
N-147 NRC Handelsblad/22.10.91 `Parijs bereid tot wijzigen van landbouwbeleid'. 
N-148 Het Financieele Dagblad/22.10.91 `Frankrijk en Duitsland steunen 
landbouwplan'. 
N-149 Boerderij/22.10.91 `Opdelen kent voordelen Boeren splitsen bedrijf om 
premie'. 
N-150 NRC Handelsblad/22.10.91 `MacSharry bemoedigd na Franse ommezvvaai'. 
N-151 Agrarisch Dagblad/23.10.91 `Buleman ziet wijziging in Duits en Frans 
standpunt landbouw'. 
N-152 Trouw/23.10.91 "Liever geen GATT-akkoord" Franse landbouwminister 
ontkent dat EG concessies doet aan VS'. 
N-153 Agrarisch Dagblad/6.11.91 `Alternatieven voor akkerbouwers na plannen 
MacSharry'. 
N-154 Agrarisch Dagblad/15.11.91 'LEL compensatie pian MacSharry 
ontoereikend voor inkomstenverlies'. 
N-155 Het Financieele Dagblad/21.11.91 `EG-landbouwhervorming en GATT op 
zelfde spoor gezet'. 
N-156 Oogst/22.11.91 `EG-socialisten achter MacSharry'. 
N-157 Oogst/22.11.91 'CLO's beraden zich op acties'. 
N-157a Agrarisch Dagblad/27.11.91 `Duits schap vreest inkomenssteun'. 
N-158 Agrarisch Dagblad/23.11.91 `Mares: protest landbouw stopt pian 
MacSharry niet'. 
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N-159 Agrarisch Dagblad/5.12.91 `Landbouwschap stelt visie op hervorming 
landbouwbeleid bij'. 
N-160 De Telegraaf/5.12.91 `Landbouwschap wijzigt standpunt'. 
N-161 Agrarisch Dagblad/4.12.91 `Copa heroverweegt pian MacSharry'. 
N-162 Boerderij/10.12.91 `Acties in hele EG'. 
N-163 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.12.91 `Voor Copa teit nu realiteit'. 
N-164 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.12.91 'Pian MacSharry treft klei-akkerbouw zwaar'. 
N-165 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.12.91 `Week van de waarheid voor Europese boeren'. 
N-166 Agrarisch Dagblad/12.12.91 'Europees Parlement neigt naar MacSharry'. 
N-167 Agrarisch Dagblad/11.12.91 'Van Rooy houdt kaken op elkaar voor jonge 
boeren'. 
N-168 Agrarisch Dagblad/17.12.91 `Verbeek neem CLO's op de korrel in boek'. 
N-169 Oogst/20.12.91 `MacSharry moet wachten op GATT'. 
N-170 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.1.92 `Portugal somber over Gatt en plan-MacSharry'. 
N-171 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.1.92 'Pian MacSharry benadeelt Groot-Britannie'. 
N-172 Agrarisch Dagblad/11.1.92 `Copa mag geen actie voeren in Brussel'. 
N-173 Boerderij/21.1.92 `Binnen maand besluit over landbouwhervormingen'. 
N-174 Financieele Dagblad/28.1.92 `Helft EG wil andere inzet GATT-ronde'. 
N-175 Agrarisch Dagblad/25.1.92 `MacSharry dreigt met prijsverlaging zonder 
compensatie'. 
N-176 Agrarisch Dagblad/28.1.92 `Copa niet gevoelig voor dreigementen 
MacSharry'. 
N-177 Het Financieele Dagblad/25.1.92 `Boeren willen duidelijkhid van EG over 
hervorming'. 
N-178 Trouw/29.1.92 `Hervorming landbouw onontkoombaar, maar EG geeft geen 
haast'. 
N-179 Het Financieele Dagblad/29.1.92 `EG-overleg vast in hervormingskluwen 
Landbouwministers zien ook van GATT-afspraken niets terechtkomen'. 
N-180 De Volkslcrant/31.1.92 `MacSharry kost EG jaarliks 20 miljard'. 
N-181 De Volkskrant/4.2.92 `EG-rapport pleit voor vrije landbouwprijzen'. 
N-182 Het Financieele Dagblad/31.1.92 'Pian MacSharry nadelig voor boeren ult 
EG'. 
N-183 Agrarisch Dagblad/6.2.92 `Belgische veehouders dupe pian-MacSharry'. 
N-184 Agrarisch Dagblad/8.2.92 `Woltjer: pian MacSharry zou tot doorbraak in 
Gatt leiden'. 
N-185 Agrarisch Dagblad/8.2.92 'Pian MacSharry 28 miljard duurder'. 
N-186 Het Financieele Dagblad/12.2.92 `Landbouwhervorming EG zit muurvast'. 
N-187 Agrarisch Dagblad/13.2.92 'Brits protest tegen pian-MacSharry'. 
N-188 Boerderij/18.2.92 "MacSharry" in gevaar Kosten bedreigen pian'. 
N-189 Oogst/21.2.92 `InIcomenstoeslagen, lagere prijzen en quotakortingen: Akkoord 
MacSharry in de maak'. 
N-190 Oogst/21.2.92 `Bukman: eerst Gatt, dan pas plan-MacSharry'. 
N-191 Agrarisch Dagblad/27.2.92 `Akkoord over pian MacSharry onzeker'. 
N-192 Financieele Dagblad/29.2.92 `MacSharry dreigt Bukman schaakmat te 
zetten'. 
N-193 Het Financieele Dagblad/28.2.92 `MacSharry wil nu besluit over 
landbouwplan EG'. 
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N-194 Agrarisch Dagblad/28.2.92 `LEI nuanceert kritiek op landbouwbeleid EG'. 
N-195 Boerderij/3.3.92 'De commissaris maant tot spoed MacSharry: ook zonder 
GATT toch hervorming'. 
N-196 Agrarisch Dagblad/29.2.92 `MacSharry bijt zich vast in eigen voorstellen'. 
N-197 Het Financieele Dagblad/5.3.92 `Duitse twijfels blokkeren eindspel EG-
landbouwhervorming'. 
N-198 Agrarisch Dagblad/5.3.92 `Mares laakt uitstel landbouwhervorming'. 
N-199 De Volkskrant/4.3.92 `MacSharry krijgt steun Frankrijk en Duitsland'. 
N-200 Algemeen Dagblad/4.3.92 `EG-landbouwoverleg mislukt Voorstellen 
MacSharry van tafel geveegd'. 
N-201 NRC Handelsblad/4.3.92 `EG-discussie over het landbouwbeleid volledig 
vastgelopen'. 
N-202 Trouw/4.3.92 `Duister EG-beraad over landbouwhervormingen levert weer 
niets op'. 
N-203 Financieele Dagblad/4.3.92 `MacSharry lijdt schipbreuk met 
hervormingsplan'. 
N-204 Boerderij/10.3.92 'Born onder "MacSharry". 
N-205 Oogst/6.3.92 `Poging tot MacSharry-akkoord totaal mislukt'. 
N-206 Algemeen Dagblad/12.3.92 `Verzer tegen MacSharry'. 
N-207 Agrarisch Dagblad/11.3.92 `Veldslag in Europees Parlement om plan-
MacSharry'. 
N-208 Trouw/13.3.92 `Landbouwbeleid Europa staat stil, prijsdaling voor 
graanboer'. 
N-209 Algemeen Dagblad/19.3.92 `MacSharry stelt bevriezingen van Europese 
landbouwprizen voor'. 
N-210 Agrarisch Dagblad/24.3.92 `Begrip bij PvdA voor prijsvoorstel MacSharry'. 
N-211 Boerderij/24.3.92 `Kritiek op prijskritiek MacSharry: boeren hebben zelf 
schuld'. 
N-212 Agrarisch Dagblad/21.3.92 `EG-voorzitter komt met mild voorstel voor 
prijsverlagingen in de landbouw'. 
N-213 Agrarisch Dagblad/26.3.92 'Nieuwe regering in Belgie tegen plannen 
MacSharry en Gatt'. 
N-214 Algemeen Dagblad/31.3.92 `Meningen over EG-landbouw blijven verdeeld'. 
N-215 De Volkskrant/31.3.92 `Tanend verzet tegen plannen MacSharry'. 
N-216 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.4.92 Tunha: alleen Belgie en Nederland nog tegen 
plan-MacSharry'. 
N-217 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.4.92 `Cunha voorziet snel besluit plan-MacSharry'. 
N-218 NRC Handelsblad/2.4.92 'Nederland geisoleerd in EG-landbouwoverleg'. 
N-219 Het Financieele Dagblad/1.4.92 Sukman blijft hardnekkig in verzet EG-
landbouwhervorming'. 
N-220 De Volkskrant/1.4.92 `EG-lidstaten starten onderhandelingen over pian-
MacSharry Bukman somber over landbouw-discussie'. 
N-221 Agrarisch Dagblad/1.4.92 `Onderzoeker RIVM: koppel milieubeleid aan 
plan-MacSharry'. 
N-222 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.4.92 Topa op demonstratie: plan-MacSharry veel 
duurder dan begroot'. 
223 
N-223 De Volkslcrant/8.4.92 Tarlamentariers bepleiten afzwakking hervormingsplan 
landbouw EG-parlement wil MacSharry afremmen'. 
N-224 Agrarisch Dagblad/10.4.92 `Koppige MacSharry blijft vasthouden aan eigen 
pian'. 
N-225 Agrarisch Dagblad/23.4.92 `Landbouwschap bezint zich op strategie 
MacSharry'. 
N-226 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.5.92 `Koers Bukman onacceptabel'. 
N-227 Het Financieele Dagblad/7.5.92 `Rinnooy Kan: EG-landbouwbeleid kan 
nationaal'. 
N-228 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.5.92 `Kritiek op standpunt schap pian- MacSharry'. 
N-229 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.5.92 `Schap staakt verzet tegen'. 
N-230 Agrarisch Dagblad/7.5.92 `Steun voor Nederlandse hervormingsvisie'. 
N-231 Boerderij/5.5.92 'Brede steun voor Bukman Verzet tegen plannen van 
MacSharry gebroken'. 
N-232 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.5.92 Schap niet tegen forse verlaging graanprijs'. 
N-233 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.5.92 `Landbouw niet verrast door ommezwaai 
Bukman'. 
N-234 De Volkslcrant/1.5.92 `Boeren voorzien "trammelant" . 
N-235 NRC Handelsblad/30.4.92 `Bukman haalt tactisch bakzeil bij hervorming 
landbouwbeleid EG Principiele bezwaren tegen directe EG-steun aan boeren halen 
het niet'. 
N-236 De Telegraaf/30.4.92 `MacSharry wijst Portugees graanvoorstel van hand'. 
N-237 Agrarisch Dagblad/8.5.92 `Landbouwschap zwicht voor politieke realiteit'. 
N-238 NRC Handelsblad/7.5.92 `Kosten voor het eerst onder helft van totale begroting 
Landbouwuitgave EG dalen volgend jaar met 9 procent'. 
N-239 Agrarisch Dagblad/8.5.92 `Landbouwcommissie Europarlement wil minder 
prijsdaling'. 
N-240 Oogst/15.5.92 `Wat MacSharry de boer kost, hangt af van compromis 
Landbouwraad De prijs van de hervorming'. 
N-241 Agrarisch Dagblac1/13.5.92 `MacSharry houdt vast aan daling graanprijs'. 
N-242 NRC-Handelsblad/12.5.92 `Uitgaven niet bevroren Landbouwplan van 
Nederland kansloos in EG'. 
N-243 Trouw/21.5.92 `Melk-affaire blokkeert EG-akkorrd landbouw'. 
N-244 Agrarisch Daglad/21.5.92 `Rusie over melkquota in EG'. 
N-245 Het Financieele Dagblad/21.5.92 `Melkproduktie Italie spil in EG-
landbouwhervorming'. 
N-246 NRC Handelsbld/20.5.92 'Green inkomenstoeslag voor melkveerhouders'. 
N-247 Het Financieele Dagblad/20.5.92 `Kritiek Rekenkamer op MacSharry'. 
N-248 NRC Handelsblad/19.5.92 'Europese boeren krijgen betaald om niets te 
doen'. 
N-249 Boerderij/26.5.92 'Kassa rinkelt voor de maisteler'. 
N-250 Boerderij/26.5.92 `Ommekeer in graanbeleid Prijsdalingen, premies en 
hectare-toeslagen'. 
N-251 NRC Handelsblad/22.5.92 `In buitenland worden acties voorbereid 
Nederlandse boeren zijn gemengd over akkoord'. 
N-252 NRC Handelsblad/22.5.92 `Weg vrij voor GATT na EG-akkoord'. 
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N-253 De Volkskrant/22.5.92 'Ray MacSharry zou eigenlijk dubbele Jameson's 
verdienen'. 
N-254 De Volkskrant/22.5.92 `Afspraak melkproduktie "zelfs niet aan een koe te 
verkopen" Mares noemt akkoord "matig". 
N-255 Boerderij/2.6.92 Tandbouwschap eist garanties voor hectaretoeslagen en 
premies'. 
N-256 Agrarisch Dagblad/4.6.92 'Onenigheld over kostenontwikkeling EG-
landbouw'. 
N-257 Agrarisch Dagblad/3.6.92 `Groeiende twijffels in EG over financiering 
landbouw'. 
N-258 Het Financieele Dagblad/3.6.92 'Nederland schrikt van financiele gevolgen 
EG-landbouwakkoord'. 
N-259 Agrarisch Dagblad/3.6.92 'Boer als natuurproducent'. 
N-260 De Volkskrant/6.6.92 Suiker Unie vreest gevolgen hervorming Europese 
landbouw'. 
N-261 Agrarisch Dagblad/6.6.92 `MacSharry wijst uitstel hervorming 
landbouwbeleid af. 
N-262 Agrarisch Dagblad/5.6.92 'Italie: rem op nieuw landbouwbeleid'. 
N-263 NRC Handelsblad/10.6.92 'Nederland wil landbouwakkoord wijzigen om 
kosten' 
N-264 Het Financieele Dagblad/10.6.92 'Nederland dreigt landbouwakkoord EG op 
te blazen'. 
N-265 Algemeen Dagblad/10.6.92 `Tumult over hervorming landbouw'. 
N-266 De Volkslcrant/10.6.92 'Den Haag, Londen en Brussel pertinent tegen extra 
stijging uitgaven Kok vindt landbouwakkoord te duur'. 
N-267 De Telegraaf/16.6.92 `Volstrekte impasse bij landbouwoverleg'. 
N-268 De Volkslcrant/16.6.92 `Twijfel remt invoering pian MacSharry'. 
N-269 Agrarisch Dagblad/16.6.92 'Franse boerenguerilla na landbouwakkoord'. 
N-270 Het Financieele Dagblad/12.6.92 `PydA eist uitsluitsel over 
landbouwuitgaven EG'. 
N-271 Agrarisch Dagblad/12.6.92 `VVD en PvdA: uitgaven voor landbouw 
bevriezen'. 
N-272 De Volkslcrant/18.6.92 `EG-ministers belonen Italiaanse boer vorstelijk voor 
wanprestatie'. 
N-273 Trouw/17.6.92 `Landbouwakkoord EG hangt op melkdorst en woedende 
boeren'. 
N-274 Trouw/18.6.92 Soosheid over bevoordeling van Italie bij melkquota'. 
N-275 Agrarisch Dagblad/18.6.92 `MacSharry staat in voor kosten van EG-beleid'. 
N-276 Algemeen Dagblad/17.6.92 `Akkoord over landbouw Italie over de streep; EG 
keurt hervorming good'. 
N-277 Agrarisch Dagblad/17.6.92 `MacSharry: kosten hervorming blijven binnen 
afspraken'. 
N-278 Agrarisch Dagblad/20.6.92 `EG wil controle op regelingen versterken'. 
N-279 Agrarisch Dagblad/20.6.92 `Mares: maispremie moet naar akkerbouw'. 
N-280 Boerderij/23.6.92 'Boer aan 't rekenen gezet Wat is voordeliger: premie of 
hectaretoeslag?'. 
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N-281 NRC Handelsblad/23.6.92 `Protesten splijtzwam in Franse 
boerenorganisaties'. 
N-282 De Volkslcrant/30.6.92 `EG kan groot deel landbouwgrond missen'. 
N-284 Agrarisch Dagblad/30.6.92 `Adviesraad: drastische sanering landbouw EG is 
overmijdelijk'. 
N-285 Trouw/2.7.92 `EG bekractigt "MacSharry". 
Frankrijk en Italie overstag, ondanks boerenprotest'. 
N-286 De Volkslcrant/2.7.92 `Italiaanse kwestie nu los van "MacSharry". 
N-287 Algemeen Dagblad/2.7.92 `EG-landen bekrachtigen hervorming landbouw'. 
N-288 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.7.92 `Schap helpt met uitwerking landbouwakkoord'. 
N-289 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.7.92 `Bukman volhardt in verzet quotumuitbreiding 
Italie'. 
N-290 Agrarisch Dagblad/2.7.92 'llervorming van EG-landbouw unaniem 
akkoord'. 
N-291 De Telegraaf/2.7.92 `Comite fel tegen Italiaanse melk'. 
N-292 Agrarisch Dagblad/11.7.92 `Tijd begint te dringen voor uitwerking van 
landbouwakkoord'. 
N-293 Boerderij/14.7.92 `Quota per boer of per regio?'. 
Opinion articles 
0-001 NRC Handelsblad/2.11.90 `Duurzame landbouw is mogelijk'. 
0-002 PZC/3.11.90 `Natuurgebied verdubbelen met premie milieuvriendelijk boeren 
Ruzie Gabor en Mansholt over nieuw landbouwplan'. 
0-003 NRC-Handeslblad/3.11.90 Stellingen voor nieuw landbouwbeleid'. 
0-004 Dagblad voor Noord-Limburg/8.11.90 `Boeren vragen terecht om een 
meerjarenperspectief Landbouwhervorming vraagt om samenhang en 
klaarheid'. 
0-005 Algemeen Dagblad/9.11.90 'Europees boer zal concurrentie nooit 
aankunnen'door Ir. L.G. Oldenburg. 
0-006 Elsevier/10.11.90 'Het grijze protectionisme'. 
0-007 Het Financieele DagblacV14.11.90 `Milieuheffing landbouw? Wijffels:ja, 
Mares: nee'. 
0-008 NRC Handelsblad/19.11.90 `Het landbouwestablishment predikt revolutie 
"Verlos de boer van de zorg voor de natuur". 
0-009 De Volkslcrant/20.11.90 `Liberalisering van landbouw is catastrofaal voor 
boeren'door Herman Verbeek. 
0-010 De Volkskrant/22.12.90 `Prijsverlagingen ondeugdelijk instrument tegen 
landbouwoverschotten Sicco Mansholt: "Men is hardleers, daar in Brussel'. 
0-011 Boerderij/18.12.90 `Rervorming EG-landbouwbeleid bedreigt Nederlandse 
boer'. 
0-012 Het Financieele Dagblad/14.12.90 `Landbouwschap vindt voorstellen EG-
commissaris MacSharry "ramp". 
0-013 De Telegraaf/14.12.90 `Landbouwschap verbijsterd na plan EG-topman'. 
0-014 De Volkskrant/14.12.90 'Europees budget voor landbouw moet fors omhoog 
Inkomen boeren komt dicht bij nul door pian MacSharry'. 
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0-015 NRC Handelsblad/13.12.90 'Europees budget voor landbouw moet fors omhoog 
Inkomen boeren komt dicht bij nul door pian MacSharry'Nieuwsanalyse. 
0-016 Boerderij/2.1.91 "Alles kan" 100 dagen Bukman als minister van Landbouw'. 
0-017 Trouw/15.1.91 `Landbouwschap is gerust: "desastreus" EG-pian is 
kansloos'. 
0-018 FEM/Jan'91 `Revolutie in de landbouw Slinkende subsidies veranderen het 
Hollandse landschap'. 
0-019 Agrarisch Dagblad/15.1.91 'Europees Commissie verdeeld over 
hervormingen'. 
0-020 Reformatorisch Dagblad/14.1.91 `Bijzondere kenmerken van landbouw maken 
overheissteun noodzakelijk "EG mag probleem landbouwoverschot niet 
afwentelen op rug van anderen". 
0-021 De Telegraaf/14.1.91 `Bukman hekelt Ierse plannen landbouwsteun'. 
0-022 De Volkskrant/14.1.91 `CDA wil debat met Bukman over pian MacSharry'. 
0-023 Agrarisch Dagblad/12.1.91 `Andriessen pleit voor ander landbouwbeleid'. 
0-024 Het Financieele Dagblad/12.1.91 `EG wijkt niet van haar bestaande GATT- 
mandaat'. 
0-025 Trouw/14.1.91 'Bukman tegen EG-voorstel om grote boer aan te pakken'. 
0-026 Trouw/16.1.91 `Nederlandse landbouw heeft behoefte aan "groene" 
deskundigen'. 
0-027 Oogst/18.1.91 'Breed front tegen pian MacSharry'. 
0-028 Agrarisch Dagblad/16.1.91 `PvdA vreest steun lidstaten voor plannen 
MacSharry'. 
0-029 Agrarisch Dagblad/16.1.91 `Copa: jonge boeren stappen uit landbouw'. 
0-030 Vrij Nederland/19.1.91 'De laatste ronde voor de GATT: een bont 
gezelschap strijdt over steun en subsidies'. 
0-031 Leeuwarder Courant/16.1.91 `CBTB-voorman Doornbos: "Plannen 
MacSharry nauwelijks serieus". 
0-032 Het Financieele Dagblad/21.1.91 `Andriessen opent`aanval op 
landbouwplan'. 
0-033 De Telegraaf/22.1.91 `EG driegt onze boeren te straffen'. 
0-034 Boerderij/22.1.91 `Geen kop in MacSharry's zand'. 
0-035 De Telegraaf/19.1.91 'Europese landbouw wordt soort sociale bezigheid'. 
0-036 Oogst/18.1.91 `MacSharry als held van de kleine boer'. 
0-037 Reformatorisch Dagblad/17.1.91 `Boeren moeten van publiekrechtelijke 
organisaties af, want ze werken in hun nadeel Landbouwschap is tegen 
subsidiering van kleine boeren, maar dat is onrechtvaardig'. 
0-038 Agrarisch Dagblad/24.1.91 `Plannen MacSharry zijn te provocerend'. 
0-039 Boerderij/ 29.1.91 Storm van kritiek op plannen MacSharry 
Landbouwbeleid EG gaat op de kop, maar de vraag is hoe'. 
0-040 Agrarisch Dagblad/26.1.91 `Twijfel over pian Delors/MacSharry'door 
Haagse Hobbels (Marianne Vogelaar). 
0-041 Agrarisch Dagblad 25.1.91 `Oud-nainister Braks: pian MacSharry 
bedreigend'. 
0-042 Haagse Courant/30.1.91 `Agrarier ontdaan van belangrijkste groeifactor 
Radicale wijziging van landbouwbeleid Europa'door Ben Haat 	tinan. 
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0-043 Leeuwarder Courant/2.2.91 `MacSharry biedt uitkomsf door 'Kat' en 
Koren'Willem Stegenga. 
0-044 PZC/31.1.91 `Landbouwbeleid lijkt op Januskop'. 
0-045 Boerderij/12.1.91 `Ontgoochelde akIcerbouwers zelf op zoek naar een uitweg 
Een jaar na de acties'. 
0-046 NRC Handelsblad/13.2.91 `Landbouwbeleid EG is uit de hand gelopen' 
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